894 So. 2d 46 - Alston v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"It is the duty of the trial court to determine what weight should be given to conflicting testimony." Mason v. State, 597 So.2d 776, 779 (Fla.1992). "The reports of experts are `merely advisory to the [trial court], which itself retains the responsibility of the decision.'" Hunter v. State, 660 So.2d 244, 247 (Fla.1995) (quoting Muhammad v. State, 494 So.2d 969, 973 (Fla.1986)). Thus, when the experts' reports or testimony conflict regarding competency to proceed, it is the trial court's responsibility to consider all the relevant evidence and resolve such factual disputes. See, e.g., Hardy [v. State], 716 So.2d [761,] at 764 [(Fla.1998)] (citing Hunter, 660 So.2d at 247 ). "Where there is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion of the lower court, [this Court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the trial judge." Mason, 597 So.2d at 779 . A trial court's decision regarding competency will stand absent a showing of abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Hardy, 716 So.2d at 764; Carter v. State, 576 So.2d 1291, 1292 (Fla.1989). Thus, the issue to be addressed by this Court is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in finding [the defendant] competent to proceed in his postconviction proceedings. In addressing that issue, we are mindful that a trial court's decision does not constitute an abuse of discretion "unless no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court." Scott v. State, 717 So.2d 908, 911 (Fla.1998).”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Alston v. Department of Corrections · Peede v. State

2. “established that the relevant test for competency in the context of waiving collateral counsel and collateral proceedings in Florida is whether the person seeking waiver has the capacity to `understand the consequences of waiving collateral counsel and proceedings.'”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 974 So. 2d 365 - James v. State · 41 So. 3d 119 - Trease v. State

3. “[W]e also recognize that the state has an obligation to assure that the waiver of collateral counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Accordingly, we direct the trial judge forthwith to conduct a Faretta -type evaluation of Durocher to determine if he understands the consequences of waiving collateral counsel and proceedings. If the judge finds a proper waiver by Durocher, he shall report that finding to this Court and the instant petition will be dismissed. If, however, Durocher does not understand the consequences of his decision, the judge shall report that fact to this Court and CCR will be allowed to proceed on Durocher's behalf. The attorney general's office and CCR may attend the evaluation, but may not participate unless permitted to do so by the judge. If the Faretta -type hearing raises questions in the judge's mind about Durocher's competency, he may order a mental health evaluation and make a competency determination thereafter.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 41 So. 3d 119 - Trease v. State