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89 Ark. 160

Ayers v. Anderson-Tully Co.

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Decided January 11, 1909

Supreme Court of Arkansas · decided 1909-01-11

Robertson, Chancellor; Appeal properly lies from the order of the chancery court setting the judgment aside. Kirby’s Digest, § 1188. The only way a final judgment may be set aside in this State is by a strict compliance with sections 4431, 4432, 4433, 4434, 4435, Kirby’s Digest; 52 Ark. 316. Such orders are appealable. 22 N. E. 930; 12 O. St. 136; 46 N. W. 201; 20 How. Pr. 439; 38 Pac. 710; 19 Md. 234.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

affirmed · Decided 1909-01-11

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently May 2003 · most notably Raymond v. Young (1947), Blackstad Mercantile Co. v. Bond (1912)

32 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1ON REHEARING.

¶2Opinion delivered February 15, 1909.

PER Curiam.

¶3Appellant insists that the statutes of this State authorize a transfer of a case from the circuit court to the chancery court, or vice versa, by the plaintiff before the answer of the defendant is filed, without an order of the court directing the transfer.

¶4The statutes relied on are as follows:

“Section 5991. An error of the plaintiff as to the kind of proceedings adopted shall not cause the abatement or dismissal of the action, but merely a change into the proper proceedings by an amendment in the pleadings and a transfer of the action to the proper docket.
“Section 5992. The error mentioned in the last section may be corrected by the plaintiff without motion at any time before the defendant has answered, or afterward on motion in court.” Kirby’s Digest.

¶5We do not think that it was ever intended that the above quoted statute should authorize the plaintiff to transfer an action without an order of the court. The correction to be made by the plaintiff, provided for in section 5992, means an amendment to the pleadings, and does not refer to the act of ordering the transfer. That must be done by the court, and the court in which the action was originally brought retains it until the transfer is ordered.

¶6But, even if the statute could be construed as meaning what appellant contends, the separation of chancery courts from circuit courts abrogated the statute to that extent. It is absolutely inconsistent with the orderly proceedings • of these courts that, after an action has been regularly instituted in one of them, it should be transferred to -the other by the act of the plaintiff except by a dismissal of the action and commencement of a new one.

¶7The Legislature in 1893, enacted a statute providing that “in cases required by law to be transferred from or to the law side of the circuit court such cases shall be transferred from the circuit court to the chancery court, and from the chancery court to the circuit court in counties wherein chancery courts are established.” Kirby’s Digest, § 1282.

¶8This statute must, we think, be construed to mean that in all cases where under former statutes it was' proper to transfer from the court to the other the right to transfer should exist, and that the proper court should order the transfer; not that the plaintiff could move the case from one court to the other at will.

¶9Rehearing denied.

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