9 P.R. Fed.
Volume 9 — Puerto Rico Federal Reports
88 opinions
- 9 P.R. Fed. 1In re Cangiano y Hijo (1916)
<p>On Voluntary Application.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Right of Foreigner to File Voluntary Petition.</p> <p>A foreigner may file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy as the benefits of the Bankruptcy Act are intended not only for the debtor, but also for the creditors.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 3Dorvalle v. Mancini (1916)
<p>On Motion fob New Tbial.</p> <p>Construction of Contracts.</p> <p>1. A contract will be construed as a whole and in the light of the circumstances surrounding it.</p> <p>Jurisdictional Amount.</p> <p>2. The amount fairly claimed in an action for breach of contract fixes the jurisdictional amount in this court, and not the amount of the verdict.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 6Jacinto y Mañon v. Cerecedo (1916)
<p>Motion foe Direction of Verdict.</p> <p>Contracts — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>1. In a suit upon a contract the burden is on the plaintiff to prove his case.</p> <p>Contracts — Public Policy — Lottery Tickets.</p> <p>2. The dealing in lottery tickets is against the public policy of the United States, and a contract entered into in Santo Domingo for the sale of lottery tickets will not he enforced by the courts of the United States.</p> <p>Note.- — Por conflict of laws as to gambling and lottery contracts, see notes in 64 L.E.A. 160, and 46 L.E.A.(N.-S.) 650.</p> <p>Contracts — Lottery Tickets — Place of Performance.</p> <p>3. A contract entered into in Santo Domingo providing for the sale of lottery tickets in Spanish territory will not Be enforced by the courts of the United States, as the dealing in lottery tickets is against the public policy of the United States, as well as against its laws and the laws of Porto Rico.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 13Ribas y Albanell v. Valdes y Cobian (1916)
<p>On an Instruction to Find for the Defendants.</p> <p>Direction of Verdict — Refusal of Jury to Sign It a Contempt of Court.</p> <p>A jury which refuses to sign a directed verdict may be punished as for a contempt of court.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 14United States v. Coll y Cuchi (1916)
<p>Oír Motioít to Remit Costs Imposed with the Sentence.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Remittance of Costs.</p> <p>When judgment is rendered against a defendant in a prosecution for a fine or forfeiture incurred under a statute of the United States, he must pay the costs, and the court cannot remit them; hut on a conviction for any other offense, not capital, the court may, in its discretion, remit the costs.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 17De Diego v. Rovira (1916)
<p>Irrigation- Rights.</p> <p>Irrigation — Civil Code — Law of Waters.</p> <p>1. The law governing irrigation waters primarily is that found in --tlie Civil Code, book 2, tit. IV., and anything not covered thereby is determined by the provisions of the law of waters.</p> <p>Note. — For admissibility of photographs as evidence, see notes in 35 L.R.A. 802 and 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 843.</p> <p>As to effect and eonclusiveness of photographs introduced in evidence, see note in 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1162.</p> <p>As to forfeiture of rights in water by nonuser, see note in 41 L.R.A. 758.</p> <p>Evidence — Maps.</p> <p>2. Maps are more satisfactory as evidence than oral testimony where a long period of time has expired.</p> <p>Evidence — Photographs.</p> <p>3. Photographs are evidence of the highest value to show the contemporaneous condition of affairs, when taken by a competent photographer.</p> <p>Injunction — Irreparable Damage.</p> <p>4. Irreparable damage is suffered when one is deprived of some right of property which is essential to its full use, and the question is not whether the damage can be estimated in money; neither can a defendant deprive a plaintiff of a property right simply because the plaintiff may be able at his own expense to supply something .to take its place in part.</p> <p>Government Concessions — Presumptions.</p> <p>5. The power of the Spanish officials to grant concessions, which they did grant, will be presumed until the contrary is shown.</p> <p>Concessions — -Third Parties — Construction.</p> <p>6. One cannot attack a concession because it is shown that others had certain rights in the concession, unless he can show that he is connected with them.</p> <p>The general rule is that a grant is to be strictly construed against the grantee.</p> <p>Concessions — Forfeiture for Nonuser.</p> <p>7. Rights once acquired are presumed to continue unless the contrary is shown, and this applies to concessions which are attacked as forfeited because of nonuser.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 35Dorvalle v. Mancini (1916)
<p>Claim foe Opeka Box Receipts. ,</p> <p>Contracts — Objects of Contract — Notarial Instrument.</p> <p>1. The object of a contract must be definite and determinate, and the form of its execution cannot improve the quality of the contract itself, even if this form be(fa notarial instrument.</p> <p>Contracts — Notarial Instrument — Delivery of Object.</p> <p>2. Where a contract of sale is reduced to a public instrument before a notary public the execution thereof is equivalent to delivery, and where conflicting claims arise between different purchasers, the ownership shall be' considered in him who first took</p> <p>. possession in good faith.</p> <p>Contracts' — Third Parties — Apparent Ownership.</p> <p>3. Where one leaves another in the apparent ownership of property, he will not be allowed to assert his right of ownership as against third parties without notice.</p> <p>Note. — As to right of one leaving his chattels in another’s possession to claim title against the latter’s creditors, see note in 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 760.</p> <p>Contracts of Sale.</p> <p>4. In a contract of sale tlie thing sold must have an actual or potential existence.</p> <p>Contracts — Parties—Agent.</p> <p>5. One party to a contract cannot act as the agent of the other as to the object of the contract.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 45Carrera y Hermanos v. del Pilar y Hermano (1916)
<p>Bankruptcy — Parties—Petition—Amendment.</p> <p>Where a petition in bankruptcy was filed against one firm, the intention being to file it against a different one, and an adjudication and subsequent proceedings were had against the former, the latter firm not having been served or answered, the court will permit the petition to be amended, but will not amend anything subsequent thereto, although it will recall all orders made subsequently to the petition.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 50Barnes v. Valdivieso (1916)
<p>Motion to Strike.</p> <p>Pleadings — Demurrer—Motion to Strike.</p> <p>After a demurrer to a complaint has been overruled and the party given a certain time within which to answer, he loses his right to file a motion to strike.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 53Blazquez Machola v. Medina (1916)
<p>Security for Costs.</p> <p>Security for Costs — Conclusion of Law.</p> <p>Where a defendant moves by motion under oath that a plaintiff give security for costs because, as alleged in the motion, on account of his financial condition he is unable to respond for costs, the defendant will be required to present proof of his allegation, which in itself is a mere conclusion of law.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 56In re Morales (1916)
<p>Ow Certificate of Referee T. E. Lee.</p> <p>Control of Goods in Hands of. Bailee of Local Court.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Jurisdiction of Poderal and Local Courts — Injunction.</p> <p>1. The Federal court has exclusive jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases, and may enjoin the local courts from proceeding further in a matter pending therein when it relates to the bankrupt’s estate.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Jurisdiction of Federal and Local Courts — Authority of Federal Court over Property of the Bankrupt.</p> <p>2, 3. From the time the adjudication in bankruptcy is made, the power of the local courts over the property of the bankrupt is taken away and the Federal court may order the custodian thereof to turn it over to its marshal, and a disobedience of the order would amount to a contempt of court.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Proceedings in Local Court.</p> <p>4. The most that a local court can do. in bankruptcy matters is to enter an order staying all further proceedings before it during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings in the Federal court.</p> <p>Note. — As to contempt by failure or -refusal of bankrupt, or person having money or property belonging to a bankrupt, to deliver it to trustee, see note in 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 255.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 61In re Padro (1916)
<p>Dismissal oar Bankruptcy Proceeding for Want of Prosecution.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Dismissal for Want of Prosecution.</p> <p>1. Where nothing is done in a bankruptcy case by either the bankrupt or the creditors, and it appears that nothing will be done, the court may dismiss the ease for want of prosecution.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Disposition of Finished Cases.</p> <p>2. When the referee has closed a bankruptcy case and has certified the record back to the court, orderly procedure requires that the court make an order directing the clerk to take the case off the docket.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 64Borda v. Plazuela Sugar Co. (1916)
<p>Dismissal of Suit — Costs.</p> <p>1. The general rule is that a plaintiff may dismiss his suit at anytime upon payment of costs, provided the defendant has not filed a cross bill or counterclaim, or otherwise raised an affirmative defense which shall not be precluded by the plaintiff.</p> <p>Dismissal of Suit — Injunction Bond.</p> <p>2. After a defendant in a suit has filed a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction, he cannot voluntarily dismiss the action without first permitting the defendant to establish the damages sustained by him as a result of the action having been brought.</p> <p>Injunction Bond — In What Eorum Enforceable.</p> <p>3. 4. A Federal court will consider an injunction bond as an incident of the main suit, and within its jurisdiction, and enforceable therein.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 71Manrique de Lara de Garrosi v. Garrosi (1916)
Statement of Facts. Tbe bill in this cause was filed June 24,1915, and alleges that the plaintiff is the wife of the defendant Tomás Garrosi. That she was a subject of the king of Spain and a resident of Porto Eieo, and that defendant Garrosi and also defendant Juana Maria Gonzalez are citizens of France, residing in Porto Rico. That in 1905 plaintiff met the defendant Garrosi in Spain and contracted marriage with him at Barcelona.
- 9 P.R. Fed. 94Garzot v. Fajardo Sugar Co. (1916)
<p>Ke Injunction as to Eailroad Switch.</p> <p>Contracts — Construction of Written Instrument.</p> <p>1, 2, 3. In the construction of a written instrument the intention of the parties as shown by the whole contract is to be carried out, and to that end words are to be taken in their ordinary sense; when doubt arises as to the proper meaning of the contract, but not otherwise, the preliminary negotiations between the parties may be considered; if there is a general description, specific descriptions following it will be interpreted in the same sense; a contract will be so construed as to render it valid rather than invalid; the practical contemporary construction given the contract by the parties themselves will be considered; and a particular clause will be construed against the party making the grant.</p> <p>Injunction — Irreparable Damage.</p> <p>4. To entitle a party to an injunction on the ground that irreparable damage will be caused to his property, he must generally prove that the damage cannot be reasonably remedied by a money compensation.</p> <p>Words and Phrases — “Branch Line” — “Siding”—Switch—Construction of Contract.</p> <p>5. A “branch line” means a substantive railroad track tributary to a main line. A “siding” relates more especially to a side track on which cars may be placed and which can be used as a switch for the passage of trains. A “switch” is a siding joined at both ends to the main track. Where the plaintiff gave the defendant permission to lay a switch which has become deteriorated, the defendant may replace it with a new one without further consent.</p> <p>Construction of Contract.</p> <p>6. Where the plaintiff granted defendant authority to fence in its railroad in such a way as to cut his property in two, unless agreed to by the parties, he is entitled to make such use of the property fenced in as will not destroy its use as a whole to him.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 102Salcedo v. Alvarez Gonzalez (1916)
<p>On Rule to Show Cause.</p> <p>Rule to Show Cause — Parties.</p> <p>Where the rule to show cause orders certain parties to appear either personally or by tbeir duly authorized attorney in fact, they must all appear in court either personally or by their duly authorized attorney in fact, and a sworn statement by one of them that' he appears for the others is insufficient to prove his authority; neither can the fact that they have authorized an attorney at law to represent them in the proceedings relieve them from the duty of appearing as directed in the rule.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 109Rounds v. St. Johns Gas Co. (1916)
Statement of Facts. The bill in this ease was filed by the complainants on April 8, 1913. It sets np that the defendant the St. Johns Gas Co., Ltd., was the owner of a perpetual usufruct under the title “á censo redimible,” of certain lands on the west side of the -Marina, at San Juan. That in 1885 the company made a mortgage for £16,000 to certain trustees for the holders of debenture stock, the mortgage being duly inscribed..
- 9 P.R. Fed. 119Sosa Oliva v. Calderon (1916)
<p>INJUNCTION AS TO PENCE AND CATTLE.</p> <p>Equity — Pleading and Practice — Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>1. Where the defendants did not answer a rule to show cause, issued upon a sworn petition, why a preliminary injunction should not be granted, but instead thereof filed a motion to dismiss, it will be taken that the defendants rested their case upon the motion to dismiss.</p> <p>Equity — Injunction—Local Statute.</p> <p>2, 3. Even when a local statute allows an injunction in case of the forcible removal of' a boundary fence, the Federal courts will not entertain an action in equity where the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, but if repeated trespasses are alleged, equity will interfere to prevent a multiplicity of suits.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 125United States ex rel. Hodriguez v. Fabian (1916)
<p>Limitation of Suit on Contractor's Bond.</p> <p>Complaint — Amendment—Contractor’s Bond — Limitation of Action.</p> <p>Amendments not of substance to a complaint are freely permitted, and if, in a suit on a contractor’s bond, the application for a certified copy of the bond is made within the statutory period of one year, although not received within the year, the action on the bond will not be barred.</p> <p>Note. — Generally on the question of relation of new pleadings to the Statute of Limitations, see notes in 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 259; 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 196; and 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 932.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 127Gregg Co. v. Utuado Sugar Co. (1916)
<p>Back Taxes nr Receotebships.</p> <p>Receiver — Lease—Taxes.</p> <p>1. A person leasing property ■which is in the hands of a receiver is not bound to pay taxes on the property -which accrued before the lease -was entered into.</p> <p>Note. — For authorities passing upon the question of priority of claim for taxes, against property in the hands of a receiver, see note in 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1052.</p> <p>Taxes — Lien—Priority.</p> <p>2. Taxes are a first lien, and will be given priority over all other liens when the property is sold.</p> <p>Taxes — Payment.</p> <p>3. It is the duty of the court to recognize as paramount the just claims for taxes of the People of Porto Rico, and to see that they are paid before the estate is distributed to other creditors.</p> <p>Taxes — Surcharges—Priority.</p> <p>4. Surcharges for unpaid taxes are entitled to the same priority that attached to the taxes.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 134Blasquez Machola v. Medina (1916)
<p>Motion fob Sbcubitx- bob Costs.</p> <p>Costs — Security, for.</p> <p>1. Plaintiff having filed an affidavit showing that he has personal property at a certain place within the jurisdiction amounting to $1,600, and having paid the docket fee, he will not he required to give security for costs.</p> <p>Costs — Security for.</p> <p>2. An attachment bond is conditioned to answer for the damages caused by the attachment, and does not cover other costs of the suit; it cannot, therefore, take the place of a cost bond.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 136Blasin v. Lopez Gonzalez (1916)
<p>Equity — Judgment on the Pleadings.</p> <p>There is no procedure authorized in equity for a judgment on the pleadings.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 137Blasin v. Lopez Gonzalez (1916)
<p>In the Matter of an Injunction Bond.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Plenary Suit by Trustee — Injunction Bond.</p> <p>Where the trustee brings a plenary suit in this court to recover assets of the bankrupt estate, it is not necessary for him to give an injunction bond in order to obtain an injunction against alienation, provided tbe estaje itself bas property.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 139Gonzalez y Gonzalez v. Arsuaga é Isaguirre (1916)
<p>Account — Lease and Mortgage.</p> <p>1. Where a piece of land is sold by the lessor to the lessee and the deed is later declared void, the original lease continues in force during its term, and the account between the parties is determined by the lease rental less interest on a mortgage held by the lessee against the lessor.</p> <p>Lease — Extension.</p> <p>2. Where a lease provided that the lessee could extend it for another term by giving notice before the expiration of the first term, and the lessor during the first term sold the land to the lessee by deed which was later declared void by the court after the expiration of the original term of the lease, there was no extension for the additional period, since no notice of such extension was given.</p> <p>Note. — Upon the question of effect of holding over after expiration of lease, with option for extension or renewal, without formally exercising option, where notice is required by lease, see note in 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 174.</p> <p>Real Property — Possession in Good Faith.</p> <p>3. One who takes a deed from an attorney in fact, knowing that, the latter has not authority to execute the deed, is not a possessor in good faith, but is a holder in bad faith.</p> <p>Real Property — Possession in Bad Faith. — Damages.</p> <p>4. The damages for which a possessor in bad faith is liable are the produce which could under reasonable circumstances have been produced upon the land, — the reasonable rental value of the land.</p> <p>Mortgages — Foreclosure—Pleadings.</p> <p>5. The court will not order a foreclosure of mortgage in a suit for another purpose, the foreclosure not having been asked for in the pleadings.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 145In re Rivera (1916)
<p>PRIORITIES in Bankruptcy.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Priorities.</p> <p>1. The debts entitled to priority under the Bankruptcy Act for the reason that they are entitled to priority nnder the state law are in Porto Rico those classified in §§ 1822-1830 of the Civil Code.</p> <p>Bankruptcy- — Priorities—Chattel Mortgage.</p> <p>2. There can he no chattel mortgage in Porto Rico, and the holder of such mortgage is not entitled to a priority in bankruptcy.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Priorities.</p> <p>3. The provision of § 1825 (4) of the Civil Code that indebtedness which appears in a public instrument shall be preferred is of no effect in bankruptcy, and does not give rise to a priority.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Priorities.</p> <p>4. The preference granted by § 1823 (1) to the vendor of personal property in the possession of the bankrupt does give rise to a priority enforceable in bankruptcy.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Priorities—Local Law.</p> <p>5. The priorities provided for by §§ 1823-1825 of the Civil Code give rise to preferences in bankruptcy proceedings, except where the Bankruptcy Act itself declares that any of the credits of that classification shall have a higher or lower place in bankruptcy distribution or where such credits are abolished by the Bankruptcy Act.'</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Priorities—Pleadings.</p> <p>6. Strict pleadings are not requisite in bankruptcy proceedings, and the court will mold its decree so as to do justice between the parties.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 153Echcandia v. Municipality of San Sebastian (1916)
<p>IN THE MATTEK OE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Citizenship.</p> <p>1. A Porto Eican woman who was married to a Spanish subject prior to the American occupation, and whose husband made the necessary declaration to preserve his Spanish citizenship after the Treaty of Paris, in the name of himself and his wife, is a Spanish subject.</p> <p>Equity — Preliminary Injunction.</p> <p>2. A preliminary injunction will not he granted where the right is not clear, and where it would greatly prejudice the public without greatly benefiting the plaintiff; a road open to the public for nine years will not be closed upon preliminary injunction where plaintiff’s right is doubtful.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 158Sosa Oliva v. Calderon (1916)
<p>In the Matter oe Preliminary Injunction.</p> <p>Parties — Citizenship.</p> <p>1. Where a person has been naturalized by an order of this court, such order cannot be attacked collaterally, and may only be set aside in a direct proceeding for that purpose.</p> <p>Equity — Injunction Pendente Lite.</p> <p>2. An injunction pendente lite should not be granted except in aid of an admitted or clear legal right, and in a ease of great doubt the discretion of the court should be exercised against such a writ.</p> <p>Note. — As to right to a preliminary injunction which would have the effect of transferring possession of property from defendant to plaintiff, see note in 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 31.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 160Gregg Co. v. Utuado Sugar Co. (1916)
<p>Claim; or Iglesias.</p> <p>Receivership — Operation of Sugar Central — Loan to Receiver — Lien Holders.</p> <p>1. Where the prior lien holders of a sugar central have tacitly consented to a loan made to the receiver under order of the court to keep the central in operation, they will not he heard to complain against the allowance of the claim as preferential.</p> <p>Receivership — Money Lent to Receiver.</p> <p>2. Money lent to a receiver under order of the court to keep a sugar central in operation is not money lent to the central, and is an administrative debt of the receivership.</p> <p>Receivership — Money Lent to Receiver — Crop Lien.</p> <p>3. Where one lends money to a receiver and secures it by a lien on a given crop and this security results insufficient, the unpaid balance will not rank with operating expenses but will rank in a class by itself after all receivership claims which have been allowed.</p> <p>Receivership' — Money Lent to Receiver under Unauthorized Order.</p> <p>4. Where one lends money to a receiver under a contract not authorized by the court, interest paid up to the time of the closing of the mill will be respected, but interest after that date must be at the legal rate.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 164Burgos v. Viejo (1916)
<p>In the Matter op Ejectment.</p> <p>Conflict of Laws — Litigation During Spanish Sovereignty.</p> <p>1. Where the facts in a ease pending in this court consist ot acts under the Spanish sovereignty, these acts will he construed in accordance with the provisions of the laws then in force, rather than in accordance with American constitutional law.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Under Spanish Sovereignty.</p> <p>2. Under Spanish sovereignty, the Constitution of Spain contained no provisions analagous td the Rill of Rights of American 'Constitutions.</p> <p>Real Property — Censo.</p> <p>3. Under the Spanish law a censo is in the nature of a mortgage and created a real right against the property.</p> <p>Real Property — Limitation of Actions.</p> <p>4. A collateral attack upon a title acquired by judicial sale cannot be made after ten years, where the claimants were residents at the time of the sale complained of.</p> <p>Courts — Proceedings—Presumption of Regularity.</p> <p>5. This court will presume that a Spanish court in a suit twenty years ago acted regularly in the matter of notice to the defendants.</p> <p>Real Property — Censo.</p> <p>6. A censo gave rise to a right of action which at civil law was a real action with the right to an annotation in the Registry of Property against alienation, which annotation was notice to all third persons.</p> <p>Real Property — Execution sale.</p> <p>7. Proceedings of the municipal court of Bayamon examined and held to he in accordance with the provisions of the Law of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Real Property — Limitation of Actions.</p> <p>8. The fact that a censo originally covered only' 100 cuerdas of land, and that on foreclosure sale 146 cuerdas were sold to satisfy the censo, is immaterial where the purchasers have been in possession in good faith for more than ten years.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 177Guerini Stone Co. v. P. J. Carlin Construction Co. (1916)
<p>ON Taxation of Costs.</p> <p>Costs — Witness Fees — Mileage Exceeding 100 Miles Outside the Jurisdiction,</p> <p>1. When a witness residing more than 100 miles outside of the district comes from his residence and testifies, either with or without subprena, he is entitled to travel fees at the rate of 15 cents per mile for 100 miles coming to the trial and in returning to his residence, and for the remaining distance actually traveled he is entitled to travel fees at the rate of 5 cents per mile in going and coming.</p> <p>Costs — Witness Fees — Corporation Oifieers.</p> <p>2. The officer of a corporation who appears at a trial as representative of a corporation party to the suit is not entitled to per diem or mileage fees for appearing as a witness on behalf of the corporation.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 180In re Lamas (1916)
<p>PETITION FOB REVIEW OF FINDING OF ReFEBEE.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — New Petition after Composition — Provable Claims.</p> <p>1. Where a bankrupt makes a composition with liis creditors for 50 per cent, gives them notes for this amount, makes some payments upon the notes, and then, more than four months afterwards, files an involuntary petition, the creditors can only prove the amount of the notes received, less payments, and not their original claims; if the new petition is filed within the four months, the creditors can file their claims for the original amount less payments received.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — New Petition after Composition — Provable Claims.</p> <p>2. Where one creditor agreed to accept 50 per cent in order to influence other creditors to accept the composition, but with the secret agreement that the bankrupt would pay him 85 per cent, the agreement with the bankrupt for the additional sum is void as against the other creditors, and this creditor can only prove his claim for 50 per cent in the second proceeding.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 183Morales Figueroa v. Valdes Cobian (1916)
<p>Demurrer to Complaint.</p> <p>Employers’ Liability Act.</p> <p>1. The Federal Employers’ Liability Act applies to railroads in territories or possessions of the United States as well as railroads between states and territories, and therefore applies to a railroad wholly within Porto Rico.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Pleadings—Citizenship.</p> <p>2. A complaint which alleges that all the parties are residents of Porto Rico does not allege that they are citizens of Porto Rico, and therefore is not bad upon demurrer on the ground that it shows there is no diversity of citizenship.</p> <p>Note. — As to constitutionality, application, and effect of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, see notes in 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 38, and L.R.A. 1915C, 47.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Pleadings—Citizenship.</p> <p>3. Qusere: Whether such complaint is bad because it does not affirmatively allege the citizenship of the parties.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Employers’ Liability Act.</p> <p>4. Quasre: Whether this court has not jurisdiction of a suit brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, regardless of the citizenship of the parties, as being a Federal right conferred by Federal statute.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 185In re Solá é Hijo (1916)
<p>Trustee’s Right to Mortgaged Property.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Preference.</p> <p>1. The disposal of property during the four months preceding bankruptcy in accordance with a valid contract antedating the four months is not to be considered as a preference; where a mortgage given more than four months before the petition was not recorded, as it contained certain defects, but these defects were cured and the mortgage recorded four days before bankruptcy, this does not constitute a preference.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Liens—Unrecorded Mortgage.</p> <p>2. A mortgage executed more than four months before the bankruptcy, but not recorded until within the four months, does not create a valid lien against creditors of the bankrupt subsequent to the date of the mortgage, and such creditors take precedence over the mortgagee.</p> <p>Note. — As to effect of mortgage given more than four months prior to bankruptcy, but recorded within that period, see note in 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 149.</p> <p>Upon the question of conditional sale contract executed prior to, but filed within, the four months period as a voidable preference, see note in 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1223.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Unrecorded Conditional Sale Agreements.</p> <p>3. Where a mortgage contains a further agreement by the mortgagor that he will give a conditional sale deed to the property on demand, and the mortgage was not recorded until within the four months, the clause regarding the conditional sale agreement is not binding upon creditors subsequent to the date of the instrument.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Liens—Mortgage Recorded within the Pour Months.</p> <p>4. Creditors having claims accruing since the date of the mortgage, which is not recorded until within the four months, are entitled to the proceeds of the mortgaged premises in preference to the mortgagee.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 193Banco Popular de Economias y Prestamos de San Juan v. Wilcox (1916)
<p>Real Property — Mortgages.</p> <p>1. The purchaser of real property whose deed recites that he takes subject to recorded encumbrances takes subject to a mortgage which was not recorded at the time of the purchase, in the absence of clear evidence that there was mistake or fraud affecting the mortgagee.</p> <p>Mortgages — Foreclosure—Procedure.</p> <p>2. When an action to foreclose a mortgage is removed into the United States district court, that court will follow neither the procedure established by the Civil Code for mortgage actions nor that established by the mortgage law for summary foreclosure, but will follow the usual course of equity procedure in foreclosure actions, and will allow the mortgagor a reasonable time to redeem the property before sale.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 196Fajardo v. Sucrerie Central Coloso (1916)
<p>Attachment — Intervention.</p> <p>1. A person alleging himself to be the legitimate owner of a property about to be attached has a right to intervene in the attachment proceedings.</p> <p>Attachment — Petition—Statement of Pact and Law.</p> <p>2. The provision of § 3 of the Law to Secure the Effectiveness of Judgments, which requires that the petition should contain a statement of the facts and of the law, disappeared by virtue of the amendment of 1916.</p> <p>Note. — On right of third person who claims property to intervene in attachment proceedings, see note in 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 536.</p> <p>Attachment — When May Be Had.</p> <p>3. The provisions of the Law to Secure the Effectiveness of Judgments apply to all obligations, whether arising out of contract or tort.</p> <p>Attachment — Bond.</p> <p>4. When it is doubtful whether or not the complaint in the action sets forth a sufficient cause of action, the attachment will he allowed, as the party seeking the attachment must give bond to answer for any damages caused by the attachment.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 200Coll y Cuchi v. Arzuaga (1916)
Statement of Facts. The bill in this case, which is under oath, was filed May 16, 1916, and alleges that the complainant is owner of thirty shares of stock of the corporation of La Compañía Azucarera… Held: at which there was a perfunctory examination of the operations of the corporation during the preceding year, and. a document showing the general balance was duly approved by all shareholders present except the complainant.
- 9 P.R. Fed. 207Municipality of Cayey v. Ormaechea (1916)
<p>On Motion to Remand.</p> <p>Removal of Case — Stipulation.</p> <p>1. Where after appearance in the local court the parties by stipulation, with the consent of the court, continued the hearing of the case, whether or not either party waives his right to remove the case to the Federal court depends upon the construction of the stipulation.</p> <p>Removal of Case — Stipulation-—Order of Court.</p> <p>2. While it is not clear whether or not the parties may extend by stipulation the time in which to remove a case from a local court to the Federal. court, the time may be extended by an order of the local court.</p> <p>Transcript of Record — Filing.</p> <p>3. Where the transcript of the record is not filed in this court within thirty days after the filing of the petition to remove a case from a local court, whether or not the case will be remanded is to be decided by this court in the exercise of its discretion.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 212In re del Pilar Hnos (1916)
<p>Attachment Lien Before Four Months.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Attachment—Priority.</p> <p>An attachment under the Porto Rican Law of March 1, 1902, To Secure the Effectiveness of Judgments, is not a vested lien subject to devestment, but is a lien which does not become vested until judgment and execution thereon, and therefore such an attachment issued more than four months prior to the bankruptcy, hut on which judgment and execution were had within the four months, is rendered null and void by § 67 of the Bankruptcy Act.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 216Ortiz v. Bull-Insular Line (1916)
<p>On Motion to Amend the Answer and Motion to Strike the Answer from the Piles.</p> <p>Pleading — Amendment.</p> <p>1. The lapse of time in moving for leave to amend an answer is not an impediment to its being granted, provided the other party is not injured thereby.</p> <p>Default.</p> <p>2. Where the plaintiff has waited until the defendant has moved for leave to amend his answer, and then moves for a default, the default will be denied, as he has been almost as negligent as the defendant.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 219Fajardo v. Sucrerie Central Coloso (1916)
<p>Demurrer to Amend Complaint.</p> <p>Contract.</p> <p>1. Under the Civil Code there is a binding contract if there has been consent of the parties, definite object and consideration; and if the terms of a contract are clear they must be taken in their literal sense.</p> <p>Agency. — Corporations.</p> <p>2. A corporation can act only through its officers, and when a corporation’s officers are doing a certain thing- for the corporation there is no presumption that they are not authorized to so act.</p> <p>Damage.</p> <p>3. The losses and damages for which a debtor in good faith is liable are those foreseen or which might have been foreseen at the time of assuming the obligation, and which are a necessary consequence of its nonfulfilment.</p> <p>Pleading — Allegation.</p> <p>4. In determining whether or not a complainant states a specific fact, this may be determined by reading the complaint as a whole.</p> <p>Contract — Tender of purchase price.</p> <p>5. The purchaser of a property need not allege a tender of the purchase price after he has learned that the vendor has sold to another, but he must show that he was and stands ready to fulfil his part of the contract.</p> <p>Note. — Eor authorities discussing the question of presumption that a contract within the power of a corporation is within the authority of its president, see note in 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 376.</p> <p>Pleading — Contracts.</p> <p>6. A court will not look to matters not in a pleading to determine its contents.</p> <p>Pleading — Complainant—Allegations.</p> <p>7. Where a plaintiff in liis complaint asks simply for damages, there is no occasion to remit him to equity.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 224Berio v. Gay (1916)
<p>Suit fob Recovery or Personal Property.</p> <p>Pleading — Actions in Contract and in Tort.</p> <p>1. Both, under the civil and common law there is a distinction between actions in contract and in tort, and a suit cannot sound in both.</p> <p>Code of Civil Procedure — Names of Action.</p> <p>2. The Code of Civil Procedure does not prescribe names in which actions shall he brought, and many names of actions formerly in use may still be used.</p> <p>Action of Reivindication.</p> <p>3. The action of reivindication applies both to movables and im-movables, and can be brought only against one in possession.</p> <p>Prescription.</p> <p>4. Actions ex contractu do not prescribe within one year, as subdivision 2 of § 1869 of the Civil Code refers to actions in tort.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 231Filbrick v. Municipality of Bayamón (1916)
<p>On Motion in the Nature oe a Demubber to Complaint.</p> <p>Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. Where a suit is brought in the name of one who is acting in a representative capacity, it is the citizenship of the representative that controls the jurisdiction, and not that of the beneficiary.</p> <p>Real Party in Interest — Equity Rules.</p> <p>2. Under Rule No. 37 of the new equity rules, an action must be brought in the name of the real party in interest.</p> <p>Pleading.</p> <p>3. Where there are a number of pieces of land mentioned in a bill and only one piece is in controversy, the bill should describe the piece in controversy with sufficient certainty to inform the defendant as to 'what he is to defend.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 234De la Rosa v. Sucrerie Central Coloso de Puerto Rico (1916)
<p>On Demtjrree to Complaint.</p> <p>Pleading — Complaint—Ultimate Pacts.</p> <p>A complaint in which plaintiff alleges that he contracted to get cane growers to deliver cane to defendant’s mill should set forth the names of those growers whom he got to deliver cane to defendant’s mill, as these are the ultimate facts, and the ultimate facts must be alleged in a complaint.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 236Mehrhof v. Muñoz (1916)
<p>Verification of Pleading.</p> <p>Pleadings — Verification.</p> <p>Where all the allegations in a complaint are made upon deponent’s knowledge, and he verifies the complaint upon knowledge and belief, the words, “and belief,” are surplusage, and do not impair the rest of the verification.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 239Dolores del Rosario v. Rucabado Argumosa (1916)
<p>Sura by Heibs.</p> <p>Pleading — Parties.</p> <p>1. Where it appears bn the face of the complaint that certain parties have no interest in the action they cannot be joined as plaintiffs.</p> <p>Parties — 'Action for Undivided Interest in Land.</p> <p>2. An owner of an undivided interest in land can bring an action in ejectment to recover his undivided interest.</p> <p>Appeal — Local and Federal Courts.</p> <p>3. Where the Supreme Court of Porto Rico has affirmed a case, the situation of the pleadings becomes the law of the case, and should not be disturbed in a suit in the Federal court growing out of the cause of action in the local court.</p> <p>Inheritance — Payment of Decedent’s Debts.</p> <p>4. Under civil law the debts of the decedent must he paid or provided for before there can be a division of the inheritance.</p> <p>Real Action — Prescription.</p> <p>5. An action to recover the land itself is a real action, and the period of prescription is thirty years.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 245Ortiz v. Bull-Insular Line (1916)
<p>On Motion to Produce Documents.</p> <p>Evidence — Discovery at Law and in Equity.</p> <p>1. Section 724 of tlie Revised Statutes of the United States has the same effect as a bill of discovery in equity.</p> <p>Evidence.</p> <p>2. Under § 724 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the court is denied the right to order the production of documents for examination prior to the trial.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 250Korber v. Guerini (1916)
<p>On Petition foe Order Directing Delivery of Certain Assets to Trustee and Intervening Petition of Pedro Schira.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Court of Bankruptcy — Referee.</p> <p>After a case has been referred to the referee, the court in bankruptcy is the referee, and all matters up to the discharge should be brought before him.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 253United States v. Escobar (1916)
<p>Violation of President’s Proclamation.</p> <p>Joint Resolution.</p> <p>1. A joint resolution of Congress authorizing the President to prohibit by proclamation the exportation of war material from ports of the United States has virtually the same effect as a statute.</p> <p>Criminal Law.</p> <p>2. If Congress has not declared an action a crime, the courts cannot do so.</p> <p>Criminal Law.</p> <p>3. A joint resolution of Congress authorizing the President to prohibit by proclamation the exportation of war material from ports of the United States, but which does not make the exportation thereof a crime nor fix a penalty, simply authorizes the President to prohibit the exportation, and one acting contrary to the proclamation does not commit a crime.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Conspiracy.</p> <p>4. The exportation of war materials from ports of the United States contrary to tbe proclamation of tbe President does not constitute a crime, and therefore there cannot be a conspiracy to commit tbe said crime or offense.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Strict Construction.</p> <p>5. There can be no intendment in support of tbe meaning of a criminal statute, as penal laws are strictly construed.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 261Wilson v. Cody (1916)
<p>On Motion fok a Default.</p> <p>Term of Court — Pleadings—Motions.</p> <p>A pleading survives the term of court and stands until some ac tion is taken upon it, hut a motion dies with the term of court.unless specially continued.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 264Lopez v. American Railroad (1916)
<p>On Moxiosr to Direct an Involuntary Nonsuit.</p> <p>Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>1. The failure of a railroad company to give the necessary signals of warning at a crossing does not relieve one approaching the crossing from the duty to stop, look, and listen, and if he does not do so he is guilty of contributory negligence.</p> <p>Railroad Crossing — Rights of Traveler.</p> <p>2. There are certain cases in which a traveler has a right to assume* that he can make a crossing, but there is not such a case when the traveler is himself at fault in not taking the proper precautions, and the principle of stop, look, and listen is now so general that it will be considered as applicable in Porto Rico.</p> <p>Note. — Authorities discussing the question of failure of railroad company to give customary signals as excusing nonperformance of duty to stop, look, and listen, are collated in a note in 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 391.</p> <p>On liability of railroad company for injury to bicyclist at railroad crossing, see notes in 47 L.R.A. 301, and 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 158.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 268Ortiz v. Sobrinos de Ezquiaga (1916)
<p>ALLEGATIONS OE NEGLIGENCE.</p> <p>Pleading — Negligence.</p> <p>In a complaint alleging negligence on the part of the defendant, the proper rule would seem to be that the act causing the injury-should be stated with an allegation that it was negligently done, and, while it is not necessary to allege the manner in which the act was done, it is necessary to allege exactly which act it was that caused the injury.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 273Ortiz v. American Railroad (1916)
<p>Suit by Illegitimate Sour.</p> <p>Illegitimate or Natural CMld — Right of Parent to Recover Damages.</p> <p>1. Where relationships are mentioned in statutes they are to he construed as referring to legal or legitimate relationships, and hence a mother cannot recover damages for injuries to her illegitimate or natural son in accordance with § 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Illegitimate or Natural Child — Right of Heir to Recover Damages.</p> <p>2. Section 61 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits recovery for damages by an heir, and as an acknowledged illegitimate child may transmit his rights to his parents in the absence of legitimate relations, it follows that a mother may be the heiress of her illegitimate son.</p> <p>Motion to Strike — Argumentative Allegation.</p> <p>3. A motion to strike part of an answer which is argumentative, and does not set out facts, will be granted.</p> <p>Note. — On right of mother to recover for the negligent killing of an illegitimate child, see notes in 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 640, and L.R.A.1916E, 125.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 276Muñiz v. American Railroad (1916)
<p>Court's Instructions To the Juey.</p> <p>Negligence — Measure of Damages.</p> <p>1. In a suit for damages for personal injuries, the measure of damages is the wages lost during the time the plaintiff was in the hospital, the actual expense incurred by him on account of the injury, a reasonable amount for his suffering, and the diminution to his earning capacity, if any.</p> <p>Eailroad Train — Eight of Way.</p> <p>2. A railroad train has the right of way over its own track, and is not compelled to stop at every crossing.</p> <p>Evidence — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>3. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and he must prove that he was injured, that he was injured by the negligence of the defendant, and the damage suffered.</p> <p>Note.- — On failure of railroad company to give customary signals as excusing nonperformance of duty to stop, look, and listen, see note in 3 L.E.A. (N.S.) 391. On duty of traveler approaching railroad crossing as to place and direction of observation, see note in 37 L-N.A. (N.S.) 135.</p> <p>Witnesses — Credibility.</p> <p>4. It is for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses.</p> <p>Negligence — Comparative Negligence — Statutory Requirements — Waiver.</p> <p>5. The fact that the plaintiff was to blame in driving his steam roller onto the railroad track does not preclude him from recovering if the engineer of the railroad company could have stopped his train in time to prevent the accident, and did not do so; but if the train was coming towards the crossing, and the plaintiff drove his steam roller onto the track without paying any attention to the warnings given by the engineer, then he cannot recover. Where the law in one part requires the railroad company to maintain a chain or other device at crossings, and in another part puts its regulations under the Department of the Interior, and the Department of the Interior, by arrangement with the railroad company, waived the placing of a chain at a particular crossing, an employee of the Department of the Interior cannot complain.</p> <p>Negligence — Statutory Requirements.</p> <p>6. If the law required the railroad company to put up a chain at a crossing, and the company did not do so, and the absence of the ■chain was not the cause of the accident, the plaintiff cannot recover.</p> <p>Negligence — Contributory Negligence — “Stop, Look, and Listen.”</p> <p>7. A person approaching a railroad crossing is supposed to stop, look, and listen for an approaching train, and if he does not do so he is not exercising ordinary care and cannot recover because he has contributed to the accident.</p> <p>Negligence — Ordinary Care — Obstructed Vision.</p> <p>8. If a plaintiff in approaching a railroad crossing looks but does not see an approaching train because of intervening objects, he is exercising ordinary care.</p> <p>Negligence — 'Loss of Presence of Mind.</p> <p>9. Ordinarily in the case of a threatened railroad collision, it is one’s duty to save his life at the expense of property, but where one could have saved his life by jumping, and did not do so because he lost his presence of mind, he is not precluded from recovering from the railroad company if the threatened collision was due to its negligence.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 299Blacini v. López Gonzalez (1916)
<p>Rule on Registras to Show Cause.</p> <p>Registrar of Property — Disregard of Court Orders.</p> <p>1. Where a registrar of property refuses to record an attachment in accordance with an order of court on the ground that the property sought to he attached is not sufficiently described, his refusal involves the construction of the registration law of Porto Rico, and does not show a wilful disregard of the court’s order.</p> <p>Attachment of Property — Bankruptcy.</p> <p>2. A bankruptcy court has full power to make all orders necessary to enforce the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act; and where the bankrupt estate is without funds to pay the recording fees of an order of attachment the court will order an entry of an injunction to be made in the hook of incapacitated persons provided by the Mortgage Law.</p> <p>Contempt of Court — Strict Construction.</p> <p>3. An action for contempt of court is strictly construed, and especially is this true of judicial officers in the exercise of their duties.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 306Carrera v. del Pilar Hnos (1916)
<p>Lien of Local Attachment.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Attachment Lien.</p> <p>1. An attachment under the local law to secure the effectiveness of judgments is to be construed in pari materia with the attachment laws of the United States, and the liens in both cases are substantially the same.</p> <p>Attachment Laws of the Different States.</p> <p>2. The attachment laws of the different states are not uniform. In Re Blair, 108 Fed. 529, 530, it is held that the attachment lien is complete from the time of the levy, and that the subsequent judgment is important only in providing a method for enforcement. The reasoning in the Blair Case was approved by the Supreme Court in considering equitable liens. Metcalf Bros. v. Barker, 187 U. S. 165. Qucere: Was it approved as to legal distinguished from equitable remedies 1</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Lien Created by a Creditors’ Bill — Attachment Law.</p> <p>3. A lien created by a creditors’ bill in equity is different from an attachment law in that the former is complete and creates a vested right against the world., while the latter is incomplete and conditional as regards third parties.</p> <p>Local Attachment Law — Sale at Auction.</p> <p>4. The attachment law of Porto Rico allows the property attached to be sold at public auction to the best bidder.</p> <p>Local Attachment Law — History—Construction.</p> <p>5. The history of the attachment law of Porto Rico to secure the effectiveness of judgments shows that it has for its basis rather the holding of the property attached in a kind of public receivership, than to vest absolute rights, and hence a judgment and execution thereon had within four months of the bankruptcy are ineffective against the bankrupt’s trustee.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 315In re Toro Velez (1916)
<p>Pbeference in Bankeuptcy.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Judicial District — Division—Absence of Judge.</p> <p>1.Porto Rico is a judicial district, and there are no divisions, properly so-called, thereof; and, while the judge is in Porto Rico, a deputy clerk of the court cannot legally certify that the judge is not within one of the divisions of the district.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Rule to Show Cause — Contempt.</p> <p>2.A proceeding to show cause is a summary proceeding, and the offense is punishable as a contempt. A referee in bankruptcy has no authority to issue a rule to show cause, to persons who claim property of the bankruptcy, why they should not deliver it to the bankrupt’s trustee. If the trustee has a right to property over against other claimants, he must proceed by plenary suit.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Controversies at Law and in Equity — Proceeding in Bankruptcy.</p> <p>3.Under § 23a of the Bankruptcy Act, United States courts have jurisdiction of all controversies at law and in equity as distinguished from proceedings in bankruptcy, and if a bankrupt’s trustee wishes to recover property from claimants holding adversely to the bankrupt he must proceed in the same manner as if bankruptcy proceedings had not been instituted, and cannot proceed by a proceeding in bankruptcy.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 320Ortiz v. American Railroad (1916)
<p>On Motion iron a Nonsuit.</p> <p>Jurisdictional Amount — Expectancy of Life of the Plaintiff.</p> <p>1. Where the evidence shows that it was a rule of the deceased to give plaintiff a certain sum of money weekly, and these sums during the expectancy of life of the plaintiff would exceed the jurisdictional amount, the court has jurisdiction of the case.</p> <p>Note. — On duty of railroad company to keep lookout for trespasser on track, see notes in 25 L.R.A. 287; 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1069; and 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 264.</p> <p>Negligence — Railroad—Trespassers.</p> <p>2. It is not the duty of a railroad company to maintain a special lookout for trespassers on its tracks, except at public crossings and within the limits of cities and towns, and then it is only bound to exercise reasonable care.</p> <p>Negligence — Drunken Persons — -Presumption.</p> <p>3. The presumption of law is that people are sober, and not drunk, and a railroad engineer is justified in relying upon this presumption, and a person who goes upon a railroad track in a drunken condition is guilty of contributory negligence.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 327Ortiz v. Bull-Insular Line (1917)
<p>The Court’s Instructions to the Jury. ,</p> <p>Negligence — Unavoidable Accident.</p> <p>1. A plaintiff cannot recover if the evidence shows that the accident was not caused by the defendant’s negligence, but was unavoidable.</p> <p>Negligence — Measure of Damages.</p> <p>2. Section 61 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Porto Rico, which provides that “such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just,” does not prescribe any new rule of damages, and must therefore be construed in connection with § 1803 of the Civil Code of Porto Rico, which provides for compensatory damages only.</p> <p>Negligence — Measure of Damages — Expectancy of Life.</p> <p>3. In an action by a mother for the death of her son, the measure of damages is the loss of support. The mortuary tables of insurance companies refer only to people in good health, and if a person’s health is such as not to meet the requirements of the insurance companies the mortuary tables do not control. In such circumstance the jury must determine the expectancy of life.</p> <p>Note. — On right of parent to recover damages for negligent killing of minor child, see note in 17 L.B.A. 79.</p> <p>Eor authorities discussing the question of assumption of risk of minor employee, see note in 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 279.</p> <p>For a discussion of the question as to what persons are deemed to be independent "contractors within the meaning of rule relieving employer from liability, see notes in 65 L.R.A. 445, and 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 371.</p> <p>On the question as to who are fellow servants on vessels, see note in 50 L.R.A. 460.</p> <p>Negligence — Married Woman — Bight to Support.</p> <p>4. The fact that decedent’s mother is married and is supported hy her husband does not deprive her of her right to receive support from her son.</p> <p>Negligence of Agent.</p> <p>5. An agent is hound to execute his duties with ordinary care, and is answerable to anyone who may be injured by his negligence.</p> <p>Negligence — Assumption of Bisk.</p> <p>6. Every person assumes the risks of his employment if he -undertakes it with knowledge of the risks.</p> <p>Negligence — Eellow-Servant Buie.</p> <p>7. Where a winchman was working on the deck of a vessel and the injured man was working in the hold, so that they' were in different branches of employment, the rule of fellow servant does not apply.</p> <p>Negligence — Independent Contractor.</p> <p>8. A stevedore who undertakes contracts for the loading and unloading of vessels as a business in itself is an independent contractor, and the person with whom he contracts to do the loading or unloading is not answerable for his negligence.</p> <p>Negligence — Selection of Agent — Besponsibility of Principal.</p> <p>9. A steamship company which-employs as stevedore a man of experience as such, and who is recognized in the community as a capable stevedore, has used the care which “a good father of a family,” prescribed by § 1804 of the Civil Code of Porto Bico would have used, and is not responsible for his negligence.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 344Gavilan v. Lugo (1917)
<p>Bankruptcy — Trustee.</p> <p>1. The trustee is not the agent of the bankrupt, but the representative of the court in the handling of the bankrupt’s estate.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Property of the Bankrupt — Rule to Show Cause.</p> <p>2. Upon the appointment of the trustee, if not earlier, all the property of the bankrupt passes to him by act of law, and if the bankrupt or his agents withhold property from the trustee, the referee may issue an order to them to show cause, and a disregard of said order is punishable as a contempt by imprisonment.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Property of Bankrupt — Presumption of Law as to Possession.</p> <p>3. If the bankrupt is unable to turn over property to the trustee, there can be no imprisonment for contempt. The sworn answer of the bankrupt that he has not possession of the property is not conclusive, as the law presumes that possession once held continues until proved otherwise.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Court of Bankruptcy — Powers of Referee — Third Persons.</p> <p>4. The referee is the court of bankruptcy for many purposes and for all purposes connected with the collection of the assets of the estate. The referee has power to initiate proceedings, and the court to punish for contempt, but this power cannot be used against a third person who holds bona- fide the title or possession of the property.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Petition for Review — Rinding of Pact by Referee.</p> <p>5. Upon a petition for review, the court will accept the referee’s findings of fact unless convinced that he was wrong.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 355United States v. Porto Rico Railway, Light, & Power Co. (1917)
Finding of Facts. Pleadings. Tbe complaint was filed in tbis case July 1, 1914, answer followed July 28, and later came stipulation waiving a jury. Tbe pleadings cover lands in San Juan, Porto Rico, witbin tbe ward of tbe Marina known as La Carbonera, as follows: “II.
- 9 P.R. Fed. 390Filbrick v. Municipality of Bayamón (1917)
<p>Motion to Strike.</p> <p>1. A motion to strike another motion is not the practice in this court, and will be denied as unnecessary.</p> <p>Suit to Quiet Title — Location of Land.</p> <p>2. In a bill to quiet title, plaintiff need not locate the road which he says defendant claims; it is sufficient if he alleges that it runs through his property.</p> <p>Bill Pro Confesso — Failure of Clerk of Court to Grant.</p> <p>3. Where the plaintiff has made a motion before the clerk of the court to take the bill pro confesso, and the clerk should have granted it but did not, the matter should be brought before the court by review, and not by an oral motion to ask the clerk to do what it does not appear he has refused to do.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 394El Banco Popular de Economías y Préstamos de San Juan v. Wilcox (1917)
<p>On Exceptions to Repost or Special Master.</p> <p>Master’s Report — Exceptions.</p> <p>1. An exception to a master’s report of a sale of property under decree of this court on the ground that the price obtained was inadequate will not be considered unless it is satisfactorily shown to the court that a higher price would be brought at a resale.</p> <p>Master’s Report — Exceptions—Informalities at Sale.</p> <p>2. An exception to a master’s report that a sale should be set aside on account of informalities in the proceeding will not be sustained where it is shown that the informalities were not material.</p> <p>Master’s Report — Exceptions—Place of Public Sale.</p> <p>3. An exception taken to a master’s report on the ground that the sale was not held at the proper place will be sustatined where it is shown that the decree ordered the sale to be held in the court room, and it was advertised to be held at the courthouse door, the point being material on account of this courthouse having several doors.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 400Fuentes v. American Railroad (1917)
<p>Suit foe Death of Illegitimate Child.</p> <p>Damages — Mother of Illegitimate Child.</p> <p>1. A mother of an illegitimate son cannot recover damages for his death under § 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Porto Rico.</p> <p>Damages — Mother of Illegitimate Child — Support.</p> <p>2. While a mother is entitled to be supported by her child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, she cannot recover damages for its death. Consistency requires that if there was a right of suit under § 1803 of the Civil Code of Porto Rico, this subject must now be regarded as falling entirely under § 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was adopted at a later date.</p> <p>Note. — On right of mother to recover for the negligent killing of an illegitimate child, see notes in 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 640, and L.R.A.1916E, 125.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 404In re Toro Velez (1917)
<p>Powers of Referee isr Summary Proceedings.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Judicial District — Division.</p> <p>1. Section 38 (3) of the Bankruptcy Act, which gives the referee the powers of the judge for certain purposes during the latter’s absence from the district refers to the judicial district, and not to the divisional district, of the referee.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Proceedings in Bankruptcy.</p> <p>2. Proceedings in bankruptcy include adjudication, collection of property by the trustee, distribution of proceeds, and the discharge of the bankrupt. The referee has power to act in a summary manner in all these four proceedings.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Controversies Arising Out of Bankruptcy.</p> <p>3. A proceeding by a trustee in bankruptcy against a third party is a controversy arising out of bankruptcy, and must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of §§ 23, 60b, 67e and 70e of the Bankruptcy Act.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Proceeding in Bankruptcy.</p> <p>4. A proceeding in bankruptcy is in the nature of a suit in equity.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Third Parties — Summary Procedure.</p> <p>5. A referee has not power to proceed by rule to compel third parties to deliver property to the bankrupt’s trustee.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 414In re Navarro (1917)
<p>Bankruptcy — Attorneys’ Pees.</p> <p>1. What is the proper amount to allow a trustee’s attorney for his services depends very largely upon each individual case; and •where it is shown that by the attorney’s efforts a sum of money was recovered for the creditors considerably larger than would otherwise have been recovered, a fee of 25 per cent is not unreasonable.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Attorneys’ Fees — Contingent Fee.</p> <p>2. The fee of trustee’s attorney who takes a case on a contingency basis should be based upon the net amount recovered.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 418Banco Popular v. Wilcox (1917)
<p>Motion to Dismiss Bill of Review.</p> <p>Bill of Review — Necessary Allegations.</p> <p>1. A bill of review must allege performance of the decree or a sufficient reason why it has not been performed. If the original decree has not been performed the new bill must ask that it be allowed without performance.</p> <p>Bill of Review — Decree Pro Confesso — Parties.</p> <p>2. A decree pro confesso is not binding upon one not a party. It is inequitable to allow a plaintiff to prosecute a bill of review to cover remedies which might have been obtained in a suit which he voluntarily dismissed as to the main party in interest.</p> <p>Notaries — Disqualifications.</p> <p>3. A notary is not disqualified from acting as such in a deed to which a bank, of which he is an official, is a party, because he and the bank are separate entities:</p> <p>Equity Pleading — Admissions.</p> <p>4. An allegation in an answer to a bill in equity which does not amount to a set-off or counterclaim is deemed to be denied.</p> <p>Usury.</p> <p>5. Section 4 of the Act of March 1, 1902, of the Porto Rican Legislature, avoids the usurious interest, but not the principal. A second mortgage which purports to be for an additional loan plus interest then accrued amounts to a rest on which interest then due was figured out and not paid, and the interest then ceases to be interest, and becomes a deferred debt.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 424De la Rosa v. Sucrerie Centrale Coloso de Porto Rico (1917)
<p>Bill of Pabticulaes.</p> <p>Bill of Particulars — Statute of Limitations.</p> <p>1. Unless the Statute of Limitations is pleaded it is considered waived, and to enable a defendant to plead the statute the complaint must definitely state the date of the origin of an account.</p> <p>Bill of Particulars — Discretion of Court.</p> <p>2. The granting of an application for a bill of particulars is within the broad judicial discretion of the court.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 427Olmedo v. Romero (1917)
<p>INTERPLEADER AT LAW.</p> <p>Pleading — Demurrer.</p> <p>1. A demurrer to a complaint on tlie ground that the suit is prematurely brought because the mandate in a related case has not been received from the circuit court of appeals will not bo sustained. In an appeal from this court to the circuit court of appeals, the rights of the parties for all substantial purposes become fixed at the time the latter court renders judgment, and not at the time the mandate is received in this court.</p> <p>Note. — On right of attorney to recover on quantum meruit for services rendered under illegal or champertous contract, see notes in 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 261, and 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1202.</p> <p>Pleading — Demurrer—Attorneys’ Rees.</p> <p>' 2. While it has been held that where an attorney has been discharged from the case, his right against the client cannot be upon the contract, that not having been carried out, but upon a quantum meruit, if the attorney is unjustifiably discharged he may sue upon the contract.</p> <p>Interpleader.</p> <p>3. Section 70 of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates the bringing in of a person not already a party to the action, and § 71, that a person subject to two conflicting claims may bring an action against both claimants to compel them to interplead.</p> <p>Interpleader — Identity of Object.</p> <p>4. To compel parties to interplead it is an inflexible rule that the thing to which parties make adverse claims must be identical, and where the claims are of different amounts they are not identical.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 434Romero v. Calaf (1917)
<p>Taxable Costs.</p> <p>Costs — Federal Courts.</p> <p>1. In the Federal courts only such costs are taxable as are allowed by §§ 823 et seq. of the Revised Statutes.</p> <p>Costs — Terms of the Contract.</p> <p>2. Where, under the terms of his contract with the defendants, plaintiff had to show a good title to the land to be conveyed, and to do so necessarily had to obtain certified copies of certain documents, the expense of obtaining them will not be allowed as costs.</p> <p>Costs — Cumulative Evidence.</p> <p>3. Whether cumulative evidence should be admitted at a trial is a matter within the discretion of the court, and, having been admitted, a charge as costs therefore is proper.</p> <p>Costs — Final Decision.</p> <p>4. Where, for the purpose of opposing a motion for a new trial, plaintiff procured certain documents, he is entitled to his costs in connection therewith although the new trial was granted, as the final decision was in his favor and the question of costs on the motion had not been previously disposed of.</p> <p>Costs — Evidence Not Admitted.</p> <p>5. The expense incurred in procuring documentary evidence not admitted by the court will not be allowed as costs.</p> <p>Costs — Law of Foreign Country.</p> <p>6. In deciding what is a proper allowance for the drawing up of documents in a foreign country, the court will be guided by the charge allowed by the laws of the country.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 439Hermanos v. Fernandez (1917)
<p>Insolvency Vel Non.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Agency—Death of Principal.</p> <p>I, Under § 1640 of the Civil Code, "what has been done by the agent, when he was not aware of the death of the principal, . . . shall be valid and of effect with regard to third persons who may have contracted with the agent in good faith,” and where creditors would have looked to the principal, had he lived, for the amount of their claims they cannot throw the agent into bankruptcy.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Probate Proceedings' — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. Proceedings in bankruptcy cannot be begun against the estate of a deceased person; and as probate proceedings cannot be had in a Federal court in bankruptcy, the court has no jurisdiction to determine whether or not one is the heir of a deceased person, as the court cannot do indirectly what it has not the power to do directly.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Wage Earner — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>3. One who is dependent for a living upon the result of his individual efforts, without the aid of property or capital, is a wage earner, and cannot be adjudicated an involuntary bankrupt; and where the evidence tends to show that one is a wage earner, the burden of showing the contrary is on the petitioning creditors.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 444In re Ramirez Quiñones (1917)
<p>Review of Referee’s Decision on Taxes.</p> <p>Taxes — Assessment—Taxes Are Not Debts, But Imposts.</p> <p>1. Taxes are due and owing from the date of the assessment, regardless of the fact that they may not be collectable until a later date and they are not debts founded upon contract, but imposts levied for the support of the government.</p> <p>Taxes — Assessment—Ownership.</p> <p>2. The assessment fixes the lien upon the property itself, and the lien is not affected by a change of ownership subsequently to the date of the assessment.</p> <p>Taxes — Assessment—Revaluation—Exemption.</p> <p>3. Notwithstanding that the local law fixes a time after which the valuation placed on property for taxation purposes cannot be reviewed, the matter can be reinvestigated by a court of bankruptcy after that time. Property in the hands of a trustee is not exempt from taxation at its proper value, and the fact that on account of an appeal it remains longer in the hands of the trustee than might be desirable makes no difference in the result.</p> <p>Taxes — Surcharges—Payment Under Protest.</p> <p>4. Where the trustee failed to pay taxes at the time fixed by law because of dissatisfaction with the valuation placed upon the property by the government, and did not pay them under protest or make a tender of the proper amount, surcharges will be allowed against him as against any other litigant.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 452In re Tapia (1917)
<p>On Application iron Habeas Corpus.</p> <p>Ee Grand Jury In Porto Rico Local Courts.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Organization—Incorporation.</p> <p>1. The organization of a territory generally, hut not necessarily, consists of putting it under a government with the usual three departments. Incorporation of territory into the United States consists of making the people a part of the Union, instead of a possession of the Union. The process relates to the land, the people, and the rights conferred. This process began at least with the Declaration of Independence, when the inalienable rights of man were declared to be life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, governments being instituted to secure them. The grand jury was one of these colonial institutions. Under the Confederation, among' the personal rights were religion, habeas corpus, trial by jury, and representative government. The extension of the country began with the Northwest Territory, settled principally by Americans, and being within the original limits of the United States. The Ordinance of 1787 for this territory furnished the model for all subsequent territories, and among the rights provided for are habeas corpus, trial by jury, and judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Constitution—Fundamental Eights.</p> <p>2. To the Constitution adopted in 1787 was added a Bill of Rights, and in Amendment 5 wr, that “no person shall he held to answer for .... an infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment by a grand jury.” While the essential rights of man may be differentiated from the rights of an American, wherever the Constitution applies we are concerned only with the rights provided for therein, among which are jury and grand jury.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Territory South of the Ohio River-Rights.</p> <p>3. The same rights applied South of the Ohio river as in the Northwest Territory according to acts of Congress creating territories in that district. The territorial system thus developed in the original Union east of the Mississippi carried with it a system of general institutions, but accommodating themselves to special local needs.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Louisiana Purchase — Orleans.</p> <p>4. The Louisiana Purchase Treaty of 1803 promised the incorporation of the inhabitants into the Union and admission to all rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, they meantime enjoying their liberty, property, and religion. The beginning of such incorporation into the Union was the creation of the territories of Orleans and Louisiana (afterwards Louisiana and Missouri), to which general statutes of the United States were extended and for which the grand jury was contemplated, and the completion of incorporation was the granting of citizenship at the admission of the states of Louisiana and Missouri.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Acquisition of Florida — Territory.</p> <p>5. Similarly the Florida Treaty of 1819 was a promise which as to incorporation of the district was fulfilled by the creation of the territory and as to citizenship by the admission of that state.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Texas and Mexican Treaty.</p> <p>6. Texas was annexed and citizenship thereby extended, and the Mexican acquisitions were incorporated by extending the American boundary southwardly so as to embrace them.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Citizenship—States.</p> <p>7. Citizenship is the sum of the rights, privileges, immunities, and advantages of those making up the sovereign people. A citizen of a state was and is necessarily a citizen of the United States, but before the 14th Amendment there was no citizenship of the United States apart from citizenship of some individual state. Under the Constitution there are only two sources of citizenship, birth and naturalization, the latter individual or collective, by the general or by special law.</p> <p>Territories West of the Mississippi — Government—Indians.</p> <p>8. The territories west of the Mississippi river thus incorporated - gradually grew into a regular system, to which separately and afterwards by Eevised Statutes the Constitution and laws not locally inapplicable were extended. While the Indians were not subject to individual naturalization, many tribes have been collectively naturalized, and others lived in the unorganized Indian Territory, which ultimately was made subject to the Constitution and admitted as part of the state of Oklahoma. All the contiguous territories were parts of the Union with right to control local matters, but themselves under the absolute control of Congress.</p> <p>14th Amendment — Alaska Treaty — Incorporation.</p> <p>9. The I4th Amendment created national citizenship, and Alaska was acquired under it. The inhabitants were shortly recognized by Congress as admitted to all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States. This was incorporation into the Union and the Constitution applied proprio vigore, beyond the power of Congress to change it, but Congress as the local legislature could make a difference between Alaska and the rest of the Union in tax matters so far as the proceeds were used exclusively for local purposes.</p> <p>Hawaii — Annexation—Preparation.</p> <p>10. The annexation of Hawaii did not carry with it incorporation and citizenship until the territorial form of government was instituted, and in the meantime the rights of man, and not the historical rights of Americans, were enforceable.</p> <p>Treaty of Paris — Philippines—Not Incorporated.</p> <p>11. The Treaty of Paris 1898 passed to the United States the sovereignty of the Philippines and Porto Eico, but instituted a new territorial policy in that it contained no promise of incorporation of the new possessions into the Union. Congress accordingly has determined the civil rights and political status of the Philippines by keeping them a “possession” not “incorporated into the Union.” The grand jury and other constitutional American rights as distinguished from the rights of man do not apply there.</p> <p>Same — Porto Eico — Foraker Act 1900.</p> <p>12. The Foraker Act of 1900 conferred many privileges of a territory on Porto Eico, both of form and substance, but did not effect full incorporation of land or people into the Union.</p> <p>Same — Porto Eico — Jones Act 1917.</p> <p>13. The Jones Act still withholds the title “territory,” but the use for Porto Rican purposes of general revenues collected in Porto Rico is not inconsistent with Porto Rico being a territory. The territorial system is flexible enough to meet any difficulties connected with Americanization of “possessions.”</p> <p>Porto Rico — Jones Act — Citizenship.</p> <p>14. Incorporation is legally that of the people and that of the land or district is only for the benefit of the people. The latter grants a quasi citizenship; general incorporation and citizenship are almost synonymous. Porto Ricans are fully Americans and fully incorporated into the Union, with the inalienable right of grand jury and with all other constitutional rights.</p> <p>Habeas Corpus — Machinery for Grand Jury — Personal Rights.</p> <p>15. The Legislature could have passed a law for a grand jury, and an American cannot be deprived of his rights because of supposed public convenience; but as a new legislature is about to come into being the execution of the writ in this case will in the discretion of the court be postponed three months to give the authorities opportunity to correct the oversight, and petitioner released on bail.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 497Ubarri v. Red (1917)
<p>Plea to Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Service by Publication — Substituted Service.</p> <p>In a suit affecting real property within the jurisdiction, absent IX. Porto Rico. — 32. defendants may be brought in by service by publication, or so-called substituted service, as sovereignties have full control over suits affecting real property within their limits. If it clearly appears from the pleadings or otherwise that a subpcena cannot be served, it is unnecessary to await the marshal’s return in order to justify the entry of an order for substituted service.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 500Gaudinaut v. Smith (1917)
<p>UNLAWFUL' DETAINEE (DESAHUCIO).</p> <p>Unlawful Detainer — Necessary Parties.</p> <p>1. In an action brought under the Act of March 9, 1905, establishing unlawful detainer proceedings, the person in material possession of the property must be made a party defendant.</p> <p>Payment for the Account of Another — § 1126 of the Civil Code — Burden of</p> <p>Proof.</p> <p>2. Under § 1126 of the Civil Code any person, with or without interest, may make payment for the account of another, but a plaintiff is not required to allege that no one has made payment, as this would be putting the burden on him of negativing the defense.</p> <p>Pleading — Complaint—-Ultimate Facts.</p> <p>3. It is a general rule of pleading that only the ultimate facts, and not evidentiary matters, may be set out in a complaint; but where it is 'attacked on the ground that it is uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible in that it does not set forth sufficient facts to enable the defendant to prepare his defense, it must be made more specific.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 505Linares v. Sucesores de Bianchi (1917)
<p>Specific Performance of Contract.</p> <p>Pleading — Ultimate Pacts — -Equity.</p> <p>1. The general rule in equity as at law is that the ultimate facts, and not evidentiary circumstances, must be stated.</p> <p>Pleading — Allegations—Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>2. A bill of complaint which alleges that plaintiffs executed a written guaranty to a third party for the benefit of the defendants is not subject to dismissal because it does not allege that the defendants made use of the guaranty, as the contract between the parties did not provide that the guaranty should be used by the defendants.</p> <p>Equity — Specific Performance — Corporate Stock.</p> <p>3. Specific performance is a remedy in equity which compels the-performance of a contract where money damages would be inadequate, and it must he performed in the precise terms agreed upon, and nothing can be left to inference, specific performance will be applied to cases of corporate stock, as well as to those involving land.</p> <p>Pleading — Allegations—Partnership—Acts of Partners — Ratification.</p> <p>4. A possible defect in a bill of complaint, consisting in failing to allege that a partner had power to perform a certain act on behalf of the partnership, is cured by an allegation that the services rendered by the plaintiffs were accepted by the other partners, as this amounts to a ratification.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 511Ex parte Araujo (1917)
<p>Application por Habeas Corpus.</p> <p>Porto Rieo — Incorporated Territory — Tapia Case Followed — States—Territories — Personal Civil Rights — Political Rights.</p> <p>1. The principles of the Tapia Habeas Corpus Case, decided May 21, 1917, ante, 452, that Porto Rico has been incorporated into the United States by the Jones Act and otherwise, are followed in this case, and the conclusion therein is emphasized by the Military Draft Law and the President’s proclamation as to the territories of Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Rico, based on it. The Tapia Case concerns only personal civil rights which are the same for all Americans. Political rights, however, are not complete until a territory becomes a state of the Union, and the question of ultimate statehood is a political, and not a judicial, question.</p> <p>Grand Jury — Infamous Crime.</p> <p>2. A person charged with violating a statute which includes hard labor as part of the punishment for its violation is accused of an “infamous crime” and entitled to a grand jury.</p> <p>Adulterated Milk — Punishment.</p> <p>3. Under the local statute there must first be a sentence to imprisonment in a district jail for a term exceeding ninety days, 'before the court can in its discretion direct that the prisoner be put to labor upon public works.</p> <p>“Infamous Crime” — Insular Courts — Presumption.</p> <p>4. It is not the punishment actually inflicted that makes a crime infamous, but the liability to an infamous punishment. The insular authorities having prosecuted a case in a certain manner, this court will indulge no presumption against their procedure.</p> <p>“Infamous Crime” — Punishment—State Prison — Penitentiary—Jail.</p> <p>5. A person accused of an infamous crime is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison, which is the equivalent of a penitentiary. Imprisonment in a local jail is not the equivalent of imprisonment in a state prison, and is not witMn the constitutional provision requiring a grand jury.</p> <p>Porto Rican Milk Adulteration Legislation — Federal Pure Pood Legislation.</p> <p>6. The local legislation concerning the adulteration of milk and the Federal pure food legislation of 1906 are in pari materia; offenses under the latter are misdemeanors and are presented by the district attorney without a grand jury.</p> <p>Imprisonment — Time Within Which Punishment for Second Offense Begins to Run — Premature Application for Habeas Corpus.</p> <p>7. A person sentenced to two terms of imprisonment cannot begin to serve the second until he has finished serving the first term, and an application for a writ of habeas corpus based on the second term of imprisonment is premature if he has not commenced serving the second term.</p> <p>Right to Trial by Petit Jury — Waiver—Ignorance of Rights.</p> <p>8. A person who does not know that he is entitled to a jury trial, and is tried and convicted by the court without a jury, does not waive his right to a jury trial, and can set up the defect after conviction.</p> <p>Trial by Jury — State Constitutions — Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>9. A state may dispense with trial by jury in minor offenses if the State Constitution permits, but the courts of the United States and incorporated territories cannot dispense with it on account of the 6th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which requires a jury trial “in all criminal prosecutions.” Nevertheless a petty offense is not such a “criminal prosecution” because it was not such a common law, and the Constitution was framed with the common law in view.</p> <p>Habeas Corpus — Procedure.</p> <p>10. This court will not interfere with the administration of justice in the local courts except where constitutional rights have been clearly violated. Procedure in habeas corpus applications after conviction outlined.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 523American Railroad v. Municipality of San Juan (1917)
Statement of Pleadings. This bill for injunction of certain municipalities against collection of a patente or so-called license tax for municipal purposes was filed November 13, 1915, and hearing has been delayed through absence of counsel and amendments. On June 12, 1916, the defendant the municipality of Mayaguez filed a demurrer and motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, and at tbe same time there was beard plaintiff’s application for preliminary injunction.
- 9 P.R. Fed. 535In re Naturalization of Costa Semidey (1917)
<p>Naturalization — Act of March 2, 1917 — General Naturalization Law.</p> <p>1. The Act of March 2, 1917, and the General Naturalization Law should he construed in pari materia, and the proceedings in both cases must follow substantially the same course, but, as to require ninety days’ notice of application would practically nullify the former act, the notice will not be required.</p> <p>Naturalization — Act of March 2, 1917 — General Naturalization Law— Residence.</p> <p>2. The provisions of § 5 of the Act of March 2, 1917, lesson materially the difficulty of proof required by the General Naturalization Law, and the applicant need not prove that he has resided continuously in Porto Rico since his birth, it being sufficient that he prove that he is now permanently residing in Porto Rico.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 539Enfors v. Municipality of San Juan (1917)
<p>Municipal Liability for Sidewakx.</p> <p>Municipalities — Powers.</p> <p>1. The law governing municipalities in Porto Rico is substantially of American, and not of Spanish, origin, and their powers are set forth in § 25 of the Municipal Law.</p> <p>Municipalities — Liability to Suit.</p> <p>2. In accordance with the American theory of government, municipalities can sue and be sued.</p> <p>Municipalities — Counties—Liability for Defective Streets and Sidewalks.</p> <p>3. Counties are mere political subdivisions of the state, and as the states are not suable neither are the counties, but cities are corporate entities and are liable for the acts of their officers.</p> <p>Municipalities — Damages—Complaint—Allegations.</p> <p>4. Where a complaint states that the injury was the result of and caused by the negligence of the employees of the municipality pursuant to its instructions, it does not state a case for a defective street or sidewalk.</p> <p>Municipalities — Payment of Judgment.</p> <p>5. Whether or not a judgment for damages against a municipality can be collected because there is no appropriation for a fund from which damages can be paid is a question for subsequent consideration.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 544In re Garffer (1917)
<p>Application por Naturalization.</p> <p>Naturalization — First Papers — Final Papers.</p> <p>1. No matter when first papers were taken out, all applications for final papers roust be made within seven years after the taking effect of the Act of 1916. Ee Yunghauss, 210 Fed. 545.</p> <p>Construction of Statutes — Intention of the Legislature.</p> <p>2. All laws should receive a sensible construction, and, however broad the language of a statute, an act which is within the letter but not within the intention of the legislature cannot he held to be within the statute.</p> <p>Naturalization — Act of March 2, 1917 — Bemedial—Ee Yunghauss, supra, Distinguished.</p> <p>3. A foreigner who took out his first papers in New York in 1905 and then came to Porto Eico, where there was no court with jurisdiction of naturalization matters, will be granted his final papers under the Act of March 2, 1917, which is remedial in its general intent. The facts in this ease are different from those in Ee Yunghauss, supra.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 548In re Lubinus (1917)
<p>On Application toe Weit of Habeas Cokpus.</p> <p>Law of Nations — Duty of Court.</p> <p>1. When alien enemies are brought before a court charged with an offense, the court cannot serve the momentary purposes of particular national interest, but must administer with indifference that justice which the law of nations holds out to independent states whether neutral or belligerent.</p> <p>Alien Enemies — Bailable Offense.</p> <p>2. Section 1015 of the Revised Statutes of the United States does not apply to alien enemies in the actual naval service of a power with which the United States are at war, as laws are made ordinarily for a state of peace, and when the basic conditions change the applicability of the law also changes.</p> <p>Alien Enemies — Bail—Offense Committed Before a State of War Existed.</p> <p>3. Members of the German Navy cannot be admitted to bail, as no member of a hostile army or navy can be at large in the United States on bail. Alien enemies who committed an offense before the declaration of war cannot be considered prisoners of war; they are prisoners of the civil authorities.</p> <p>Alien Enemies — Treatment of Prisoners.</p> <p>4. The court will see to it, on the ground of humanity, that alien enemies who are prisoners of the United States are treated as all other prisoners are treated.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 556Rivera v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (1917)
<p>Application to Cancel Satisfaction.</p> <p>Satisfaction of Judgment — Avoidance—Attorneys’ Fees.</p> <p>1. A satisfaction of judgment procured by fraud, accident, or mistake may be ordered stricken from the files, and this is particularly true when the settlement made affected the proper fees of the attorney of one of the parties and was made without his knowledge.</p> <p>Judgment — Term of Court.</p> <p>2. Ordinarily a court cannot alter a judgment after the closing of the term at which It was rendered; and it must be attacked generally by a bill in equity.</p> <p>Attorney’s Fees — Judicial Notice — Case on Appeal.</p> <p>3. The court takes judicial notice of the fact that attorneys’ fees constitute a part of the litigation, and that they are seldom paid in advance or otherwise secured. When a case is pending on appeal the lower court can do nothing except to preserve the corpus.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 560In re Tapia (1917)
<p>Application fob Wbit of Habeas Cokpus.</p> <p>Habeas Corpus — Local Courts — Federal Courts — Jurisdiction—Equal Civil ' Rights Act.</p> <p>1. The Federal courts will endeavor not to interfere in a case of which the local courts have taken jurisdiction, and even in habeas corpus matters there must he urgency or some other very good reason for interfering. The Equal Civil Rights Act applies to class legislation or class discrimination, and if an accused person is being treated no differently from others he has no right to complain.</p> <p>Habeas Corpus — Local Courts — Federal Courts — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. Where an accused person has been placed in jail, that marks definitely the closing of a proceeding in the local court, and this court can then interfere to determine whether or not he is unlawfully detained.</p> <p>Habeas Corpus — Procedure—Immaterial Changes in Writ.</p> <p>3. Changes made in the writ without authority of the judge issuing it are disapproved, but are allowed in this special case, especially as the change made is immaterial.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 565Banco Popular v. Wilcox (1917)
<p>Appeal and Bond.</p> <p>Appeal — Confirmation of Mortgage Sale.</p> <p>1. A decree confirming a sale under foreclosure is final, and an appeal may be taken therefrom.</p> <p>Appeal — Supersedeas Bond.</p> <p>2. The principal controlling the amount of a supersedeas bond is that it shall be sufficient to indemnify the opposite party for the losses he may sustain on account of the nonsatisfaetion of the judgment when rendered. It is a matter primarily within the discretion of the judge allowing the appeal.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 569Banco Popular v. Wilcox (1917)
<p>Re Deficiency Judgment after Mortgage Sale.</p> <p>Decree Pro Confesso — Parties-—Due Process of Law.</p> <p>1. A decree taken pro confesso against a party to a suit cannot affect one not a party to the suit and against whom it was not taken as at common law, and under the 14th Amendment every person is entitled to due process of law, and is not bound by any proceeding to which he is not a party.</p> <p>Foreclosure of Mortgage — Procedure.</p> <p>2. In addition to the mortgage procedure, a mortgage may be foreclosed in Porto Rico by the proceeding established by the Law of March 9, 1905, analogous to other judicial proceedings or by a foreclosure in equity.</p> <p>Mortgage — Third Party — Mortgage Law — Civil Code.</p> <p>3. A mortgage is primarily a security, and a third party, as purchaser, while liable for the obligation to the extent of the mortgaged property, is not liable further. Where the Civil Code conflicts with the Mortgage Law the Code prevails.</p> <p>Mortgage — Third Party — Express Liability — Novation—Equity.</p> <p>4. While a third party, as a purchaser, is ordinarily liable only . to the extent of the mortgaged property, this is not so where he expressly obligates himself further. An original mortgage debtor may be substituted by another, with the consent of the mortgagee, and this must be done by an instrument of equal dignity with the mortgage, but where this is not done but the parties act as if it had been done, equity will consider it as having been done.</p> <p>Mortgage — Foreclosure—Deficiency Decree.</p> <p>5. Under the general power of a court of equity to mold its procedure to meet the justice of the case, there may be a decree of foreclosure, and if the sale does not produce an amount sufficient to cover the debt there may be a subsequent decree for the deficiency.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 577Ex parte Judice Susoni (1917)
<p>■Application foe Oath of Allegiance.</p> <p>Naturalization — Ability to Speak English — Translation of Application.</p> <p>1. Congress having admitted to American citizenship by the Porto Rican Organic Act of March 2, 1917, a million or more people, without requiring them to be able to speak English, an applicant under § 5 of the said act need not express this requirement in his application. The applicant will be required, however, to furnish a certificate from the official translator of the court, showing that the application has been translated into Spanish and read to him, as the signing by the applicant of a paper written in English would be a pure formality.</p> <p>Naturalization — Petition—Birth Certificate — -Pees of Translator.</p> <p>2. As the translation of petitions is not covered by the salary of the interpreter of the court, he will be allowed a fee of 50 cents for the translation thereof and his certificate. Where a translation of a birth certificate is necessary he will be allowed a total fee of $1, this to cover interpreting the petition.</p>
- 9 P.R. Fed. 579Porto Rico v. American Railroad (1917)
Statement of tbe Pleadings. Tbis suit was commenced April 25, 1917, by a petition filed on that date in the local district court at San Juan, praying an injunction against an increase of freight rates by the defendant on sugar cane and other products from and after May 1, 1917. A restraining order was accordingly issued by Honorable José Benedicto, judge of the local court, and the matter made returnable on April 28 for further consideration.
- 9 P.R. Fed. 596Charge to the Grand Jury (1917)