Volume 9 — United States Reports

A bill of exceptions stated that the plaintiff below Produced and read to. the court the following acts of the general assembly of Virginia, v-iz.( “ An act f°r incorporating the town of Alexandria in the county of .Fairfax, and the town of Winchester-in the' county Frederick,” passed' .October 4th, 1779, by which it is enacted that “ The mayor, recorder, aldermen and common councilraen shall have power to. erect and repair work-houses, houses of correction, and prisons and…

t-olumoia. , On the plea of payment to an action of debt upon a bond, for 500 dollars, dated in .178 Í, the defendant offered evidence to prove that in the'year 1797 the plaintiff acknowledged that he had_ received of the money of the defendant to the amount of about 1,000 dollars,, of one Willoughby Tibbs, out of the amount of a decree which the defendant had obtained against him for 3,000 dollars, and that the money which he so received was in full of all his claims…

. , , , , . . „ A bill or exceptions stated that the plaintiffs on the trial produced in evidence to support their title to the goods, a certain paper writing signed by one John Withers, to which one John Pierson had subscribed his name as, a witness, and offered parol evidence to prove that the subscribing-witness “ had upwards of a year ago left the district of Columbia, and that before he left the said district he declared that he should go to the northward, that is to…

• The defendants below pleaded non .assumpserunt, ‘.and the statute of limitations.

at Alexandria, iii an action of assumpsit brought by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error, as executor.

.. . • ~ . Pennsylvania, m an action of ejectment., The only question was, whether the exemplification of a deed from Allen to Delaney, could be lawfully rea(l in evidence at the trial. This question arose upon the following case : William Allen, on the 27th of December, 1771, being seised in fee of the land in controversy, lying *n Northampton county, by deed of bargain and sale of that date, conveyed the same to James Delaney and Margaret his wife, in fee.

Upon the general issue, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, below for 143 dollars and 33 cents, subject to the opinion of the court upon the following case: Thomas Moore, the bankrupt, carried on the trade and business of a vendue master in copartnership with one Henry Moore, which copartnership was on the 31st of March, 1802, dissolved on the terms that Thomas Moore should collect the balances due to,and pay the debts due from the joint concern as far as the joint…

promissory note, negotiable in the bank Alexandria, made by Young to Yeaton, and by him enibrsed to the bank. # . .

ERROR.to the Circuit court of the district of Colúmbia, in an action of 'assumpsit brought by the defendants in error against the plaintiff in error as endorsor of a promissory note for the accommodation of .R, Young, the maker. ' The declaration contained two counts. One upon the endorsement of. the note, in the usual form, and without any averment of the insolvency of the maker, or of any steps taken to enforce ‘payment from' him.

. The only question decided in this court was that relative to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. The parties were described in the declaration as follows : “ William-Henderson Boardman, and Pascal Paoli Pope, both of Boston, in the district of Massachusetts, merchants and citizens of the State of Massachusetts,, complain of The Hope Insurance.

the circuit court for the district of The declaration, ox. petition, was as follows; as it is there called, District of Georgia. To the honourable the judges of the sixth circuit court of the United States, in and for the district aforesaid.

ÉRROR to the supreme court of the state of Ohio for the county of Muskingum, in an action of ejectment brought by Zane’s Lessee against Matthews, in which both parties claimed title under the laws of the United States. The question of jurisdiction in this case was settled at last term.

Straas and others,' of Rickmondf covenanted with the plaintiff for the said u QeorSre p, Straas and others, of Richmond, as well . , . * - . .

AT the last term Gideon Oltiistead, in behalf of himself and Artimus White, Aquilla Rumsdale, and David Clark, moved the court for a mandamus* to be directed to the honourable Richard Peters, judge of 'the district court of the' United -States for the Pennsylvania district, commanding him to order and direct an attachment or other proper process to issue to enforce obedience to the sentence of the said district court in a civil cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,…

The noté was made by Brooke, payable, in 30 days, at the bank of Alexandria, to the order °f Violett, arid by him endorsed to Patton. ' The declaration had two counts.

wrong of her late husband, Charles Turner, deceased. Upon the issue of never executrix, the jury found a special verdict, stating in substance the following case: On the'14th of February, U98, the defendant, by the name of Rebecca Kenner, being a feme sole, and seised and possessed, in her own right, of certa“‘ land and slaves, conveyed the same by deed, in consideration of an intended marriage between herse¡f an¿ Charles Turner, to trustees, to be held in trust for the use…

Kennedy arid M. Cowell, citizens of- the state of New-Jersey, for land in that state. Upon the trial of the cause upon the general issue, a bill of exceptions was taken by the plaintiff, which presents the following case : Grace Coxe, the lessor of the plaintiff, being seised m lee ot the land m question, before the year 1772 intermarried with John Tabor Kempe, who died in August, 1792.

r plaintitrs in error* The point in issue, in the’ court below, was, whether the insured, on the 11th of December, 1800, when he wrote his order, for insurance, had notice of a storm which happened at Jamaica, on the 2d of November, 1800.

Thomas Bodley, James Hughes, Robert Poague and Robert Campbell, citizens of Kentucky, brought their bill in chancery against John Taylor, a citizen of Virginia, in the state court for the district of Washington, from whence it was afterwards, by consent, removed into the federal court for the district of. Kentucky.

r and Quarles were complainants against Brown. The bill of the complainants was dismissed by the Court below. Both parties claimed under military warrants upon the king’s proclamation, for services rendered prior to the year. 1763. nni_ • i • , ¶ • • ¶ . I he. complainants claimed under a warrant l\l favour of Angus McDonald, for 2,000 acres issued the 5th of February, 1774. Th.e defiendan, claimed unciera warrant in favour of. Jethro.

<p>ERROR tq the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania. Tliis was an ejectment, brought by the defendant in error, in the Court below, to recover the possession. of certain lands in York county, in the State of Pennsylvania.. On the 4th; of March, 1681, Charles II. granted to William Pepn, the ancestor of the lessor of the plaintiff below, that tract of country which now constitutes the State of Pennsylvania. The grant contains special powers to erect manors and to alien the lands, with liberty to the alienees to hold immediately of the pro* prietor and his heirs, notwithstanding the statute of quia emptores. On the 11th of July, in the same year, William Penn, having interested many persons in his grant, agreed with “the adventurers and purchasers” in England, on “ certain conditions and concessions,” which, being for their mutual advantage, were to be obligatory in the future management of the property and settlement of the province. The 9th of these conditions is, that “in every 100,000 acres, the Governor and proprietary, by lot, reserveth ten to himself, which shall lie but in one place.” In the year 1762, a warrant was issued for the survey of the manor of Springetsbury. This warrant recites a former survey of the same land, in 1722, as a manor ; states the general outlines of such former survey, and directs a resurvey. This resurveying was made, and returned into the land office in 1768, where it has remained ever since. This resurvey included the lands claimed by the plaintiffs in error, which were held under warrants, of which the following is a specimen :</p> <p>“ Pennsylvania, ss: By the Proprietaries.</p> <p>“ Whereas, Bartholomew Sesrang, of the county of Lancaster, hath requested that we would grant him to take, up two hundred , acres of land, situate between Codorus creek and Little Cone-wagá creek, adjoining the lands of Killian Smith and Philip Heintz, oq the west sidé of the Susque-hannah river, in the said county of Lancaster, for which he agrees to pay to our use the sum of fifteen pounds ten shillings, current money of this province,, for each hundred acres; and the yearly quit-rent of one halfpenny sterling for every acre thereof.</p> <p>“ These are, therefore, to authorize and require vou to survey, or cause to be surveyed, unto the said Bartholomew, at the place aforesaid, according to the method of townships appointed, the said quantity, of 200 acres, if not already surveyed or appropriated; and make return thereof into the secretary’s office, in order for further confirmation; for which this shall be your sufficient warrant: which survey, in case the said Bartholomew fulfil the above agreement within six months from the date hereof, shall be valid; otherwise void.</p> <p>“Given under my hand and seal of the land office, by virtue of certain powers from the said Proprietaries, at Philadelphia,</p> <p>[i,. s,] this eighth day of January, Anno Do-mini one thousand seven hundred and forty-two: “ George Thomas.</p> <p>“ To Wm. Parsons, Surveyor General.”</p> <p>In virtue of this warrant, a survey of the land claimed by Caleb Kirk, one of the plaintiffs in error, was made on the 12th of October, 1747, in favour of Jacob Wagner, the then holder of the warrant, by various mesne transfers. The title was regularly deduced by various conveyances, from Wagner to Kirk, accompanied with possession, No grant was ever issued for the land. Ten pounds, a part of the consideration, were paid about the date of the warrant, and there was no proof of the payment of the residue. It appeared to have been the usage of the proprietaries, not to insist upon the terms of the contract, by which the survey was declared to be void, unless the agreement was fulfilled within six months from the date of the warrant, and large arrearages of purchast money remained due. after the surveys were made both within and without the manors. The only distinction appears to have been, that the reserved lands were sold by special contract; and the lands not reserved, were sold at stated prices.</p> <p>At the commencement of the war of the American revolution, the proprietary went to Great Britain, where he remained ; and in the year 1779, the legislature of Pennsylvania passed an act, entitled “an act for vesting the estates of the late proprietaries of Pennsylvania, iii this commonwealth.” The ejectment was brought in the year 1819, and on the trial of the cause, the question whether the land in controversy was included within the lines of the manor of Springetsbury, as surveyed under the warrant of 1762, was left to the jury, who found that it was included within those lines. The opinion of the Court below, was, that if the land was within those lines, the right of the plaintiff below was excepted out of the general operation of the act of 1779, and was not vested in the commonwealth. The court also instructed the jury, that the statute of limitations of 1705,' commonly called the~“ seven years law,” was inapplicable to the cáse. To these instructions, the defendant’s Counsel excepted, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff having been rendered in the Court below, the cause was brought by writ of error to this Court.</p> <p>On the part of the plaintiffs in error, it was contended, 1. That the rights derived to the plaintiffs below, were proprietary, and not manorial. Being in their origin proprietary, they were not, and could not be, affected by the survey of a manor in 1768, subsequent to their commencement.</p> <p>2. That the rights, being proprietary, and not manorial, vested in the Commonwealth of Penn- . sylvania, by the right of conquest, and the act of confiscation of 1779. The 7th section confirms all persons, and, consequently, the plaintiffs below, in their rights, derived from the proprietaries. The act must be construed according to its intention, ascertained-by a comparison of all its parts. The intention was to confiscate the proprietary rights, wherever situated; and to reserve the private or manorial rights, wherever located. If a proprietary right was situated within a manor, it was to be confiscated. If it were part of the manor, that is, of the right springing out of the manor, it was reserved. There is no reservation to the proprietaries of the arrears of purchase money due within manors. There is only an exception from the operation of the abolition of ¡quit-rente and arrears of purchase money, within manors; and this exception must be construed to mean the case of lands bought as part of the manor. It would be to . contradict the whole scope and meaning of the act, to construe it as abolishing proprietary rights every where but in manors, and to leave them there in full vigour. According to this view of the act, we shall have a consistent and congruous interpretation. The pub-lie rights of the proprietaries, wherever situated, will have been confiscated; and the private rights, wherever situated, will have been preserved. The 0ourj¡ vvill look to the nature of the thing, and not to the accident. If a proprietary right be situated within á manor, it will be abolished, because it is proprietary. Such is the construction which the local Legislature itself has put üpon this statute, by the act of 1781, for establishing the land office,a and by the act of 1784.b These ac.ts are cotemporaneous, and in pari materia. If, then, the rights, of the proprietors were vested in the State, there remained nothing in them; the legal title passed to the Commonwealth, and, consequently, they could not maintain this action of ejectment. But if any was reserved, it was only the arrears of the purchase money, and not the title, which they might sue. for-in any manner.</p> <p>3. That whatever might be the nature of . the claim, (manorial or proprietary,) it was barred by the statute called the seven years law, passed in 1705, whether the consideration money is paid, or not.c This limitation of seven years, appears to have been a favourite period of protection in Pennsylvania. William Penn enacted a. law to that effect, in England, the year after he obtained his charter;d and again, in 1700, the same period js provided.e And a short period of limitation to protect possessions, is believed to have been the favourite policy of all the colonies. The act of 1705, to afford the protection which it intends to give, requires two circumstánces: 1. That the entry should he under an equitable estate. 2. That there should have been seven years quiet possession. The intention of the act was to protect the property. The vendor was at liberty to enforce payment of the consideration money, by all legal means. Even the land itself was not withdrawn from the operation of a judgment. . After seven years, the title was complete, but it was still liable to execution. If the plaintiffs in ejectment can recover, it is because they have a lien. Now, if the lien were express^ it would have been barred by the lapse of twenty years; and no lien, created by operation of law, can be more durable, than one created by express act of the party.a To support this right of recovery, would be to uphold a remedy after the right is gone, and to make the remedy immortal, whilst the right is temporary.</p> <p>4. That the payment of the purchase money ought to have been presumed; and, consequently, a perfect equitable title in the defendants, barring the action of ejectment. The length of time elapsed, would have authorized a jury to presume a charter, patent, or deed.b The fact of acttml payment being made out by presumption, the Courts of Pennsylvania adopt the Chancery principle of considering that as done which ought to be done.a When a. party, entitled to a conveyanee, does every thing necessary to be done, in order to obtain a decree for a specific performance, jje atancjs jjy tbe local law, in a situation to support or defend an action for the possession of the land.b</p> <p>5. That the plaintiffs below were barred by the statute of limitations of 1785.c If we had entered by disseisin, our right would have been protected. We entered claiming the whole fee. Our title and our possession were, therefore, exclusive; that is to say, adverse to every other title or possession. It is said that it was not adversary, because we claim from them: but the mortgagee claims from the mortgagor, and, nevertheless, is barred, after twenty years. The idea of an amicable possession,, is founded upon confounding the case with that of leases, reversions, and remainders. If. the vendee purchases the whole estate, his possession, from the' moment of his entry, is adverse to that of the vendor.d But, from the period of the survey of 1768, there was an adverse state of possession. The proprietaries set up,their manorial or private right against their public or. proprietary right, and from that epoch, inconsistent and opposing titles were brought into being. From that moment, the statute of limitations began, to run. There is no escape from this dilemma: either the survey of the manor did not affect, in any way whatever, the previous proprietary right, or it did, and was an attempt tó reappropriate to the use of the manor, what had been appropriated before. In the first case, the right was confiscated; in the latter it is barred.</p> <p>For the defendants in error, it was stated, that; by the royal charter to William Penn, of 1681, he derived an absolute right of ownership to the territory within the limits described, and power to grant, subject to no restrictions but such as he thought fit to impose upon himself. He came to Pennsylvania in 1682 ; and the powers of government and rights of property were always kept distinct, the former being exercised by the General Assembly, and the latter by means of an agency, constituting what is called a land office. Two principles were early settled, that nó sales were to be made, nor settlements permitted, till the Indian title should be extinguished ; and that no title, could origínale but by grant from William Penn. In the establishment of the land office, it was originally intended that no title should begin but by warrant and survey. But this was soon broken in upon ; every kind of irregularity occurred; and, finally grew up the title by settlement and improvement.a All these inceptive rights were under the proprietary, and they were to be consummated by payment of the purchase money and issuing the patent. For that purpose, the warrant fixed a price and time of payment; and where there was no warrant, the price of the ,tjme wag to ke paid, which was called “ common terms.” . The mass,of the.country was opened by opening the land office, but this did not include proprietary tenths and manors. These last were appropriated by virtue of his own right of owner-. . ghip, and are not to be understood as meaning a manor in a legal sense, with its court and train of feudal appendages. . The term did not mean a private reservation, for his own separate use, to be taken out of the market, and granted in a different mode. . It meant.only a portion of country, sepa-, rated from the common mass, so as not to be open to purchasers (on common terms) of to settlers. The peculiar and appropriate mode of granting in a manor, was a warrant to agree. It was, in fact, an exception out of the country offered for sale. No particular form of exceptions was necessary, and pone was pursued.a He was subject to laws, but only to his own laws. He might be considered as saying, “ So much I will sell at a fixed price; só much at'the value to be agreed.” W. Penn died in 1718, and a dispute arose with Lord Baltimore respecting the boundary line of Maryland,b which was settled by an agreement between the two proprietaries, in 1.732, and ratified by decree in Chancery, in 1750.c The line •was finally run in 1768, and ratified by the King in Council, in 1769. In 1732, the Marylanders encroaching, and the Indians growing uneasy, Sir W. Keith, at the request of the latter, issued an order to survey the manor of Springetsbury, which was accordingly surveyed in that year. The land office was not then open west of the Susquehannah, the Indian title not being extinguished. In 1736, before the land office was opened, Thomas Penn, the proprietary, recognised and adopted the survey, and thereby gave it validity. In 1762, the survey, of 1732 having been mislaid or lost, Gov. Hamilton issued a warrant of resurvey, which, was duly returned into the land office, in 1768, whére it has since remained.</p> <p>When the revolution occurred, the descendants of the proprietary were the owners of all the vacant lands in the province; they had the legal estate in all lands, to which individuals had only acquired inceptive rights, for the purpose oí enforcing the terms; they were entitled to all purchase money, and to all quit-rents; they had also private estates subject to the ordinary legislation. The whole, as then existing, may be arranged into three classes. (1.) Their private estates, which may be at once dismissed., (2.) Estates or rights in lands not included, in the limits of manors: and these might be legal, or legal and equitable. (3.) Estates or rights in lands included within the limits of manors : which might also be legal, or legal' and equitable. And the nature of their legal right to kinds within a manor, would depend upon the nhture of the equity of the occupant. Whether his equity be more, ór less, is . q? no consequence at law, -since it does not diminish the éxtent or power of the legal right. These inceptive rights are passed from hand to hand,' by deed; they descend, aré devised, and sold by the Sheriff;, and every body knows their nature, and the liabilities to which they are subject. The deeds frequently express it, as in the present instance. Hence thé lapse of time affords no presumption of the payment of the purchase money, or completion of the title. In truth, there js ho such thing in Pennsylvania as the presumption of a grant.</p> <p>This was the. state of things at the period of the revolution. That event, ipso facto, determined the ppwers of government conferred by the charier, but left the. rights of property exactly-as they stood before, in which state they remained until the act of 1779. That act devests the estate of the proprietaries, only by vesting it in the Commonwealth. It, therefore, devests no further than it vests; and as to all besides, leaves it on the same footing as before. It did not at all change the relation between the proprietaries and those who. had purchased their lands. They then had, : and still have, a land office, to receive purchase moneys and grant patents. The Commonwealth land office will h'ot receive the purchase money of lands included ip. the limits of mánors, nór will they grant patents for ih. The act thus had the effect of making a partition, and from that time forward there have, in fact, been two land offices in Pennsylvania. Great indulgence has been shown in the collection of the purchase money; but the.tenure has never undergone any change, arid it has never been doubted that the legal title remained in the proprietors and the Commonwealth, respectively, and that they might at any time enter, to enforce the terms of sale.</p> <p>The act of 1779 did not assert that the estates of the- proprietaries had been devested by the revolution, nor could that proposition now be rriaintainéd, if the question were open. It did , not profess to confiscate their property, nor could it justly do so, for they had committed no offence. Neither did it assert a right of conquest. The act was not passed to benefit individuals, nor to alter or lessen their just liability. It was a partition between the Commonwealth and the proprietary of all their estates, legal and equitable, of which the manor lines, were the lines of division. It left the proprietors, then, their vacant lands, their legal estates, and all else within the manors. The terrris of the act give no countenance to the idea, that the legal title was assumed by the Commonwealth, leaving, the purchase money to the proprietaries. The reservation is of private rights. But the whole of this question has been long since disposed of, and it is now considered as settled law in Pennsylvania, that the legal estate is in the descendant of the proprietaries, as a security for the purchase money.a</p> <p>As to ihe seven years law of Í7Ó5, it has,never been beard of since the time of its enactment, and we are, therefore, compelled to look for a construction of it consistent with its disuse. It is a retrospective law in its very terms, and, having performed its office at the time, has been ever since disused. No such construction as that insisted on, ever could have been given to it.</p> <p>As to the presumption of payment, it must be founded, in every such case, both upon the length of time, and the omission to do what would be done if the. presumed fact did not exist. It is a presumption merely, , and may be repelled by circumstances, showing why an earlier demand has not been made.a No. such presumption, therefore, exists, unless the forbearance be unusual, or contrary to what might have been expected. But it has been, the universal practice to forbear. If there had been a payment, there would have-been a patent. Where the fact to be proved must appear by deed, the presumption, from length of time, does not arise.b The surveys, if made, were never returned ; therefore, there could have been no payment. The receiver general’s books will show what has been paid.</p> <p>The statute of limitations of 1785, is not a bar. To make possession a bar, it must be adverse.c It may be adverse as to. one, and not as to another. A possession under one, is not adverse to him. Possession under an agreement, is not adverse;a and ouster cannot "be presumed where the possession is not only under, but according to the agreement. To maintain a title, or a claim, of adverse possession, such possession must be adverse at its commencement, and so continue for twenty years.b There must be, at least, a claim, or colour of title, adverse or hostile; though it is not necessary that it should be a good title.c A person who enters without claim, or colour of title, is deemed to be in possession in subservience to the legal owner, and no length of time will make it adverse.d The doctrine of adverse possession must be strictly taken, and the fact must be made out by clear and positive proof, and not by inference. Every presumption is in favour of a possession, in subordination to the title of the true owner.e If the defendant has acknowledged the plaintiff’s title, he cannot, after-wards, dispute it.f So, an acknowledgment, by a person under whom the defendant claims, that he went into possession under the lessors of the plaintiff, is conclusive against the defendant, as to tenancy. And though it may not have that effect, yet it will prevent possession from being adverse.g In the present case, it is not disputed, that the defendants went into possession under the proprietors, and nothing has since occurred to change the character of the possession. No one could hold adversely, unless he came in .by title paramount to the proprietary; and ho title against the Commonwealth, or grantee of the Commonwealth, can bé acquired by length. of time:a The possession of lands held by warrant and survey, is not adverse to, but under the Commonwealth.b</p> <p>The cause was continued to the present term for advisement.</p>

' The capias ad respondendum issued on the 28th of June, 1803, returnable to the first Móndate of July in the same year, and was served on the 3Qth of June. The declaration was in the usual form of an action of debt for the penalty of the bond with a proferí, but without setting forth its condition or any breach thereof.

THE first of these cases was a writ of error to the judgment of thq circuit court of the district of Co-in an action .of debt at common law brought by Auld, agent and attorney in fact for Dunlop. & Co. against Hepburn and Dundas for 45,000 dollárs, the penalty or the same articles ot agreement which are recited in the case of Hepburn and Dundas v. dillldy dTltC^ VOl• 1* p• 321» The second of these cases was an appeal from a decree of the same court dismissing the bill in…

<p>it is not a ground for a •writ of error that the judge to'reinstau^a cause after nonsmL</p>

THIS was an appeal from the sentence of the circuit court for the district of Maryland, which condemned the schooner General Pinkney and cargo, for breach of the act of congress prohibiting intercourse with certain ports or the island oí at. Domingo; passed February, 28th 1806. Vol. 8. p. 11.

THIS was a case certified from the circuit court for the district of Maryland. The question upon which the iudgés of that court differed in opinion JO was, Whether round copper bottoms turned up at the edge are hable to the payment of duty within the meaning of the several acts of congress.

contended, that the replevin bond being in the penal sum of 1,200 dollars only, was conclusive evidence that the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, did not amount to 2,000 dollars, and consequently this court has ho jurisdiction in the case. stated that he did not know till yesterday that this point would be made in the cause, and prayed, time to show by affidavits the real value pi the matter in dispute. Which. The court granted.

THIS was a case certified from the circuit court f°r the 7th circuit and district of Kentucky, in which the judges below differed in opinion upon the flowing questions : Whether the complainant, (Logan,) who is a citi¿en .of the state of Kentucky, .and is so stated in the pleadings, can maintain this suit, in this court, against the defendant, who is a citizen and inhabitant of the state of Virginia, and is so stated in the pleadings, upon the following case : John Patrick…

THIS was an appeal from a decree of the circuit court for the district of South Carolina, in a suit in equitv, m which Richard Harrison was complainant, and the following parties defendants, viz. 1. The United States. 2,.. St eery and others, assignees of ,H. M. Bird and Benjamin Savage-, under a British commission of bankruptcy. 3. Aspitnvall and others, as-■ signees oí Robert Bird, under an American commission of bankruptcy. 4.

<p>THIS was a cáse certified from the circuit court for the district of Virginia,. the judges of that court being divided in opinion upon the question whether they had jurisdiction of the case.</p> <p>It was an action on a bond given by an executor for the faithful execution of his testator’s will, in conformity with the statute of Virginia. . The object of the suit was to recover a debt due from the testator in his life-fime to a British subject. The defendant was a citizen of Virginia. The persons named in the declaration as plaintiffs were the justices of the peace for the county of Stafford, and were all citizens of Virginia.</p> <p>The question being submitted without argument,</p>

Hodgson and Thompson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809), was a United States Supreme Court case that held part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitutional. The invalidated portion conferred federal courts jurisdiction to try cases between aliens.

the district of Columbia, in a case, of seizure of certain merchandise, being párt ol the cargo of the schooner Sea Flower, Matthew Keene, claimant, imported from the HaVanna, in the island of Cuba, into the port of Vienna, in the district of Maryland, the vessel having sailed on a foreign voyage under a coasting license.

4. p. 388. because the goods were not u invoiced according to the actual cost of, at the place of exportation,” .with design to evade ‘ ~ . . *• * ' w part of the duties. ■The goods were consigned by a merchant of Liverpool, in England, to Mr. Riddle, at Alexandria, for sale, accompanied by two invoices; one charging them at 671. 5s. 6d. the other at 132/. 14s. 9d. with directions to enter them by the small invoice, and sell them by the larger.' Mr. Riddle delivered both…

THIS was án appeal Irom so much of the final séntence of the circuit court for the district óf South Carolina;-rendered upon the mandate from this court issued upon the reversal of the former sentence 0f that court, [see' ante, vol. 4. p. 292.) as affirmed the report of auditors appointed by the court “ to inquire and report whether any, and if any, what deductions are to be allowed for freight, insurance and other expenses ivhich would have been incurred by the owners in…

YOUNGS, for the defendant in error, objected to the hearing of the cause at this term, the citation not having been. served thirty days before the first day of the term.

against Mandeyille- and Jamesson, remote end.orsors of a promissory noté, dated March 2,1798, at sixty days, for 1,500 dollars, drawn hy Vincent Gray, payable tb the defendants or order, and by them endorsed’ in blank, Upon its ^ace h was declared to be negotiable in the bank of Alexandria, The note so drawn and endorsed was by Gray put' into the hands of a broker who passed h,*0 D* Wi Scott for -flour, which he sold for 1,200 dollars in cash, and pdid the money to Gray.

The bill in this cause was filed in behalf of one of the coheirs of Richard Barnes, deceased, and her children; and claims an account of the profits of his estate, from the defendant, J. T. M., also a co-heir, who claims and holds possession of the estate, under the will of the said Richard. Three instruments of writing, purporting to be the will of the testator, all of them properly authenticated, were exhibited in the record.

' ERROR to the circuit court for the district of Columbia, sitting at Alexandria, in an action of assumpsit by the endorsee of a promissory note against his immediate endorsor. The nqte, was made by Wellborn, on the 1st oí January, 1806, tor 200 dollars, payable to Hodgkin or order 120 days after date, negotiable at the bank of Alexandria.

iicy of insurance on the brig Richard, at and from Tobago to one or more ports, in the West Indies, and at and frem thence to Norfolk.

law and equity in that state, in an action of ejectment brought by the defendant against the plaintiff in error, both parties being citizens of Maryland, for a tract of land in Baltimore county, called “ The Discovery,” being part of atract of land called Brown’s Adventure, originally patented for 1,000 acres to Thomas Brown, .in the year. 1695, who conveyed to John Gadsby, who conveyed to Aaron Rawlins in 1703, who mortgaged in fee to Jonathan Scarth, a London merchant, by…

.Welsh, who was the principal debtor, not being found in, and not being an inhabitant of, the district of Columbia, the suit abated as to him.

<p>ERROR to the Circuit Court of Maryland.</p> <p>The case agreed, stated, that William M‘Creery was seised and possessed of a tract of land in Baltimore county, in the State of Maryland, called Clover Hill, and died possessed thereof about the 1st of March, 1814. He had previously executed an instrument of writing, purporting to be his last will and testament, by which he devised the above tract of land to those under whom the defendant, Somerville,. claimed ; but it was witnessed by two persons only, and was, therefore, inoperative to pass lands in Maryland, the laws of which require, three witnesses to a will for that purpose.; W. 'M*Creery left at his death no children, but a brother, Ralph M‘Creery, a native of Ireland, who is still living, and who has not been natüraHzed, and three nieces, Letitia Barwell, Jane M'Cieery, and Isabella M‘Creery, the latter being the lessor of the plaintiff, who are the daughters jof the said Ralph, and native born citizens of the United States. The devisees under the will applied by petition tp the Legislature of Maryland to confirm the will, and the Legislature, accordingly, without the knowledge or consent of the lessor of the plaintiff, passed an act for that purpose ; saving, nevertheless, the rights of all persons claiming title to the lands devised, by conveyance from any of the heirs of W. M'Creery. The action was brought to recover an undivided third part of Clover Hill.</p> <p>Upon, this case, judgment was rendered by the Court below for the defendant, and the cause was brought by writ of error to this Court.</p>

Columbia, for taking in execütign, on a ji. fa. against the estate of Robert Alexander, deceased, a slave named Ben, who was. claimed by Chapman as his property. The jury tound a verdict for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court upon a statement of facts agreed by the parties, which .was in substance as follows : The slave was the property, and in possession of the late Robert Alexander the elder, at the time of his death.

'ERROR to the circuit court for the district of Columbia, sitting at Alexandria, in an action of detinue for a female slaye named Eliza!

<p>(Ihstakce Court.}</p> <p>A decree of acquittal, orj a proceeding in rent, without a certificate of probable cause of seizure, and not appealed from with effect, is conclusive, in every inquiry before any other Court, that there was no justifiable cause of seizure.</p> <p>The'French Tannage Duty Act of the 15th of May, 1820, c. 125., inflicts no forfeiture of the vessel for the non-payment of the tonnage duty. The duty is collectable in the same manner as by the Collection Act of 1799, c. 128.</p> <p>The 29th section of the Collection Act of 1799, c. 128., does not extend to the case of a vessel arriving from .a foreign port, and passing through the conterminous waters of a river, which forms •' the boundary between the United States and the territory of a foreign state,- for the purpose of proceeding to such territory.</p> <p>The municipal laws of one' nation do not extend, in their operation, beyond its own territory, "except as regards its own citizens.</p> <p>A seizure for the breach of the municipal laws of one nation, cannot be made within the territory of another.</p> <p>It seems that the right of visitation and search, for 'enforcing the revenue laws of a nation, may be exercised beyond the territorial jurisdiction, upon the high seas, and on vessels belonging to such nation, or bound to its ports.</p> <p>A municipal seizure cannot be justified or excused, upon the ground of probable cause, unless under' the special provisions of some statute.</p> <p>The probable profits of a- voyage, either upon the cargo or freight, ^do not form an item for the computation of damages, in cases of marine torts.</p> <p>Where the property is restored, after a detention, aemurrage is allowed for the .detention of the ship, and interest upon the-value of the cargo.</p> <p>Where the vessel and cargo hhve been ibid, the gross amount of the sales, with interest, is allowed; and an addition 'of 10 per cent, sometimes made, where the property has been sold under disadvantageous circumstances.</p> <p>Counsel fees may be allowed, either as damages or costs, both on the Instance and Prize side of the Court. '</p> <p>Effect of a decree of acquital as a res and judicata.</p> <p>Effect of pro-seizure in mu-iucJpal cases.</p> <p>whether there wus probable cause of seizureinthepresent case. .</p> <p>Rule of daSuftorts.m</p> <p>Demurrage.</p> <p>Counsel fee.</p>

, ERROR to the circuit court of the United States, for the district of Columbia, in an action of debt upon a bond given by the defendants in error to the United States, for duties on a cargo of salt from St. Ubes, which arrived and came to anchor within the collection district of Alexandria, sixteen miles below the town ^tind port of Alexandria, on the 23d of December, 1807, but did not arrive-at' the port of Alexandria until the first of January, 1808.

THIS was an appeal from the séntencé of the Strict court for the district of Maine, condemning the sloop Sally and cargo for violation of the revenue *aws the United States. The appeal was directly to this court. No appeal lies from that court directly to this in a case where that court acts in the capacity of district court.

<p>. APPEAL from, the Circuit Court of South Carolina.</p> <p>In each of these two cases, a libel of information was filed in the District Court of South Carolina, against the ship Emily and the brig Caro- s line, under the 1st section of the act of the 22d of March, 1794, c. 187. [xi.] prohibiting the carrying on the slave trade, from the United States to any loreign place or country; and on the. 2d section of the act of the 2d of March, 1807, c. 77. [Ixvii.] to prohibit the importation ox slaves into the United States, after the 1st. day of January, 1808. Each libel contained three counts, two upon the act of 1794, and one upon that of 1807/ which are the same in their provisions, so far as vaspects this case; and the libels described the offence in the alternative, pursuing the words of jaw^ ¡c that said vessel was fitted out within a port or place of the United States, to wit, the port of Charleston, or caused to be sailed irom a port or place within the United States, to wit, the said port of Charleston, &c. for the purpose, of carrying on trade or traffic in slaves,” &>e. A decree of condemnation was pronounced, in each case, in the District Court, which was affirmed in the Circuit Court, and the causes were brought by appeal to this Court.</p> <p>On the part of the appellant it was contended, (1.) That the informations were fatally defective; inasmuch as in all the counts, they charge alternatively, the commission of one or the other of two distinct and separate acts, each of which constitutes, under the statute of Congress, a distinct substantive offence; thus leaving it wholly uncertain to which of the charges _the claimant was to . direct his defence and proof.a (2.) That the proof did not sustain any of the counts, because it showed ' that neither cf the vessels was actually sent from the port of Charleston, before the seizure; and did not show that .either of them was so fitted out there, previous to the seizure, as to be in a condition to be sent. That the offence of fitting out, was not complete when the seizure took place, and that a mere inceptive fitting out, or an attempt to fit outj did not constitute the offence created by the acts of Congress.</p> <p>For the respondents, it was argued, (1.) That the charge, with the alternative, was sufficient, both of the alternatives being illegal. The note of the reporter, correcting the account of the decision, when one of these cases (the Caroline) was formerly before this Court, was referred to, in order to show that the Court did not mean to decide in that case, that stating the charge in the alternative, would not have been sufficient, if each alternative had constituted an offence, for which the vessel would have been forfeited by the law. The informations had been amended, and studiously avoided the difficulty heretofore made on account of the alternativeness of the charges. As they now stand, they are in conformity with the language of the statute which creates the forfeiture, and though still alternative in form, they are not. so in substance; since both the facts charged are equally penal, and the latter part of the section merely makes either of the facts evidence of the illegal intention. The Legislature has thought fit to depart,. in this instance, from the general principle of penal enactments; it aims at punishing the intention, and makes either of the rtwo facts evidence of the illegal intention. Both, then, being illegal, the information has correctly c]jarge(j ^e offence, (2.) The law requires nothing more toJconsuinmate the offence, than distinct acts, showing the quo animo. The offence is complete, when there is any overt act clearly indicative of the attempt to commit it. If this were not the case, and the crime were not to be considered as consummated until the preparations were complete, it would be impossible to define what was a complete preparation. Many articles might be purposely left unfinished, and completed at sea; so that the construction contended for, would furnish an -effectual recipe for a fraudulent evasion of this part of the law.</p>

These were the cases of several vessels, and their eargoes of African slaves. The information filed in the case of the Constitution was, as well on behalf of the United States, as of George M. Brooke, a colonel in thé army of the United States.

<p>[Instance Court, Slave Trade Acts. Iaen of Material Men.]</p> <p>A question of fact, under the Slave Trade Acts. Condemnation pronounced.</p> <p>The claim of seamen, for wages, on a voyage, undertaken in violation.of the Slave Trade Acts, out of the proceeds of the forfeited vessel in the registry, rejected.</p> <p>The claims of seamen, for wages, and of material men, for supplies, where the parties were innocent of all knowledge of; or participation in, the illegal voyage, preferred to-the claim of forfeiture on the part of the government.</p> <p>Material men have a lien, which may be enforced by a proceeding in the Admiralty, in rem, for necessaries or supplies, furnished.in a port to which the vessel does not belong.</p>

<p>APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Maryland.</p>

This was a libel of information, filed in the District Court of Massachusetts, against two hundred chests of tea, alleging that, on the 8th of September, 1819, the collector of the customsfor the port of Boston seized at that port the said chésts of tea, as forfeited, for having been unlawfully imported at the port of New-York, in the ship Ontario, on the 29th of June, 1819, from Canton, in China, as being that kind and denomination of teas commonly called bohea teas, and…

This was a bill brought by the appellant, Mason, to rescind a purchase made by him, jointly with W. Jones, of. a part of the glebe land which ^as un(]er the decree of this Court, in the case of Tcrrett v. Taylor, reported in the 9th vol. of Mr. Cranch's Reports, p. 43.

<p>ERROR to the Circuit Court of Ohio.</p>

<p>[Evidence.]</p> <p>If a party intend to use a written instrument in evidence, he must produce the original, if in his possession.' But if it is. in the possession of the other party, who refuses to produce it, after notice, or if .the original is lost or destroyed, secondary evidence (being the best which the nature of the case allows) will be admitted.</p> <p>The party, in stích case, may read a counterpart; or, if there is no counterpart, an examined copy; or, if no such copy, may give parol evidence of- the contents.</p> <p>Where a writing has been voluntarily destroyed, for fraudulent purposes, or to create an excuse for its hou-production, secondary, evidence of its contents is not admissible. But where the destruction or loss (although voluntary) happens through mistake or accident, such evidence will be admitted.</p>

<p>[CaAWCERy. Aliiw. Mortgage.]</p> <p>Where the mortgage deed contained a defeasance that the mortgagor should pay the debt, according to the condition of a bond recited in the deed, by which it was payable on a day already past, at the time of the execution of the deed, held that this circumstance did not avoid the mortgage deed in equity, where it was to be considered as a conveyance, absolute at law, but intended as a security merely, and to be treated in the same manner as an ordinary mortgage.</p> <p>A Court of equity looks to the substantial object of the conveyance, and will consider an absoluté deed as a mortgage, wherever it is shown to have been intended merely as a security for the payment of a debt.</p> <p>In the case either of a legal or equitable mortgage, the mortgagee may pursue his legal remedy by ejectment, and, at the same time,file his bill to foreclose the equity of redemption.</p> <p>Under the 9th article of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, of 1794, it is not necessary for the alien to show that he was in the actual possession or seisin of the land, at the date of the treaty, which applies to the title, whatever that may be, and gives it the same legal validity as if the parties were citizens. The title of an alien mortgagee is protected by the treaty. .</p> <p>But, independent of the stipulations of the treaty, an' alien mortgagee has a right to come into a Court of equity, and have the property, which has been pledged for the payment of the debt, sold for the purpose of raising the money. His demand is merely a personal one, the debt being considered as the principal, and the land as an incident.</p> <p>A mortgagbi cannot redeem after a lapse -of twenty years, after forfeiture and possession by the mortgagee, (which period ha* bees adopted in equity by analogy to the statute of limitations,) jio'in-terest having been paid in, the mean time, and no circumstanced appearing to account for the neglect.</p> <p>Where- the mortgagee brings his bill of foreclosure, the mortgage "will, after the same length of time, be presumed to have been discharged, unless circumstances can be shown to repel the presumption, as, payment of interest, a' promise to pay, an acknowledgment by the mortgager that the mortgage is still subsisting, and the like.</p> <p>A bonce Jidei purchaser under the mortgagor, w.ith actual notice of the mortgage; or constructive notice by means of a registry, can only protect himself, by the lapse of, time, or other equity, under the sanie circumstances which would afford a protection to the mortgagor.</p> <p>Such a purchaser is not entitled to have the value of the improvements made by him' deducted from the proceeds of the sale oí the-mortgaged premises.</p> <p>Effect of the impossiblecondtition contained in the mortgage deed.</p> <p>An absolute deed considered as a mortgage, in equity, where it is intended merely as security.</p> <p>Alienage of the mortgagee.</p> <p>Lapse of time, its effects upon the rights of. mortgagor and mortgagee, and of purchasers claiming under the former.</p> <p>Improvement made upon the mortgaged.</p> <p>Apportionment of the debt among the different purchasers of the mortgaged property.</p>

<p>[Local Law.]</p> <p>The land law ofVirginia, of 1779, makes a pre-emption warrant superior to a treasury warrant, whenever they interfere with each other, .unless the holder of the pre-emption warrant has forfeited that superiority, by failing to enter his warrant with the surveyor of the county, within twelve months after, the end of the session at which ■ the land law was enacted,; and on that period having expired, and being prolonged by successive acts, during which tim,e there was one interval between the expiration of the law and the act of revival, the original right of the holder of the pre-emption warrant was preserved, notwithstanding that in jrval, the entry of th< holder flf the treasury warrant not havi g been made during th^ same interval.</p>

<p>ÉRROR to the. Circuit Court of West Tennessee,</p>

<p>[J URISI>I.Cl'ION.]</p> <p>in replevin, if it be of goods distrained for rent, the amount for which avowry is made, is the value of the matter in controversy; and if tire writ be issued to try tlie title to property, it is in the nature of detinue, and the value of the article replevied is the value of the matter in controversy, so as to give jurisdiction to this Court upon a writ of error.</p>

Mr. Emmett moved for a rule to show cause why a mandamus should not issue to the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, commanding that Court to restore’ one Burr, an attorney of that Court, who had been suspended from practice for one year, by order of that Court.a

<p>[Chancery. Jurisdiction.]'</p> <p>In all-cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the Court which first-lias possession of the subject, must determine it conclusively..</p> <p>Although Courts of equity have concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of law, in all matters of fraud, yet, where the cause has already been tried and determined by a Court of law, a Court of equity cannot take cognisance of it, unless there be the addition of some equitable circumstance to give jurisdiction.</p> <p>In sucli a case, some defect of testimony,' or other disability,'which a Court of law cannot remove, must be shown, as a ground for resorting to a Court of equity.</p>

<p>ERROR to the District Court of Mississippi.</p>

<p>[Local Law.]'</p> <p>•By the statute of limitations of Tennessee, of 1797, a possession of seven yenis is a protection, only when held under a grant, or under mesne conveyances which connect it w ith a grant.</p> <p>A Sheriff’s deed, which is void for- want of jurisdiction in the Court 'under whose judgmeht the sale took place, is not such a conveyance as that a. possession under it will'be protected by the statute of limitations.</p>

<p>[Practice.]</p> <p>Under the judiciary act of 1780, ch. 20. s. 22. the security to he . taken from the plaintiff in' error, by the Judge signing a citation on a writ of error, must be sufficient to secure the whole amount of the judgment, and is not to be confined to such damages as the appellate Court may adjudge for the delay.</p>

This was an action of assumpsit, commenced in the Court below;, in February, 1321, by Baits, the plantiff in error, against PeWs &“ Stebbins; the defendants in error, in which the plaintiff de- . dared against the defendants, upon an agreement to account with him for goods delivered by hito to the defendants, for sale on commission, and also For money had and received, and upon an in simul ■computassent.

<p>[Local Law.J</p> <p>In a declaration upon u promissory note, the omission of the place Where it is payable is fatal.</p> <p>Secondary evidence of the contents of written instruments is not admissible, when the ■ originals are within the control or custody of the party.</p> <p>This rule of evidence is not dispensed with by the local statutes of Kentucky, which provide that no person shall be permitted to deny his signature, as maker or assignor of a note, in a suit against him, unless he will make an affidavit denying the execution or assignment. These statutes do not dispense with proof of the existence of the instrument, or of the right of the party to hold it by assignment.</p>

<p>APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Ohio.</p>

<p>[Locaa Law.]</p> <p>Under the following entry, “ H..R. enters 2000 acres' in Kentucky, by virtue of. a warrant for military services performed by him in the last war, in the fork 'of the first fork-of lacking, running up each,fork for quantity it appealed in evidence, that at the first fork of Licking, the one fork was known and generally distinguished by the name of the Soutlrfork, and the other by the name of the main Licking, or the Blue Lick fork, and that some miles above this place.the South fork again forked: held, that the entry cquld not be satisfied with lands lying in the first fork.</p> <p>I*1 su°h a case, the entry could not be explained, and the survey supported, by oral testimony. The notoriety and names of places may be shown by such testimony, but the words of an entry are to 9°nstrued kj the Court .as any other written instrument.</p>

In 1797, John Den, lessee of Ambrose Walden, instituted an action of ejectment in the United States District Court of the District of Kentucky, against Richard Fen, as casual ejector. The declaration states a demise for the term of ten years from the 15th day of August, Í789.

<p>[Practice.]</p> <p>The discharge of the jury from giving a verdict in a capital case, without tile consent of the prisoner, the jury being unable to agree, is not a bar to a subsequent trial for the same offence. '</p> <p>The Court is invested with the discretionary authority of discharging the jury from giving any verdict, in cases of this nature, whenever, in their opinion, there is a manifest necessity for such an act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.</p>

Held: that bank usages, established respecting demands on makers of promissory notes, and notices to. en-. dorsers, being known to dealers in the banks, they were bound by them, and that the usage was proper evidence to be submitted to a jury.

Held: in England, to stand committed; and, although from the contiguity, and, in some instances, reduced size of the States, and their union under the general government, the analogy is not perfect, yet it is obvious, that a removal from the seaboard jtó the frontier States, or vice versa, would be attended with all the hardships tp a holder, especially one of the same State with the maker, that could result from crossing…

<p>[Patent. Practice.]</p> <p>Under the 10th section of the patent act of the' 21st of February, 1793, ch. 11. upon granting a rule, by the Judge of the District Court, upon the patentee, to show cause why process should not issue to repeal the patent, the patent is not repealed, de facto, by -making the rule absolute; but the process to be awarded is in the nature of a scire facias at common law, to the patentee to show cause why the patent should not be repealed, with costs of suit; and upon the .return of such process, ,duly served, the Judge is to proceed to stay the cause, upon th.e pleadings filed by the parties, and the issue joined thereon. If the issue be an issue of fact, the trial thereof is to be by a jury; if an issue of law, by the Court, as in other cases.</p> <p>In such a case, a record is to be made of the proceedings, antecedent to the rule to show cause why process should notissue to repeal the patent, and upon which the rule is founded.</p>

The. appellant, Thomas Tenant, filed his petition on the 14th of November, 1821, in the Circuit. Held: that if the purchaser has neglécted to inform himself of such matters within his observation, as might have, prevented the pürchase, he shall bear the loss : and,farther, even ail express warranty would not extend, to things discernable by ordinary vigilance.a The only remaining ground, then, on which the appellant’s claim can rest,…

<p>[Construction op Statute.]</p> <p>Under the 2d and 4th sections of the act of the Sd of March, 1797, ch. 368. a certified transcript from the books of the Treasury is evidence against the defendant; and no claim for any credit can be admitted at the trial, which has not been presented to, and disallowed by, the accounting officer of the Treasury, (unless in the cases excepted by the act,) although no proceedings have been bad against the debtor, under the act, of the 3d of March, 1795, ch. 289., by notification from the Treasury Department, requiring him ■ to render to the Auditor of the Treasury his accounts and vouchers for settlement.</p> <p>(¿uare, Whether the act of the 3d of March, 1795, ch. 289. is not virtually repealed by the act of the 3d of March, 1797, ch. 368.?</p> <p>The official bond given by a Receiver of Public Moneys, does not extinguish the simple contract debt arising from a balance of account due froth him to the United States. An action of assumpsit for the balance of account, and an action of debt upon the bond against the principal and sureties, may be maintained at the same time.</p> <p>In an action against the Receiver, not describing him in his official capacity, evidence may be given of moneys received in hi? official capacity; and, under a count for money had and received, evidence may be given of public stock received by him, where such stock is, by law, made receivable, at par, in payment for lands sold by the United States.</p> <p>It is not necessary that a bill of exceptions should be formally drawn and signed before the trial is at an end. The exception maybe taken at the trial, and noted by the Court, and may, afterwards, during the term, be reduced to form, and signed by the Judge. But, in such cases, it is signed nunc pro tunc, and purports, on. its face, to be the same' as if actually reduced to form, and signed during the trial; It would be a fatal error if it were to appear otherwise.</p>

Circuit Court of.Maryland. mi • p This was the case of a libel filed by the Consul-General of Portugal, on behalf of certain Portuguese subjects, owners of a number of hides which had been brought from St. Thomas to Baltimore in the brig Fanny.

<p>ERRQR to the Circuit Court of West Tennessee.</p>

Held: that the undertaking stopped upon the admission of a new partner.

Held: that the liability of the', sureties was strictly confined to the duties and obligations created by the acts passed,antecedent to the date.of the bond. And we are pf opinion that this is the true construction of the condition of the . bond.

The bill filed in this cause, was exhibited in the Court below, at September term, 1819, in the name of the respondents, and signed by solicitors of. the Court, praying an injunction to restrain… Held: that upon the decisions which had taken place, the bill must be sustained.

THIS cause was brought up on a certificate of a division of opinion between the Judges of the Circuit Court of Georgia, upon the questions arising in it, and was argued by the same counsel with the preceding case pf Osborn v. The Banlc of the United States.