Smith v. Zant’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[Jjudicial economy might be served in the following situation: at the new sen tencing trial conducted in state court, a life sentence might be imposed, and petitioner might decide to accept that sentence without returning to the district court to seek relief from his conviction by litigating the unadjudicated claims that challenge his conviction. 16 He might accept a life sentence, for instance, if he fears that a second trial to determine his guilt would again result in a conviction [of capital] murder, thereby subjecting him once more to a possible death sentence in the sentencing phase that would follow. In such a situation, petitioner might request the district court to dismiss his outstanding habeas claims, and the litigation would end. Even if petitioner fears reconviction for the offense of [capital] murder, however, he might not accept the life sentence and thereby end the matter.... [Petitioner might] make an argument— sufficiently meritorious at least to require consideration by a court — that once a life sentence is imposed in the resen-tencing trial originally ordered by the district court, the state is thereafter precluded from seeking imposition of the death penalty after a new trial on the [capital] murder charge. See, for example, the debate between the majority and Justice Harlan, in North Carolina v. Pearce, on the issue of whether the double jeopardy clause of the [F]ifth [A]mendment protects a defendant, once sentenced, from later imposition of a harsher s”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Clisby v. Jones

2. “The 'voluntariness' inquiry is concerned solely with the defendant's motive in waiving his Miranda rights. The 'knowing and intelligent' inquiry, on the other hand, does not look to the defendant's motive, nor does it consider post hoc the efficacy of the waiver; instead, the 'knowing and intelligent' inquiry focuses solely on whether the suspect understands what he is doing.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Blanco v. Singletary

3. “[A] court need only inquire into whether the defendant understood that he had a right “not to talk to law enforcement officers, to talk only with counsel present or to discontinue talking at any time,” and that “whatever he chooses to say may be used as evidence against him.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 249 F. Supp. 2d 1285 - Brown v. Crosby