Angel v. McClean’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““If the respondent and his wife had left home together in the car, and an accident had happened through her negligence while driving, no one could seriously contend that he could recover for personal injuries or for damage to the car from the owner or driver of another car whose negligence had contributed to the accident. “We have reached the conclusion that the same rule applies under the facts in this case. When the respondent entered the car, he regained dominion over it and the rule' applicable under the statute in the absence of the owner ceased to apply. It was respondent’s car, he was present and had the legal right to control its operation, and the negligent conduct of the driver was imputable to him. The mere fact that he chose to sit on the rear seat and refrained from directing its operation did not change his rights or limit his liability.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Pearson v. Erb

2. ““In Turnpike Co. v. Yates, 108 Tenn. 428, 440 , 67 S. W. 69 , 72, this court quoted approvingly from A. & E. Ency. Law, Vol. 7, p. 448, as follows : “ ‘The true principle seems to be that, when a person is injured by the negligence of the defendant and the contributory negligence of one with whom the injured person is riding as a guest or companion, such negligence is not imputable to the injured person; while, on the other hand, it may be imputable when the injured person is in a position to exercise authority or control over the driver.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Howard v. Dewey Motor Co.

3. “'* * * Clearly, in such a case the owner (which is the wife in this case) by her consent and acquiescence selected her husband as a suitable person to, not only operate her car for her own purpose, but also to guard and protect her personal safety while traveling in her car with him as driver, and since the negligence of a stranger as her agreed chauffeur would be imputed to her, we conclude that the same principles should apply when her selected chauffeur is her husband.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Bartek v. Glasers Provisions Co.