892 So. 2d 969 - Brooks v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “`In a criminal case a notice of appeal by the defendant shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 42 days (6 weeks) after pronouncement of the sentence.' Rule 4(b)(1), Ala.R.App.P. In the context of postconviction relief, the 42-day period runs from the date of the entry of the circuit court's order denying the Rule 32 petition. See Ex parte Potts, 814 So.2d 836 , 838 n. 1 (Ala.2001) (`This Court has held that the date of entry by the clerk, rather than the date the judgment is rendered, should be used when computing the time within which the notice of appeal must be filed.'). "In Symanowski v. State, 606 So.2d 171 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), this Court stated: "`An appeal must be taken in the manner and within the time prescribed by the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, or it is not taken at all. See Rogers v. Singleton, 286 Ala. 83 , 237 So.2d 473 (1970). [Ala.]R.App.P. 4(b) provides that in a criminal case the notice of appeal must be filed within 42 days of pronouncement of sentence, provided that the notice of appeal may be orally entered at the sentencing, or it must be filed within 42 days after the denial or overruling of a motion in arrest of judgment, motion for a new trial, or motion for judgment of acquittal filed within 30 days of sentence. "This 42-day period is to be applied uniformly....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 892 So. 2d 976 - Brooks v. State

2. “"`Considering the limited facts before us on this mandamus petition, we conclude that, through no fault of his own, Johnson has never been notified that his Rule 32 petition has been denied, even though it appears the petition was denied and even though he was entitled to such notification. The trial judge does not dispute Johnson's allegation that he has never received notification of the disposition of his Rule 32 petition, and the judge has presented no evidence suggesting that Johnson has received notice. On this state of the record, we must conclude that Johnson was not informed of the denial of his Rule 32 petition. "`We cannot deny Johnson his day in court simply because the trial court has not notified him of the disposition of his Rule 32 petition. See Weeks. Like the defendant in Weeks , Johnson asked, through the office of the circuit clerk, that he be notified of material developments in his case. Johnson was not notified that his Rule 32 petition was denied, and the 42-day period during which he could have appealed that denial has expired. We vacate the order dated May 15, 2000, denying Johnson's Rule 32 petition, and we direct the trial court to enter a new order and to promptly send Johnson notification of that order.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 892 So. 2d 976 - Brooks v. State

3. “"¹ That Court reversed that aspect of this Court's judgment affirming the denial of Fountain's first Rule 32 petition. "² Although Brooks's petition focuses on the fact that the trial court's order was undated, Brooks nonetheless argued that the order `denies the petitioner due process of law as it cannot be ascertained when the 42 days start or stop in which to appeal this undated order.' (C. 29. Petitioner's Opposition Response to the Respondent's Answer and Motion to Dismiss.)"”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 892 So. 2d 976 - Brooks v. State