Lemaster v. United States’s Empirical Analysis
891 F.2d 115 · 1989
Citation profile
14 federal appellate · 1 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently March 2014 · most notably Crowe v. Smith (1998), Runfola & Associates, Inc. v. Spectrum Reporting II, Inc. (1996)
14 federal appellate · 1 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 26 U.S.C. § 6901 · 26 U.S.C. § 7426 · 28 U.S.C. § 1927
Relies on Wrenn v. McFadden · Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. · G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States · Pavelic v. Marvel Entertainment Group · Texas State Commission for the Blind v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“All courts addressing this issue have concluded that mere survival of a summary judgment motion, in which all facts are construed in the non-movant’s favor, does not insulate the party from sanctions if it is later determined that all factual claims were groundless. Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir.1988), Rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Pavelic LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 , 110 S.Ct. 456 , 107 L.Ed.2d 438 (1989); Barrios v. Pelham Marine, Inc., 796 F.2d 128, 132 (5th Cir.1986). The mere fact that a judge declines to dismiss an action or grant summary-judgment on procedural grounds, or allows an issue to go to the jury for purposes of administrative convenience, does not preclude the imposition of sanctions or even constitute evidence that sanctions should not be granted, [citation omitted]”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“In dealing with the reasonableness of [plaintiffs’] actions, assuming that the government acted to pursue funds from an alter ego under section 6331, plaintiffs attempt to claim that their challenge to the government’s actions was reasonable because, at the time the suit was filed the legality of seizures from nominees without pre-seizure hearings was uncertain. We disagree. The Supreme Court resolved the alter ego seizure question, in the government’s favor, in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 , 97 S.Ct. 619 , 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977). The tactic of proceeding against the nominee of a taxpayer for the purpose of satisfying the taxpayer’s tax obligations had also been upheld by post-G.M. Leasing circuit court decisions. Loving Saviour Church v. United States, 728 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir.1984); Valley Finance, Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162, 171-73 (D.C.Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 , 101 S.Ct. 3007 , 69 L.Ed.2d 389 (1981). Given these facts, it was unreasonable to be lieve that doubt existed as to the legality of the government’s theory.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Mil-ross Ltd.,” operates in England today. 2 . Although Milton Ross’ son, Jason Ross, was president of Jaross for a short while, Milton Ross is currently the only officer and shareholder of Jaross. 3 . Whether the standard for successor corporations has been met is decided under state law. 4 . It is also well-settled that the IRS may seek to proceed against a nominee or alter ego of a taxpayer for the "purpose of satisfying the taxpayer's obligations.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.