89 Wash. 2d 217 - State v. Ruzicka’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 40 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Every person convicted of a crime shall be a competent witness in any civil or criminal proceeding, but his conviction may be proved for the purpose of affecting the weight of his testimony, either by the record thereof, or a copy of such record duly authenticated by the legal custodian thereof, or by other competent evidence, or by his cross-examination, upon which he shall answer any proper question relevant to that inquiry, and the party cross-examining shall not be concluded by his answer thereto.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 25 Wash. App. 830 - State v. Roberts · 89 Wash. 2d 236 - State v. Carter

2. “The object of a trial is not solely to surround an accused with legal safeguards but also to discover the truth. What a person is often determines whether he should be believed. When a defendant voluntarily testifies in a criminal case, he asks the jury to accept his word. No sufficient reason appears why the jury should not be informed what sort of person is asking them to take his word. In transactions of everyday life this is probably the first thing that they would wish to know. . . . Lack of trustworthiness may be evinced by his abiding and repeated contempt for laws which he is legally and morally bound to obey . . . though the violations are not concerned solely with crimes involving "dishonesty and false statement."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 31 Wash. App. 352 - State v. Anderson · State v. Wayne Kelley

3. ““[W]e do not believe allowing the prosecutor to impeach a defendant through the introduction of the defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes constitutes an impermissible burden on the defendant’s right to testify. Although there are other factors which the jury may consider in weighing the defendant’s credibility, such as his demeanor and motivation to lie, this does not lessen the value of the defendant’s prior criminal record as a further factor for the jury to consider. Because introduction of a defendant’s prior convictions on cross-examination for impeachment purposes is thought to serve a useful purpose in helping the jury to weight all of the evidence before it, RCW 10.52.030 cannot be construed as being a penalty imposed on a defendant’s right to testify on his own behalf. “Not all burdens placed on the defendant’s choice of whether to testify constitute impermissible penalties on his exercising his constitutional right to testify on his own behalf. For example, the police may obtain a statement from the defendant which violates his Miranda rights. Although his statement cannot be introduced in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief, if the defendant chooses to testify the prosecutor can use the defendant’s statement for impeachment purposes. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Riddell v. Rhay, 79 Wash.2d 248 , 484 P.2d 907 (1971). In deciding whether to testify, the defendant must weigh the pros and cons of perhaps having ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. People v. Henry