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← 894 SO2D 679 - Ex Parte McCord-Baugh

Ex Parte McCord-Baugh’s Empirical Analysis

2004

Citation profile

13
cited by 13 later decisions
2
states following
September 2018
most recently cited

13 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Washington v. Davis · Village of Willowbrook v. Olech · Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney · St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. Camp · Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. See Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commission of Webster Cty., 488 U.S. 336 (1989). In so doing, we have explained that ‘ “[t]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.” ’ Sioux City Bridge Co., supra, at 445 (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918)). “... The complaint also alleged that the Village’s demand was ‘irrational and wholly arbitrary’ and that the Village ultimately connected her property after receiving a clearly adequate 15-foot easement. These allegations, quite apart from the Village’s subjective motivation, are sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““[u]nless a motion for summary judgment challenges the existence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, the motion does not shift to the nonmoving party any burden to produce evidence supporting that essential element, and the motion will not support a summary judgment grounded on an absence of supporting evidence or the existence of undisputed countervailing evidence on that essential element. Kennedy v. Western Sizzlin Corp., 857 So.2d 71, 78 (Ala.2003); Tanner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 874 So.2d 1058 , 1068 n. 3 (Ala.2003); Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health Servs. Found., P.C., 881 So.2d 1013, 1020 (Ala.2003); Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681, 683 , 69 S.Ct. 754 , 93 L.Ed. 971 (1949).””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.