Burgess v. Easley’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “An instrument conveying real property “must be subscribed and delivered by the conveyor....” Tex. PROp.Code Ann. § 5.021 (Vernon 1984) (emphasis added). Without evidence to the contrary, the law presumes a grantor delivers a deed on the date of execution and acknowl-edgement. Hicks v. Loveless, 714 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.); Lichtenstein v. F & M Nat’l Bank, 372 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tex. Civ.App.-Dallas 1963, no writ). When a grantor places a deed within the grantee’s control, intending it to operate as a conveyance, the grantee’s rights in the property vest. See Steffian v. Milmo Nat’l Bank, 69 Tex. 513, 518 , 6 S.W. 823, 824 (1888). The grantor’s delivery of a deed is as necessary as the grantor’s signing of a deed. See id; McGowen v. Montgomery, 248 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. CivApp.-Amarillo 1952, no writ). What constitutes delivery of a deed is a question of law. Whether there has been a delivery is a question of fact. Kuhn v. Downs, 208 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex.Civ. App.-Waco 1948, writ ref d n.r.e.).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Cullins v. Foster