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9 Johns. 73

Hornbeck v. Westbrook

New York Supreme Court

Decided January 15, 1812

New York Supreme Court · decided 1812-01-15

IN error, on certiorari, from a justice's court. The return in the first cause, stated that the parties voluntarily appeared before the justice, and Westbrook, the defendant in error, declared against Hornbeck, the plaintiff in error, in an action of trespass qvare clausumfregit; and for cutting wood, &c. the 1st of April, 1810, on a certain tract of land, which Jacob De Wilt and others, trustees of the town of Rochester, by virtue of the patent to them, by deed, on the 6th…

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1812-01-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 21 later decisions — most recently October 1925

20 state decisions — followed in 13 states

30181218201830184018501860187018801890190019101920decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Per Curiam.

¶1The proviso in the deed of 1728 was null and void. The inhabitants of the town of Rochester were not incorporated, so as to be competent to take an estate in fee; A grant to them would have been void for uncertainty, in like manner as a grant would be void to the churchwardens of a parish, orto the inhabitants of Dale, or to the commoners of such a waste. (Shep. Touch. 236. Co. Litt. 3. a.) It was decided, at the last term, that a grant to the people of the county of Otsego was void, for the samé reason. (Jackson, ex dem. Cooper, &c. v. Cory, 8 Johns. Rep. 385.) The grantors in the deed of 1728, were seised in fee, as private individuals, and were competent to convey in fee, the common lands of the town of Rochester. This was so settled in the *75case of Jackson v. Schoonmaker. (2 Johns. Rep. 230.) And if the inhabitants were incompetent to take an estate at law, by that name, a reservation to them, in a deed in fee to a third person, would be equally void. But such a covenant or reservation to any third person would be void. A person who is not a party to a deed, cannot take any thing by it, unless it be by way of remainder. The grantor cannot covenant with a stranger to the deed. This is an acknowledged rule of law. (Salter v. Kidgley Carth. 76.) In Whitlock's Case, (8 Co. 69.) it was adndtted~ that a reservation in a deed to a stranger was void. If this proviso had any legal operation, it could not have vested a right in any other persons than those who were at the time of making the deed inhabitants of Rochester. There were no words of perpetuity, and the inhabitants were not an incorporated body, so as to be enabled to transmit a privilege to their successors. If it was any thing, it was a personal privilege, and confined to the then existing inhabitants.

¶2The right claimed by the defendant below is, then, in every point of view, absolutely groundless, and the judgment in each case ought to be affirmed-

¶3Judgment affirmed.

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