Grossie v. Sam’s Empirical Analysis
894 F.2d 778 · 1990
Citation profile
15 federal appellate · 4 district · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 93 later decisions — most recently January 2024 · most notably National Gypsum Company Century Indemnity Co (2000), In the Matter of Phyllis Maxine Pence Appeal of Pacesetter Bank of Montpelier
15 federal appellate · 4 district · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 11 U.S.C. § 523 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. · City of New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad · Neeley v. Murchison · Lompa v. Price (In Re Price)
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 93 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(a) A discharge ... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt— (3) neither listed nor scheduled ... in time to permit— (B) ... timely request for a determination of dischargeability of such debt ... unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing and request.”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[A]ll constitutional due process requires ... is that [the creditor] have “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [him] of the pendency of the action and afford [him] an opportunity to present [his] objections.””
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Obviously, one of the purposes of Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) and sections 523(a)(3)(B) and 523(c) is to give creditors notice and an opportunity to be heard. Another purpose of the time references in these statutes, however, is to promote the expeditious and efficient administration of bankruptcy eases by assuring participants in bankruptcy proceedings “that, within the set period of 60 days, they can know which debts are subject to an exception to discharge.” See Neely, [v. Murchison ] 815 F.2d at [345] 347-48 [(5th Cir.1987) ]. Our construction of the rule and the statutes in Neely simply recognized that the purpose of the notice requirement is satisfied when the creditor has actual knowledge of the case in time to permit him to take steps to protect his rights. Under such circumstances, technical compliance with Rule 4007(c)’s requirement that the creditor receive thirty days notice of the bar date frustrates the expeditious and efficient administration of cases in the bankruptcy court and is unnecessary to provide adequate notice.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.