¶1concurring.
¶2Although I wholeheartedly concur in the result reached herein by the majority in af*798firming the appellant’s conviction, I write sepai’ately to voice my opinion that the testimony of Officer Eric Bostrom was properly admitted by the trial court. The majority holds, on the other hand, that Officer Bos-trom’s opinion as to the causation of the fatal collision invaded the province of the jury and consequently was improperly admitted by the trial court, though amounting only to harmless error. Officer Bostrom was recognized as an expert witness in the field of accident reconstruction by the trial court after hearing the officer’s testimony as to his training and experience in the field. Bos-trom showed the jury a videotape and still photographs of the scene of the accident while explaining the measurements and mathematical formulas which he employed to ascertain the approximate speed and relative positions of the vehicles at the time of the collision. Bostrom was then asked to state, based upon his investigation, his expert opinion as to the cause of the collision. In my opinion, the trial court properly overruled the objection of the defense. Bostrom’s testimony was designed pursuant to KRE 702 to assist the jury in understanding the evidence and in making its determination of the degree of culpability to ascribe to the appellant should they find him guilty of wanton murder or any lesser offense. Officer Bostrom in testifying did not give an opinion as to whether the appellant was guilty of murder, manslaughter, or reckless homicide, all of which would indeed have been the exclusive province of the jury. Rather, he testified from his reconstruction of the accident as to how the collision occurred considering evidence of record that the appellant was intoxicated, traveling at a high rate of speed, driving his vehicle on the wrong side of Fifth Street, entering the intersection against the traffic signal, and striking the Simms vehicle. The opinion here was of the same character as that admitted with our approval in Wemyss v. Coleman Ky., 729 S.W.2d 174 (1987). There we held that a properly qualified witness may express an opinion that the failure of a driver to use a seat belt was a contributing cause to injuries received in an accident.
¶3Such testimony, in my opinion, is far different than that proscribed by the Court of Appeals in Kennedy v. Hageman, Ky.App., 704 S.W.2d 656 (1985), quoted by the majority opinion. As the Court stated, there the trooper’s testimony was the equivalent of his giving an opinion as to whether or not a particular party was negligent.
¶4For the reasons set out above, I would not only affirm the conviction, I would also hold that Officer Bostrom’s testimony was clearly admissible.
¶5LAMBERT and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this concurring opinion by SPAIN, J.