89 Md. App. 488 - Matthews v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1991
Citation profile
2 district · 14 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently April 2019
2 district · 14 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (§ 287 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))
Relies on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte · United States v. Mendenhall · United States v. Matlock · United States v. Robinson · Illinois v. Rodriguez
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Mrs. Metz invoked her statutory right not to testify and it was honored. We construe the statute to mean exactly what it says, that a husband or wife shall not be compelled “to testify as an adverse party or witness.” Mrs. Metz was not compelled to testify and there was therefore no error. We are not persuaded that we should otherwise construe the specific and unambiguous language of the statute or convinced that we have the power, in any event, to depart from what we believed, to be the clear legislative intent. We do not find that it was the legislative intent to exclude statements, otherwise admissible, voluntarily made by one spouse to police officers, simply because that spouse refuses to testify against the other. We hold that Code, Art. 35, § 4 [now § 9-106] does not preclude the admission of the challenged statements.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“As we are called upon to review the constitutionality of an allegedly consensual search, our standard of review is clear. We extend great deference to the fact finding of the suppression hearing judge with respect to determining the credibilities of contradicting witnesses and to weighing and determining first-level facts. With respect to the ultimate, conclusionary fact of whether the act of consent was truly voluntary, however, we are called upon to make our own independent, reflective constitutional judgment.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Prior to Ms. Matthews taking the stand before the jury, appellant objected to her testimony on both confidential communication and voluntariness grounds. Specifically with respect to confidential communications, defense counsel stated: “I want to state for the record my position regarding confidential communications. My client is not waiving any privilege that he has in having those confidential communications with this witness excluded.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.