Hurst v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 18 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A defendant's substantial rights include a right to sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the charge; and, if the amendment does not affect any particular defense or change the positions of either of the parties, it does not violate these rights.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. William E. Mays v. State of Indiana · Baker v. State

2. “"The ex post facto clauses prohibit Indiana from enacting a law that "imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then preseribed.'" Goldsberry v. State, 821 N.E.2d 447, 464 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (quoting Spencer v. O'Connor, 707 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied ). The focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether the legislative change causes a disadvantage. Id. Instead, we must determine whether the change "increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable" or "alters the definition of criminal conduct". Id. We have previously stated that the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto criminal sanctions require that criminal proceedings be governed by the statutory provision in effect at the time of the offense. Settle v. State, 709 N.E.2d 34 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). This suggests that in this case we should apply the version of I.C. § 35-34-1-5 in effect prior to May 8, 2007. We, however, have noted that the ex post facto clause " 'does not give a criminal a right to be tried, in all respects, by the law in foree when the crime charged was committed.'" Hayden v. State, 771 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977), trans. denied. The clause is not designed "to limit legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance." Id. "Even though it may wo”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Baker v. State · Brown v. State

3. “For'over twenty years prior to Fajardo , case law regularly’ permitted amendments related to matters of substance as long as the substantial rights of the defendant were not prejudiced, regardless of whether the amendments were untimely under I.C. § 35 — 34—1—5(b). On -January 16, 2007, our [s]upreme [c]ourt changed course and held that the statute clearly required amendments of substance to be made not less than thirty days before the omnibus dates, even if a defendant’s substantial rights were not prejudiced by the amendment. The legislature immediately responded to Fa-jardo by amending the statute, effective May 8, 2007, to reflect the pre-Fajardo law (ie., amendments of substance permitted anytime before trial so long as the defendant’s substantial rights are not prejudiced). Thus, Fajardo was superseded by statute in less than four months. This prompt return to- pre-Fa-jardo law indicates urgency in the legislature’s desire to negate the effects of Fajardo . Though the legislature did not expressly provide for retroactive application of the amended statute, we are confident that this was the clear intent of. such legislation.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jones v. Zatecky · Abernathy v. Gulden