Makinen v. PM P.C.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 district · 8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(a) If an employee covered by this act receives an injury under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the employer to pay damages, the employee if engaged in work for his employer at the time of the injury is not deprived of any compensation to which he is entitled under this act. He may also pursue his remedy at law against the third party or the coemployee to the extent permitted by W.S. 27-14-104(a). Except as provided by subsections (b), (e) and (f) of this section, if the employee recovers from the third party or the coemployee in any manner including judgment, compromise, settlement or release, the state is entitled to be reimbursed for all payments made, or to be made, to or on behalf of the employee under this act but not to exceed one-third (1/3) of the total proceeds of the recovery without regard to the types of damages alleged in the third-party action. Ml money received by the state under this section shall be credited to the worker’s compensation account and considered in computing the employer’s experience rating. (b) The director and the attorney general shall be served by certified mail, return receipt requested with a copy of the complaint filed in any suit initiated pursuant to subsection (a) of this section. Service of the complaint on the director and attorney general is a jurisdictional requirement in order to maintain the suit. The director and the attorney general shall be notified in writing by certified mail return receip”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Streeter v. Amerequip Corp.

2. “In order to determine whether the district court had jurisdiction over this case, we must construe the relevant portions of § 27-14-105. In construing a statute, we must determine whether the statute is clear or ambiguous. "[A] statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistency and predictability." Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 220 (Wyo.1991). "[A] statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations." 813 P.2d at 219-20 . "[W]hether an ambiguity exists in a statute is a matter of law to be determined by the court." 813 P.2d at 220 . If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory construction. Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772, 773 (Wyo.1991). The Makinens contend that the district court had jurisdiction over the case because they served the complaint on the director and the attorney general in compliance with the statutory notice requirement. They assert that § 27-14-105 is ambiguous with respect to when the complaint must be served upon the director and the attorney general, and they argue that service of the complaint is not required in order for the district court to obtain jurisdiction over the case. PM P.C. and Mr. Larscheid maintain that the statute is not ambiguous. They contend that, pursuant to § 27-14-”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Terex Corp. v. Hough

3. “[A] statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistency and predictability.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Terex Corp. v. Hough