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← 895 F.2d 563 - High Tech Gays

High Tech Gays’s Empirical Analysis

895 F.2d 563 · 1990

Citation profile

178
cited by 178 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
12
states following
November 2018
most recently cited

62 federal appellate · 28 district · 13 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 178 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently November 2018 · most notably Lawrence v. Texas (2003), Nissan Fire & Marine Insurance v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2000)

62 federal appellate · 28 district · 13 state decisions — followed in 12 states

880199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 10 U.S.C. § 925

Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · City of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living Center · Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al. · Bolling v. Sharpe

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 178 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[B]y the [ Bowers v. ] Hardwick majority holding that the Constitution confers no fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy, and because homosexual conduct can thus be criminalized, homosexuals cannot constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis review for equal protection purposes. [Citations.]”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[i]t would be quite anomalous, on its face, to declare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict [or heightened] scrutiny under the equal protection clause. More importantly, in all those cases in which the Supreme Court has accorded suspect or quasi-suspect status to a class, the Court’s holding was predicated on an unarticulated, but necessarily implicit, notion that it is plainly unjustifiable (in accordance with standards not altogether clear to us) to discriminate invidiously against the particular class---- If the Court [in Bowers ] was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.