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← 9 Kan. App. 2d 671 - Grant v. Grant

9 Kan. App. 2d 671 - Grant v. Grant’s Empirical Analysis

1984

Citation profile

42
cited by 42 later decisions
6
states following
February 2016
most recently cited

6 district · 33 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 42 later decisions — most recently February 2016 · most notably In re the Marriage of Grubb (1987), 13 Kan. App. 2d 313 - In Re the Marriage of Harrison (1989)

6 district · 33 state decisions

2501984199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 10 U.S.C. § 1408

Relies on McCarty v. McCarty · Trammel v. United States · 10 Cal. 3d 592 - In Re Marriage of Fithian · 78 Ill. App. 3d 653 - In Re Marriage of Hunt · Cearley v. Cearley

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““All property owned by married persons, including the present value of any vested or unvested military retirement pay, whether described in subsection (a) or acquired by either spouse after marriage, and whether held individually or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership, such as joint tenancy or tenancy in common, shall become marital property at the time of commencement by one spouse against the other of an action in which a final decree is entered for divorce, separate maintenance, or annulment. Each spouse has a common ownership in marital property which vests at the time of commencement of such action, the extent of the vested interest to be determined and finalized by the court, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1610 and amendments thereto.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““Here, plaintiff’s military retirement pay had no lump sum present value determinable when the divorce was filed. Military retirement pay has none of the qualities commonly attributable to marital assets such as cash surrender value, loan value, redemption value, lump sum value, or á value realizable after the death of the retiree. Ellis v. Ellis, 191 Colo, at 318-19. In these respects, military retirement pay is similar to good will in a professional practice which our Supreme Court concluded in Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan. 456, 461-63 , 648 P.2d 218 (1982), was not a marital asset subject to division. Military retirement pay is nothing more than a future stream of income which will cease at plaintiff’s death. Defendant’s comparison of military retirement pay to an annuity is not compelling as annuity value based upon estimated life expectancy provides only a speculative future value. We conclude military retirement pay has no present determinable value which would qualify it as a marital asset subject to division.” 9 Kan. App. 2d at 676 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. ““(1) Division of property. The decree shall divide the real and personal property of the parties, whether owned by either spouse prior to marriage, acquired by either spouse in the spouse’s own right after marriage or acquired by the spouses joint efforts, by: (A) a division of the property in kind; (B) awarding the property or part of the property to one of the spouses and requiring the other to pay a just and proper sum; or (C) ordering a sale of the property, under conditions prescribed by the court, and dividing the proceeds of the sale. In making the division of property the court shall consider the age of the parties; the duration of .the marriage; the property owned by the parties; their present and future earning capacities; the time, source and manner of acquisition of property; family ties and obligations; the allowance of maintenance or lack thereof; dissipation of assets, and such other factors as the court considers necessary to make a just and reasonable division of property.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.