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← 9 Cal. 3d 871 - People v. Dumas

9 Cal. 3d 871 - People v. Dumas’s Empirical Analysis

1973

Citation profile

424
cited by 424 later decisions
21
states following
April 2008
most recently cited

12 federal appellate · 3 district · 409 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 424 later decisions — most recently April 2008 · most notably 43 Cal. 3d 171 - People v. Ledesma (1987), 12 Cal. 3d 731 - People v. Hill (1974)

12 federal appellate · 3 district · 409 state decisions — followed in 21 states

19501973198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Katz v. United States · Carroll v. United States · Aguilar v. Texas · Chimel v. California · Coolidge v. New Hampshire

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 424 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"[O]ne of the primary purposes of [the knock-and-announce statute] . . . is to prevent possible violent responses that might be aroused in a startled and fearful householder suddenly confronted with unknown persons breaking into his home for unannounced reasons. The danger that such a confrontation will result in serious injury or death to the occupant, police officers, or innocent bystanders is obviously intensified when the householder is in possession of a firearm. Thus, where the police are aware of such a weapon, the case for requiring them to give notice of their authority and purpose becomes more rather than less compelling."”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““The pattern of prior decisions suggests that one of the most crucial determinants of the validity of warrantless searches is the nature of the place subjected to search. . . . The courts have implicitly recognized that man requires some sanctuary [such as the home] in which his freedom to escape the intrusions of society is all but absolute. Such places have been held inviolate from warrantless search except in emergencies of overriding magnitude. . . . Certain other places carry with them an expectation of privacy which, although considerable, is less intense and insistent. These places may be searched upon probable cause alone under circumstances of less demanding urgency. Still other sites are regarded as so public in nature that searches are justifiable without any particular showing of cause or exigency. 10 This hierarchy of protection arises not from the application of differing constitutional standards to various locales, but rather from an application of a single standard of reasonableness to all places in accordance with a fundamental understanding that a particular intrusion into one domain of human existence seriously threatens personal security, while the same intrusion into another domain does not.””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “Probable cause for a search exists where an officer is aware of facts that would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe ... the object of the search is in the particular place to be searched.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.