Collins v. Zant’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

19 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[t]he Supreme Court has interpreted this category very narrowly and we do not believe that the [Jackson] rule . . . falls within the 'small core of rules requiring . . . procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty[,]'”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Bannister v. Delo · Flamer v. State of DE

2. “[i]n Teague , Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined Justice O’Connor’s opinion, which adopted Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity, but proposed a modification of Justice Harlan’s second exception. Justices Stevens and Black-mum concurred in the plurality’s adoption of Justice Harlan’s approach, but they explicitly rejected the plurality’s proposed modification of his second exception, especially in the context of capital cases. Justice White concurred only in the result reached by the plurality, which he described as “an acceptable application in collateral proceedings of the theories embraced by the Court in cases dealing with direct review” (such as United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 , 102 S.Ct. 2579 , 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982), Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 , 105 S.Ct. 1065 , 84 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985), and Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987)). Those direct review cases, however, did not address the specifics of Justice Harlan’s exceptions to the rule of nonretroactivity. We cannot, therefore, read Justice White’s concurrence as an endorsement of the plurality's adoption of Justice Harlan’s general approach and certainly not as an endorsement of the proposed modification of Harlan’s second exception. Thus, six Justices concur in the general application of Justice Harlan’s retroactivity analysis, but only four members of the Court support a restriction of Harlan's second exception.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Flamer v. State

3. “[a] second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Mains v. Hall