898 So. 2d 790 - Lee v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 33 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"In this case, the trial court found that one aggravating circumstance existed-the appellant committed the capital offenses while he was engaged in the commission of a robbery or an attempted robbery. See § 13A-5-49(4), Ala. Code 1975. Because the jury convicted [Lee] of the capital offense of robbery-murder, that statutory aggravating circumstance was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, in this case, the jury, and not the judge, determined the existence of the 'aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.' Ring , 536 U.S. at 609 , 122 S.Ct. at 2443 . Furthermore, ' Ring and Apprendi do not require that a jury weigh the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances.' Ex parte Waldrop , 859 So.2d 1181 , 1190 (Ala. 2002). Therefore, there was not a Ring violation in this case."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 244 So. 3d 998 - Lee v. State · 990 So. 2d 931 - McGowan v. State

2. “"In this case, however, there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated. Although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the robbery-murder, there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he consumed that day at the time of the murder. Evidence that someone was drinking an alcoholic beverage is not evidence that that person was intoxicated. There was no `reasonable theory' to support an instruction on intoxication because there was no evidence of intoxication. There court did not err in not instructing the jury on intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time the robbery-murder occurred."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Stephens v. State · 930 So. 2d 550 - Pilley v. State

3. “' "In reviewing the reasonable doubt instruction, we do so in the context of the charge as a whole. Victor v. Nebraska ; Baker v. United States , 412 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1018 , 90 S.Ct. 583 , 24 L.Ed.2d 509 (1970) ; Williams v. State , 538 So.2d 1250 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988). So long as the definition of 'reasonable doubt' in the charge correctly conveys the concept of reasonable doubt, the charge will not be considered so prejudicial as to mandate reversal. Victor v. Nebraska ; Holland v. United States , 348 U.S. 121 , 75 S.Ct. 127 , 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Stanley v. State · Smith v. State