<p>STATEMENT OE THE CASE.</p> <p>This was an action of slander. The declaration consisted of two counts. The first was abandoned, and the cause was tried below on the second alone. It stated that in the months of May and June, A. D. 1873, in the city of Washington, and District of Columbia, the defendant spoke and published of and concerning the plaintiff, in the presence and hearing of others, the words following: u He [meaning the plaintiff] is a damned thief.” “I [meaning the defendant] “paid him [meaning the plaintiff] three dollars a day for every day while he [meaning the plaintiff] was superintendent on Four-and-a-half street;” that “he [meaning the plaintiff] had robbed him [meaning the defendant] while he [meaning the plaintiff] was superintendent on Four-and-a half street, of a large amount of money, to wit, three dollars a day for every day that the plaintiff was superintendent on said street.” The plaintiff also alleges that by means of the speaking and publishing of said false, scandalous, and opprobrious, and malicious words the plaintiff has been, and now is, greatly injured and prejudiced in his good name, fame, and credit, insomuch, that many of the neighbors of the plaintiff, and other good citizens of the District, not knowing the innocence of the plaintiff in the premises, have believed the plaintiff to be guilty of said charged, and also has been thereby hindered and prevented from obtaining profitable employment, and that he has suffered great pecuniary loss thereby, to wit, the sum of $5,000. Plaintiff claims $20,000 damages, and costs of this suit.</p> <p>The plea is, “Not guilty.”</p> <p>Upon the trial of the cause, the plaintiff, after calling witnesses to prove the words uttered by the defendant, was examined as a witness on his own behalf, and, among other things, was asked by his counsel whether, after the utterance of the alleged slanderous words, he had applied and failed to get employment from any one. The question was objected to by defendant’s counsel, and the objection was overruled by the court; the plaintiff then answered that he had applied to the board of public works, the board of health, and the present commissioners of the District of Columbia, and failed to obtain employment. The defendant’s counsel objected to the answer as not being justified by the pleading, and as not showing that the failure to obtain employment was in consequence of the alleged slander. The objection was also overruled by the court, and this constitutes the first exception in the case.</p> <p>After the plaintiff’s case was closed, the defendant became a witness in his own behalf, and testified as follows, viz-: That the plaintiff had been employed by the defendant on a job of work, for which he had paid him, and that he never was employed by him on Four-and-a-half street; that the plaintiff was superintendent during part of the time, and during that time required defendant to pay him different sums of money, which he did.</p> <p>The plaintiff inquired of him, upon cross-examination, whether he had spoken the words as testified to by Whitaker, Oarahan, and Morsell, in reference to his being a thief; to which the defendant, by his counsel, objected, on the ground that the matter inquired about was in no way brought out in the examination-in-chief, and related entirely to new matter; but the justice trying the case overruled the objection, and the defendant testified, in answer to the question, that he had spoken about the plaintiff, but did not recollect of calling him a thief, as charged against him, and did not pay the money as a bribe.</p> <p>The testimony being all' in, the plaintiff requested the court to instruct the jury as follows :</p> <p>1st. If the jury find from the evidence the fact alleged in the declaration, and further find that by the words and conduct of the defendant the plaintiff was prevented from obtaining employment that he otherwise might have obtained, then the plaintiff is entitled to special damages.</p> <p>2d. If the jury find from all the evidence in the case the fact alleged in the declaration, and that the plaintiff is entitled thereby to recover a verdict, then, in fixing the measure of damage, they have a right to take into consideration the nature of the accusation, to what extent it was calculated to affect the reputation and standing of the plaintiff, and the pecuniary condition of the defendant.</p> <p>The defendant’s counsel objected, but the objection was overruled by the judge, and the instructions given, which constitute the second exception.</p> <p>The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of-dollars.</p> <p>A motion was made to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, which was denied, and the casé is now here upon the foregoing exceptions.</p>
