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← 891 So. 2d 423 - Buford v. State

891 So. 2d 423 - Buford v. State’s Empirical Analysis

2004

Citation profile

15
cited by 15 later decisions
1
states following
December 2015
most recently cited

15 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on 471 So. 2d 485 - Faircloth v. State · 471 So. 2d 493 - Ex Parte Faircloth · 358 So. 2d 1040 - Bankston v. State · 391 So. 2d 133 - Dolvin v. State · 725 So. 2d 1063 - Price v. State.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"It is well settled that `[a] defendant cannot be convicted of both a capital offense and a lesser offense that is included in the capital charge.' Adams v. State , [Ms. CR-98-0496, August 29, 2003] ___ So.2d ___, ___ (Ala.Crim.App. 2003). See also Turner v. State , 924 So.2d 737 (Ala.Crim.App. 2002). Section 13A-1-8 (b), Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part: "`(b) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. He may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: "`(1) One offense is included in the other, as defined in Section 13A-1-9 .' "Such a double-jeopardy transgression implicates the jurisdiction of the trial court and must be noticed by this Court regardless of whether it was raised. See, e.g., Straughn v. State , 876 So.2d 492 (Ala.Crim.App. 2003) (opinion on return to remand and on application for rehearing); Borden v. State , 711 So.2d 498 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997), aff'd, 711 So.2d 506 (Ala. 1998); and Rolling v. State , 673 So.2d 812 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995)."”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““ ‘ “ ‘[t]he mere fact that a person witnesses a crime does not make him an accomplice.’ Nelson v. State, 405 So.2d 392, 397 (Ala.Cr.App.1980), reversed on other grounds, 405 So.2d 401 (Ala.1981). ‘The mere presence of a person at the time and place of a crime is not sufficient to justify his conviction for the commission of the crime.’ Dolvin v. State, 391 So.2d 129, 133 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), reversed, 391 So.2d 133 (Ala.1980). However, ‘if presence at the time and place a crime is committed, in conjunction with other facts and circumstances, tends to connect the accused with the commission of the crime, then the [trier of fact] may find the accused guilty.’ Dolvin, 391 So.2d at 137. ‘[Presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are circumstances from which one’s participation in the criminal intent may be inferred.’ 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 88(2)(d) (1961). Gibson v. State, 49 Ala.App. 18, 20 , 268 So.2d 49 (1972). [[Image here]] “ ‘ “Although mere presence at the time and place of a crime is not sufficient to justify a conviction for the commission of that crime, presence is a factor to be considered by the [trier of fact] in determining the guilt of the accused because ‘mere presence does establish a “material fact, which is the opportunity of defendant to commit the offense.” ’ German [v. State ], 429 So.2d [1138,] 1141 [(Ala.Crim.App.1982) ]. “ ‘ “To make one accused of a crime an accomplice, ‘the State must adduce some legal evidence implying that he”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “"`"Such facts as the defendant's presence in connection with his companionship, his conduct at, before, and after the commission of the act, are potent circumstances from which participation may be inferred." Sanders v. State, 423 So.2d 348, 351 (Ala.Crim. App.1982). However, "`"`[t]he mere fact that a person witnesses a crime does not make him an accomplice.' Nelson v. State, 405 So.2d 392, 397 (Ala.Cr.App.1980), reversed on other grounds, 405 So.2d 401 (Ala.1981). `The mere presence of a person at the time and place of a crime is not sufficient to justify his conviction for the commission of the crime.' Dolvin v. State, 391 So.2d 129, 133 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), reversed, 391 So.2d 133 (Ala.1980). However, `if presence at the time and place a crime is committed, in conjunction with other facts and circumstances, tends to connect the accused with the commission of the crime, then the [trier of fact] may find the accused guilty.' Dolvin, 391 So.2d at 137. `[P]resence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are circumstances from which one's participation in the criminal intent may be inferred.' 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 88(2)(d) (1961). Gibson v. State, 49 Ala.App. 18, 20 , 268 So.2d 49 (1972). "`".... "`"Although mere presence at the time and place of a crime is not sufficient to justify a conviction for the commission of that crime, presence is a factor to be considered by the [trier of fact] in determining the guilt of the accused because `mere presence does est”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.