Volume 9 — Colorado Reports

<p>1. When goods in the hands of an assignee are attached by a creditor of the assignor, and the assignee interpleads, he is deemed to admit prima facie the legal possession of the attaching creditor, and the burden is upon the interpleading claimant to show a superior title in himself.</p> <p>2. In the absence of statutory prohibition, an assignor has the right to make such provision for the payment of attorney’s fees-for the necessary and proper execution of the trust; he may appoint an attorney, even his own attorney, assignee.</p> <p>3. Though the law does not favor preferences, it tolerates them, and in the absence of interdicting statutes, a debtor has the right to make preferences in respect to his creditors.</p> <p>4. A necessary consequence of all assignments is to hinder and delay creditors to a certain extent.</p> <p>5. The hindering and delaying meant by the law as vitiating an assignment is that hindrance and delay intended to be produced by the assignor through covin and malice, or for his own benefit and advantage.</p> <p>C. In such cases the question of fraudulent intent is a question of fact and not of law, but the court is not deprived of the power to pronounce the judgment of the law in any case upon the facts disclosed, whenever the duty so to do becomes apparent.</p> <p>7. Whenever an assignment contains provisions which are calculated per se to hinder and delay or defraud creditors, although the fraud must be passed upon as a questiomof fact, it nevertheless becomes tlie duty of the court to set aside the finding if in opposition to the plain inference to be drawn from the face of the instrument.</p>

<p>1. In an action against a corporation the plea of ultra vires is not to be understood' as an absolute and peremptory defense in all cases of excess of power without regard to other circumstances and considerations. The plea is not to be entertained when its allowance will do great wrong to innocent third persons.</p> <p>2. If a private corporation has accepted and retained the full benefit of a contract which it had no power to make, the same having been fully performed by the other party thereto, and if the transaction is of such a nature that the party thus performing will suffer manifest hardship and injustice, unless permitted to maintain his action directly upon the contract, no other adequate relief being at his command, the defense of ultra vires may be disallowed.</p> <p>Beck, C. J., and Helm, J., concurring specially.</p>

The complaint alleges that on October 6, 1881, William Stimson was the owner in fee of southwest quarter section 21, township 1 south, range JO west, in the county of Boulder, Colorado; that on said day he leased the same to the defendants for the purpose of mining for coal, and defendants took possession of the same; that by the terms of the lease it was provided that if said Stimson should sell the leased premises during the term of the lease, the said Stimson should pay…

The complaint sets out that on the 6th day of October, 1881, William Stimson leased to the defendants in error the southwest quarter of section 21, in township 1, range 70 west, in said county, for the period of four years and six months, for the purpose of mining for coal, under the conditions of said lease; that they had no knowledge of the location of the boundary lines of' said tract at the time of the leasing, and that they so informed Stimson, the defendant in the…

The defendant having made application for the government title to a certain placer claim, the plaintiff filed an adverse claim, and brought this action for a portion of the premises, to wit, “for one mill-site, two hundred and fifty feet square, * * * and the land for a millrace from said mill-dam * * * to said mill-site.” Trial by jury, and instruction by the court to find for the defendant. Verdict and judgment for defendant.

<p> Appeal from District Court of Lake County. </p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Petition for rehearing. The cause was tried upon an agreed statement of facts. This statement is, in brief, as follows: Ferdinand Jensen and William M. Bliss were engaged as partners in mercantile business at Denver, Colorado, and Deadwood, Dakota. The firm name, at the former place, was Jensen, Bliss & Co.; at the latter, it was Jensen & Bliss.

Original agreed case. In. the year 1883 the Farmers’ and Merchants’ Insurance Company was duly organized as a mutual fire insurance association under the following section of our insurance statute: “The provisions of this act shall not be construed to prevent any number of persons, not less than twenty, from associating together for the purpose of forming an incorporated company for the purpose of mutual insurance of the property of its members.

This was an original action in the supreme court, asking for mandamus on defendant, treasurer of Lake county, to accept and receive a county warrant issued prior to July, 1885, in payment of county taxes.

The plaintiff below, Mary Bohm, filed a complaint against the defendant, Magdalena Bohm, alleging the ownership and possession of plaintiff to twelve blocks of lots in Bohm’s subdivision of the city of Denver. That she claimed title in fee thereto, but that said defendant claimed an estate or interest therein adverse to the title of the plaintiff.

On motion to dismiss cause. The attorney who tried this cause in the court below and obtained the judgment for Pless, took a written assignment of one-half thereof as security for his fees. Upon the appeal this attorney employed Stuart Brothers, •and re-assigned to them one-fourth of the judgment to secure their fees. Stuart Brothers rendered valuable services and incurred some expense in connection with the appellate proceedings.

<p> Appeal from Superior Court of the City of Denver. </p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p> Error to District Court, Pueblo County. </p> <p>Motion to amend judgment.</p>

<p>1. Where the evidence in a criminal case is wholly circumstantial, it is error to instruct the jury that they need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of each link in the chain of circumstances relied upon to establish the defendant’s guilt.</p> <p>2. A charge containing two conflicting propositions of law upon a material point, one correct and the other incorrect, must be held erroneous, it being impossible to determine upon which proposition the jury relied.</p> <p>3. To prevent reversal for error in the charge, it must appear that the.</p> <p>prisoner could not have been prejudiced thereby. i. Where the title of a statute contains but one general subject, the addition in the title of subdivisions under that subject does'not render the act obnoxious to objection under section 21, article V, of the constitution.</p>

This suit was originally brought in the county court. The complaint alleges, in substance, that on the 29th day of March, A. D. 1880, the defendant Wagner leased to plaintiff certain premises in the city of Denver for the period of two years, to be used as a dwelling-house and saloon; that on or about the 1st day of April, A. D. 1880, the plaintiff entered into possession of the premises and opened a saloon therein; that he spent large sums of money in painting, repairing,…

<p> Appeal from District Court, Arapahoe County. </p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

This action was brought against the railway company by the defendant in error to recover damages for injuries received by him as a passenger in one of the railway company’s coaches while being carried therein from Pueblo to Canon City.

On rehearing. This case was originally brought in the county court of Laké county, where judgment by default was rendered against the defendant. The defendant appealed to the district court of Lake county, and filed therein his answer to the complaint. A change of venue was taken to Park county, where a continuance of the case was had on motion of the plaintiff.

This action was brought in the district court by appellee, under section 1031 of the General Statutes. Her husband, Eobert H. Ooe, was employed by appellants upon a certain mine belonging to them in Lake county. While in the discharge of his duties, Ooe was struck and killed by a bucket used to hoist earth and water, descending in the shaft wherein he was working.

<p> Appeal from County Court, Gunnison County. </p> <p>' The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The complaint alleges that the amount in controversy • does not exceed $200; that on the 18th day of July, A. D. 1876, Benjamin Lake and Henry J. Hawley recovered a judgment against one Alfred Rollins, before Harley B. Morse, a justice of the peace in Gilpin county; that on the 24th day of January, A. D. 1S77, an execution was issued thereon, delivered to a constable'of said county, and on tile 25th day of February, A. D. 1877, the same was returned indorsed that no property…

James F. Welborn, prior to December 1, 1881, was the proprietor of the premises No. 323 California street, in •the city of Denver, and with his wife occupied the same as his residence. He became indebted to the late E. P. Jacobson, and likewise to various other persons, and previous to December 1, 1881, conveyed these premises to Jacobson, but continued to reside thereon until April 1, 1882.

Proceedings were instituted in the court below in pursuance of the eminent domain act, for the purpose of condemning a right of way over premises under the control of plaintiff in error. In accordance with the statute, an order was obtained from the court for occupancy and use pending the condemnation proceedings.

This cause was originally brought in the county court. Judgment being there rendered in favor of the plaintiff, defendant prayed an appeal to the district court. The appeal was allowed under section 499 of the General Statutes.

This action was originally begun in the county court by appellee, against appellants, to recover the principal' and interest claimed to be due upon two promissory notes executed by the latter in favor of the former. These notes were set out in haec verba in the complaint, and the complaint further averred that they were due and unpaid. Defendants answered, denying the genuineness and due execution of the notes, and also denying that the notes were due.

The appellees were the plaintiffs below. The complaint alleges, in substance, that on April 1, A. D. 1881, the premises known as the “ Willamette Lode ” was part of the public mineral domain of the United States, and open to location; and that on said date Sarah J. Arden, Charles E. Lombard and William Olmsted began to sink a discovery shaft thereon, and on May 10, A. D. 1881, discovered a well-defined crevice, at a depth of more than ten feet from the lowest rim at the…

This action was brought by the appellee, Ernest Stahl, to recover the possession of the Lone Tree lode. His patent from, the government, under date of the 5th of November, 1878, reciting entry at the local land office at Central City, Colorado, on the 13 th day of April, 1873, shows his title in fee. The defendant Lee is the owner of the Argentine silver lode.

' The complaint alleges — First, that the plaintiff resides in the county of San Miguel, state of Colorado; second, that on the 10th day of July, A. D. 1883, at Mark’s ranche, in the county of Ouray and state of Colorado, the plaintiff deposited. in the hands of the defendant, as .stakeholder, divers sums of money, not exceeding the sum of $2,000, to wit, the sum of $885, to abide the event of wagers made between the plaintiff and divers other persons on the result of a…

This suit was originally commenced before George L. Sopris, a justice of the peace of Arapahoe county, by Balcom, the appellee, to recover of and from the defendants, George S. Lee and M. J. Lee, the sum of $250, claimed to be due said plaintiff upon the following due-biff: “December 20, 1882. “Due P. Balcom the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars, value received, with .interest at ten per cent, per annum after four months from date. “ George S. Lee, “M. J. Lee, per George…

<p>1. Under the statute the right of appeal from the county to the district court is conferred only upon the party against whom the judgment has been rendered.</p> <p>2. A motion filed after the adjournment of the court, and not acted upon, is not such an appearance as to give the court jurisdiction over the person filing the motion,</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court of San Juan County. </p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The complainant, in substance, alleges: That the plaintiffs and defendant Lizzie Neuman were the owners of a certain mining claim known as the “Atlantic Lode,” and that plaintiffs and said last-named defendant owned said lode in proportion as follows: John Dreifurst, an undivided one-third; Ben Werner, an undivided one-third; John Bernhardt, an -Undivided one-sixth; and defendant Lizzie Neuman an undivided one-sixth; that for the purpose of working and mining said lode in…

Indictment for larceny: * * * “ The grand jurors chosen, selected, impaneled and sworn, within and for the county of Arapahoe, in the name and by the authority of the people of the state of Colorado, upon their oaths, present that William Kollenberger and Charles Huff, late of the county of Arapahoe aforesaid, on, to wit, the 6th day of July, A. D. 1882, in the county of Arapahoe aforesaid, in the state of Colorado, — two calves, of the value of $15 each, the same being…

The appellees, Goodridge & Marfell, brought suit before a justice of the peace against the appellant, Rice, to recover upon a bill for lime furnished by said firm upon the order of one I. 1ST. Marcy. The original amount of the bill was $226.50, but it appeared to have been reduced to a balance of $169.50 by two payments credited thereon as made by the defendant, one of $25 and the other of $32.

Original proceeding for mandamus. Upon the petition presented, an alternative writ issued by order of the court. The matters averred in respondent’s return thereto constitute, in legal effect, a special demurrer, and in ordinary actions would doubtless be-pleaded as such. All facts essential to a correct understanding of the opinion are sufficiently stated therein.

<p>1. The legislature has no constitutional power to provide by law that the terms of the district court of a single county shall be held every year at a place designated in the act, which is not and never has been the county seat of such county.</p> <p>S. A juror who attends a court at a place where there was no legal authority for holding such court is not entitled to his fees.</p> <p>3. When a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional it is as if it had never been. And what is true of an act void in toto is true also as to any part of an act which is found to be unconstitutional.</p>

Bill for injunction. Judgment for defendants. Writ of error to the supreme court. -x * * * -» * -X -x -x -x * “An act to define county boundaries, and to locate county seats, in Colorado territory: “Be it enacted by the council and house of representatives of Colorado territory: “Sec. 1. That the following shall be the boundaries of the respective counties, and the county seats therein, as named, with the description thereof: “Sec. 2.

This was a proceeding to enforce a mechanic’s lien upon certain premises situate near the town of Erie, in Weld county.

Armstrong, as subcontractor, brought a mechanic’s lien suit against Cook as original contractor, and also against Tabor as owner of the property upon which the labor was performed and materials furnished.

Action to declare a trust in the real estate of plaintiff in error. In the year 1871 plaintiff in error was a married woman, living with her husband, Charles M. Farrand. Owing to domestic trouble, they concluded to and did separate. On or about June 21st of that year, in connection with such permanent separation, and as a part of the agreement therefor, Charles M. Farrand conveyed to plaintiff in error, and to 0.

The complaint in this case avers: That the Rocky Mountain Insurance & Savings Institution is a corporation existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Colorado, and was such corporation on and prior to the 20th day of April, 1878; that on said day said corporation, being authorized by law to •do a life insurance business in said state, and to write policies or certificates for that purpose, and issue the same, did, by B. F. Johnson, its president, and W. L.…

<p> Error to County Court of Clear Creek County. </p>

The relief sought by the complaint was to quiet title to a mining claim. The defendant Holton was alleged to be one of the .original discoverers, and to have been possessed of an undivided one-half interest therein. The plaintiff, who' is appellant here, alleges a sale and conveyance by Holton of his interest to one Morgan, and a conveyance by Morgan to the plaintiff.

One of the sureties on the official bond of the defendant in error, who was a justice of the peace of Arapahoe county, gave notice to the board of county commissioners, as provided by law, that he was not longer willing to be such surety. Thereupon the county clerk notified said justice of the fact, and likewise that the board of county commissioners required him to file other surety as required by law.

Error io District Court of Arapahoe County. This was an action brought by the plaintiff in error against the defendant railway company to recover damages for an alleged ejectment from one of the defendant’s trains, The main issue in the trial of the case in the court below was whether the plaintiff, at the time he purchased his mileage tickets, was notified by the agents of the defendant company that they would not be accepted for fare over that portion of the company’s road…

This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover three times the value of certain personal property seized by the defendant as deputy-sheriff on execution.

This was an action brought by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error and others on certain bills of exchange. The defendant below pleaded the statute of limitations, and the plaintiff replied a new promise. Trial by the court, and judgment against the defendant in the sum of $1,480.

<p>Where the several owners of two irrigating ditches entered into an agreement to construct a new ditch to supersede the old ditches, and, upon the trial of the question what proportion of water, carried through the new ditch each one was entitled to, it appeared by the weight of evidence that nothing was said in the agreement about the division of the water, held, that the decree of the court adjudging that each party to the agreement was entitled to the same share of the water conveyed through the ditch as he • owned of the new ditch itself was erroneous, as being against the weight of evidence. Held, further, that the finding of the court that the appropriations of water by the different parties were to be referred ■ to the date of the contract respecting the new ditch, was erroneous, it not appearing that priorities had been waived by the contract respecting the new ditch.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court of Saguache County. </p>

This action is brought by the appellee, Mickel, against the appellant, Miller, the owner and proprietor of the Miners’ & Merchants’ Bank of Breckenridge, Summit county, Colorado, to recover on a book-account for services rendered by said Mickel, at the instance of Miller, and to recover the balance of a bank account at defendant’s bank. There was a direct conflict of evidence, on which the court, sitting without a jury, gave judgment in plaintiff’s favor.

Plaintiff was hired as a day-laborer on the construction of defendant’s road.

During the years 1875-76 what is known in the record as the “Ontario Tunnel” was run by one Lewis. The tunnel was about one hundred feet in length, and disclosed a vein of mineral at its breast. The last- fifty feet and the vein found were in territory which at the time was unappropriated. About one hundred feet of drifting was also done by Lewis at or near the inner end of the tunnel. He then took no further steps towards perfecting a mining location.

<p>1. One acting as the agent of another- in perfecting title to a mining ■ lode, who paid no part of the purchase price, owned no individual interest, and conveyed with no covenant of warranty, is not es-topped, after his agency ceased, from conveying any other or different title which he thereafter acquired to the premises in controversy.</p> <p>3. In 1865 the manner of locating lode claims in Griffith mining district, Colorado, was governed by miners’ rules and customs; and, to locate and hold a claim, development wort, after posting the discovery notice, was requisite.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court of Clear Creels County. </p> <p>Condemnation proceedings.</p>

<p>An appeal to a district court is rightly dismissed for failure of the appellant to cause a transcript of the proceedings below to be filed in the district court within the time required by a rule of the said court, notwithstanding that the statute authorizing the appeal prescribes no time within which the transcript shall be transmitted to the appellate court.</p>

It appears from the record that about the month of October, 1880, the appellee made its application in the United States land office in Lake City, Colorado, for patent to the Titusville lode claim, situated in San Juan county, and that the appellants, on the 23d of October, 1880, filed in said office their adverse claim, alleging that a certain portion of the premises sought to be patented by the appellee was covered by the Bear lode claim, a prior location owned by the…

The appellee, Jenuie Green, who was plaintiff below, caused to be deposited with the appellant, who was a warehouseman, a box containing various articles of clothing and household goods. While the box remained in appellant’s custody his warehouse was entered by thieves, and the box rifled of its contents. Mrs. Green demanded of the appellant, as payment for the loss of her goods, the sum of $250, which she testifies was their value.

The plaintiffs, Bailey & Allen, kept a feed-stable and corral in Denver, in 1882. One Alexander Kemp, who was engaged in the lumber business on Buffalo creek, in Jefferson county, at a point about thirty-five miles from Denver, became indebted to the plaintiffs for hay in the sum of about $241. On the 29th of May, 1882, Allen, one of the plaintiffs, went up to Buffalo creek for the purpose of collecting this bill.

This action was brought by Williams, the appellee, in the county court of Weld county. The case was after-wards taken by appeal to the district court, where a trial was had by a jury. Verdict' and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $814, with interest at ten per cent, from September 15, 1883.

This action was brought against the appellants, as directors of the German Printing Company, under the following statute: “Sec. 16.

This was an action brought before a justice of the peace by Jones, the appellee, to recover the sum of $156 damages for grass and pasturage burned on his farm by a fire set out by the defendant company.

Bauer brought his action of replevin in the state court, claiming ownership and right to possession of the goods and chattels described in his complaint. Smith, among the defenses set up in his answer, averred that he held the property as United States marshal by virtue of levies under writs of attachment duly issued out of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Colorado in two certain suits brought against one Julius Kessler.

Plaintiff Bouscher brought his suit in the court below to recover upon the quantum meruit for services rendered to the defendant company. He also prayed a lien, under the mechanic’s lien law, upon the property described. Plaintiff’s services consisted of work as foreman, superintendent and mechanic upon certain mines belonging to defendant; also of labor as defendant’s agent in disbursing its money, and in keeping its ac-' counts.

<p>Appeal from County Court of Gunnison County.</p>

This was an action of replevin, brought by the plaintiff below, Thomas Keenan, against the defendant, Joseph Lamping, for the recovery of a span of- mules and a set of double harness. It was originally instituted before a justice of the peace, who gave judgment for defendant Lamping.

Appellees brought suit in the county court of Pueblo ■county against the appellants, on an account for goods sold and delivered appellants on the 3d day of May, 1881, .amounting to the sum of $221.85.

<p> Appeal from County Court of Eagle County. </p> <p>Motion to dismiss appeal.</p>

Mandamus to Treasurer of Lake County. This case is now considered by the court on the pleadings for the third time. It was first presented upon a demurrer to the original petition (.People v. May, 8 Colo. 485); it was again submitted upon a demurrer to the answer (People v. May, ante, p. 80), while the present discussion takes place upon a demurrer to the replication. At each of these stages of pleading different questions have been submitted, examined and adjudicated.

<p>1. The case of Potterv. Douglass, relied upon by the petitioner, construes constitutional pi’ovisions ■which limit the amount of taxation as well as of indebtedness.</p> <p>2. Judgments obtained upon void warrants by reason of a failure to’ plead the constitutional "limitation, have, in some instances, been protected where collaterally attacked, upon the proposition that the question of the validity of such warrants was res adjudicata.</p>

This action was brought in the court below by the appellee, Niles, against the defendant city to recover damages for injuries resulting from a fall upon snow and ice accumulated upon defendant’s sidewalk. The accident happened to the plaintiff upon the evening of the 6 th of February, while walking, after dark, upon Pine street.

This is an original proceeding instituted in the supreme court for a writ of mandamus to compel the county-clerk of Arapahoe, county to extend on the tax list of said county, for the year 1886, certain taxes in conformity with a notice sent him by the state auditor.

<p> Error to District Court of Arapahoe County. </p> <p>Indictment for murder. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>1. The original charter and various amended charters of Denver, where not referring to expressly enumerated constitutional inhibitions, are not obnoxious to the constitutional provision dealing with local or special legislation.</p> <p>2. It was competent for the legislature to confer upon the city authorities exclusive conurol over the subject of prohibiting and suppressing bawdy-houses, and such exclusive control having been given, a ' party cannot be indicted and tried under the general law of the state, such power having been accepted by the enactment of an ordinance covering the offense.</p> <p>3. The repeal or suspension of the general law thus effected within the city producing, as it does, a disturbance in the territorial jurisdiction of the criminal courts, is not obnoxious to the constitutional provision relating to the uniformity of jurisdiction, etc., of courts of the same class or grade.</p>

Roberts, the defendant below, was tried and convicted of the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses, at the September term, 1884, of the criminal court of Arapahoe county. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were made and denied, and the prisoner sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for a period of ten months.

The plaintiff Beighly brought suit in the county court-of Clear Creek county, to the November term, 1882, against the defendants, Orpheus I. Barnes, L. H. Barnes- and S. A. Gilbert, for discovery, and in aid of a judgment previously recovered in the said court by the same plaintiff against the -said Orpheus I. Barnes.

The evidence shows that on the night of the 25th of October, 1880, Marshall, the defendant in error, registered at the McClure House, in Canon City, of which Murray, the plaintiff in error, was proprietor. He registered his name, and was assigned to a room by the-clerk, to which he retired, taking his valise with him. The next morning (the 26th) he came down to the office-of the hotel, and handed his valise to the clerk, telling him that he would call for it.

Judgment in the court below for the plaintiff on the pleadings.

Two objections are raised by the appellant to the regularity of the proceedings below, and it is insisted that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to the rights of the appellant as to require a reversal of the judgment of the-county court. The suit was instituted January 8, 1883, by the appellee Lewis, as assignee of a promissory note executed by the appellant oii the 21st day of March, 1882.

This was an action brought by Riddell against McMurtrie, to remove a cloud from the title held by plaintiff to certain lots in the town of Silverton, in San Juan county. Riddell claims to have acquired title, through a judicial sale, against one Wightman, their former owner.

Disbarment proceedings. On rehearing. On the 16th of June, 1886, Lucius P. Marsh and Merrick A. Rogers filed in this court their petition for a rule upon Thomas A. Green and Horace B. Johnson to show cause why they should not be disbarred.

This is an action, brought by Mack against Jackson and others on an injunction bond. The injunction was issued at the suit of Jackson against Mack, restraining him from the use of water in a certain irrigating ditch described in the bond “ as the first head of the Moore ditch.” The injunction was subsequently dissolved, and the plaintiff, by this suit, seeks to recover damages for the loss of his crops by reason of the issuing of the injunction.

Kobert Long, deceased, the original defendant below, made application at the proper land office for a patent to the Portland lode. James A. Drummond and others, plaintiffs below, owners of the Amphitheatre and Mountain Bell lodes, filed an adverse claim, and brought this suit in pursuance thereof. The Portland lode was located in 1875.

This action was brought by King against the “board of county commissioners of the county of Boulder,” in the county court of Lake county, where he obtained judgment. From ■ this judgment the defendant; the plaintiff in error,'appealed to the district court. This appeal was dismissed for reason of the failure of the plaintiff in error to file a sufficient appeal bond, in compliance with the order of the court.

The appellant company, having procured the right of • way for its railroad through Georgetown, proceeded to excavate for its road-bed. In so doing, the removal of rock by blasting became necessary. While its employees were thus engaged, large pieces of rock and other debris were hurled into the air, falling at considerable distances, and upon the premises of private parties, including plaintiff, living in the vicinity.

This case, like that of &., B. & L. Ey Co. v. Eagles, ante, is an action for damages occasioned by blasting in the excavation of the defendant company’s road-bed. Sarah Doyle, who was plaintiff below, owned a certain building in Georgetown near the place where defendant was doing its work. This building she was using as a hotel, and when defendant’s excavating commenced she had considerable patronage.

This was an action instituted by the plaintiff in error. to recover the alleged contract price of a quantity of wood delivered by said plaintiff to the defendant in error. 1 The complaint states that the wood was delivered on a contract entered into between the parties.

• Appeal from Superior Court of City of Denver. This was an action brought by Rhodes against the city of Denver to recover for damages alleged to have been done to his- stock in trade by backwater from obstructions in Fifteenth street, during a shower of rain.

The said plaintiff complains of the said defendant, and says that heretofore, to wit, on the 15th day of July, 1881, one Henry A. Garvey was indebted to the said plaintiff in the sum of $277.81 for goods, wares and merchandise, before that time sold and delivered by plaintiff to 'the said Garvey, for which said goods,-wares and merchandise a bill was made out by plaintiff against the said Garvey, and delivered to and approved by him, which said bill, so made out and…

<p>Where the bill of exceptions on appeal from the county court is merely a statement of the proceedings, not signed by the county judge, it does not form a part of the record, and cannot be considered.</p>

Appeal .from District Court of Chaffee County. This action grows out of an oral contract entered into by and between the plaintiff Chadbourne, and the defendant Davis, early in the month of June, 1881, by the terms of which Davis agreed to prospect for the discovery of mines during the summer season, and to locate his discoveries in the joint names of himself and Chadbourne; each to be the owner of an undivided half interest therein.

On June 12, 1882, at Idaho Springs, Colorado, the plaintiff, Henry Wilson, leased to Charles Gerhardt and A. J. Yoight, as Gerhardt & Yoight, certain premises there situate, for the term of three years, at the monthly rental of $30 per month, payable in advance, the lease containing the usual covenants for the payment of rent, etc. In September, 1882, Gerhardt withdrew from the business, and assigned his interest in the lease to Yoight, which assignment was assented to by…

Pearsons recovered judgment against Assig, before a justice of the peace, on two checks of $50 each, purporting to be signed by Assig. On appeal to the county court, Assig asked leave to file his affidavit in the case denying that the signature to the checks sued upon was his signature and alleging that the same were forgeries.

<p>1. Before either party can. recover in an “adverse” mining suit, he must show a compliance with- the statutes, state and federal, and local miners’ rules and regulations relating to the location of mining claims. Proof of occupancy merely will not suffice.</p> <p>2. The miners’ regulations of Gregory district, adopted in 1860, required the locator to indicate by stakes or otherwise upon the surface, the ground or the vein sought to be appropriated.</p> <p>3. An action in the nature of ejectment is proper in support of an adverse filed in the land office. But the ordinary rules in ejectment are somewhat modified.</p> <p>4. Under the code, a party is entitled to such relief as his evidence, together with the facts averred in the body of his pleading, justify, regardless of the relief demanded in his prayer.</p>

The complaint alleges that on June 27, 1879, M. Leppel & Co. were a firm; that the First National Bank of Lead-ville was a corporation, — both doing business in Leadville; that on June 27, 1879, plaintiffs deposited in defendant's bank, for collection, a promissory note, executed by-F. W. Clark to Isidore Heller, and by him indorsed to M. Leppel & Co., which note was for the sum of $400, payable thirty days from date; that at and after the maturity of said note plaintiffs…

This was an action of ejectment. The complaint was as follows: “For that the said plaintiff, on the 1st day of December, A. D. 1865, was possessed of a certain parcel of land with the appurtenances, lying in the county of El Paso, in the state of Colorado, and described as follows, to wit: the north half of the southwest quarter of section 5, township 14 south, range 67 west, of which said lands and tenements the plaintiff is seized in fee by and through divers mesne…

In 1882 one Orrin Skinner, on various false and fraudulent pretenses, obtained large sums of money from several banks in Georgetown, Idaho Springs, and other places, by getting cash on drafts which were returned unpaid. On the 26th day of October of that year, Skinner obtained from the Bank of Idaho Springs, of which McClelland, the appellee, was cashier, the sum of $2,500, by presenting a draft on Cummings & Oo., New York.

In 1882 Voight was engaged in merchandising, renting a store-room for the purpose from Wilson. Upon dissolution of a partnership previously existing between Voight and Gferhardt, Voight retained the business, executing to Gerhardt for .the latter’s interest his promissory notes for some $500, and also, to secure- the same,, a chattel mortgage upon the fixtures, tools, implements, accounts due, and stock in trade.