Fangman v. Moyers’s Empirical Analysis
1932
Citation profile
2 district · 6 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently September 2008
2 district · 6 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Kennedy v. . Ryall · State ex rel. School District No. 1 of Waukesha v. Thayer · McNish v. State ex rel. Dimick · State ex rel. Smith v. Board of Education · State ex rel. Mickey v. Selleck
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Moyers, an attorney, lived in Alamosa and practiced law there. His son, Billy, was placed in the home of one Swift, which home was in a different school district than Alamosa. There was no family relationship between Swift and Moyers, and no reason for Billy's being placed in the Swift home other than `for the sole purpose of giving him a home with desirable influence and surroundings.' Since, as it appears from the records in the *Page 12 case, Moyers paid the Swifts for Billy's board, and since it does not appear that there were any other operative facts which would render the Swift home more desirable for Billy than many other homes in which Billy could have been placed, there were no urgent reasons why Billy should reside at the Swift home in preference to a home obtainable with some family in the district in which Mr. Moyers resided — Alamosa.* * *. It does not appear in the case, nor do the records reveal, that Mr. Moyers was financially unable to pay the small amount of tuition asked. The court said that `the sole question here presented is the district of Billy's residence for school purposes.'”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Cline v. Knight“In the incidents of human life families are broken up and must be scattered, by the necessities of obtaining a livelihood, by death of one or both parties, or by abandonment of offspring, as in this case. Such children, as all others, are the wards of the state, to the extent of providing for their education to that degree that they can care for themselves and act the part of intelligent citizens. To secure these ends, laws relating to public schools must be interpreted to accord with this dominant, controlling spirit and purpose of their enactment, rather than in the narrower spirit of their possible relations to questions of pauperism and administration of estates.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Cline v. Knight“that `generally speaking domicile and residence mean the same thing' ( Kennedy v. Ryall , 67 N. Y. 379 , 386 .); that' in general children whose parents are nonresidents of a district are not permitted to attend schools therein' (25 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law [2d ed. *Page 13 p. 22); and that children `temporarily' with relatives in one district yet have their school residence in the district where their only living parent resides ( Hudson v. Mattingly , 69 Colo. 528 , 195 Pac. 113 ). But Billy's residence in the Mosca district cannot be properly called `temporary,' nor do the facts surrounding that residence bring it within the `general' rule referred to.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Cline v. Knight
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.