Case: 23-20107 Document: 00517020482 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/03/2024
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 23-20107
January 3, 2024
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
Jessica Banks, Clerk
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Daniel Herbrich; Robin Williams; Linda Juarez;
Michael Matchett,
Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:18-CV-2023
______________________________
Before Wiener, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge:
This appeal arises out of the removal of R.B., then a four-year-old
child, from the custody and care of his mother, Jessica Banks, without
parental consent or a court order. After commencing an investigation
premised on an anonymous report alleging neglect and abuse, the Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) concluded that
exigent circumstances existed justifying the emergency removal of R.B.
Banks sued DFPS on behalf of herself and her minor son pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth
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No. 23-20107
Amendments. The district court denied DFPS’s motion for summary
judgment, concluding that its employees were not entitled to qualified
immunity because they violated clearly established law by removing R.B.
without court order, parental consent, or exigent circumstances. We
AFFIRM IN PART and REVERSE IN PART.
I
A
On June 10, 2016, DFPS received an anonymous report alleging that
Jessica Banks mistreated her four-year-old son, R.B. It specifically alleged
that Banks drank with her family and did drugs while R.B. was in the home,
had people in the home who used drugs, had hit R.B. on the back of his head
with an open hand, and had threatened R.B., saying things like “give me my
f’ing phone before I kill you.” It also alleged that Banks was a sex worker and
a stripper, and that it was unknown who cared for R.B. while she worked, as
R.B. allegedly did not go to day care or school. In addition, the report noted
that R.B. was “not underweight or malnourished” and that there was “no
known concern with gang involvement, weapons or domestic violence.”
On June 15, 2016, Investigator Robin Williams was assigned to
Banks’s case. Special Investigator Daniel Herbrich joined the investigation
the next day. Linda Juarez and Michael Matchett, Investigation Supervisors,
also assisted in the investigation. 1
The investigation lasted from Wednesday, June 15 to Sunday, June 19,
2016. Throughout the course of the investigation, Banks provided conflicting
_____________________
1
DFPS did not appeal the denial of qualified immunity as to Matchett.
Accordingly, we do not consider the district court’s ruling that Matchett had sufficient
personal involvement to warrant the denial of qualified immunity.
2
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information about where she and R.B. lived. 2 However, when Williams
spoke with Banks on June 16, 2016, she expressly denied the allegations in the
anonymous report. She denied abusing R.B. She admitted that residents of
the Berger Road Home had a history of drug use, but she was unaware of drug
use occurring in R.B.’s presence. She also admitted that R.B. had been
present for a fight between her mother, Shirley Banks, and Shirley’s
boyfriend, Justin Muesse, that occurred outside the Berger Road Home, but
that she told him to lock the front door and hide in a bedroom. Significantly,
Banks passed a drug test administered that same day.
On June 17, 2016, Herbrich gathered additional information on Banks
from Fayette County Assistant Attorney (ADA) James Herbrich. He
learned that Banks physically fought another woman at the Berger Road
Home while R.B. was present and that Shirley Banks and Muesse were
methamphetamine users with a history of multiple assaults. Based on the
allegations in the anonymous report, Banks’s evasiveness as to where she
lived, and the information provided by ADA Herbrich, Williams and
Herbrich relayed their concerns about R.B.’s safety to Juarez and Matchett.
Juarez then involved Child Protective Services Program Director Dora
Montoya and Fayette County District Attorney Peggy Supak to discuss
whether there were sufficient grounds to remove R.B. if Banks was unable to
identify a Parental Child Safety Placement (PCSP)—a temporary, shortterm placement for R.B. Supak indicated that she believed there were
sufficient grounds to remove R.B.
_____________________
2
For example, Williams spoke to Banks outside a courthouse in La Grange, where
she had been subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury. Banks informed him that she no
longer lived at the Berger Road Home and had moved to Houston with her boyfriend, but
she could not identify the address. Later that day, Banks was arrested for outstanding
warrants and driving without a license, and at that time, told arresting officers she lived in
Giddings, Texas.
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After being unable to locate Banks and R.B. on June 17 and 18,
Herbrich saw R.B. playing in the front yard of the Berger Road Home on
Sunday, June 19. Shirley Banks and Muesse were at the Berger Road Home
with R.B. Banks arrived home shortly after Herbrich called Williams and
local deputies to assist. Banks identified several possible PCSPs, but
Herbrich and Williams rejected each for drug use or criminal history. After
several hours, Herbrich contacted Matchett, who advised that Banks had
been given enough time to find an appropriate PCSP and that R.B. should be
removed. Banks did not consent to DFPS removing R.B., and DFPS did not
get a court order because it was a Sunday.
B
Individually and on behalf of her son, R.B., Banks brought this § 1983
suit against Herbrich, Williams, Juarez, and Matchett, all DFPS employees
(referred to collectively as “DFPS” herein). DFPS moved to dismiss
Banks’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, arguing they were
entitled to qualified immunity.
In its initial ruling on the motion to dismiss, the district court denied
qualified immunity, determining that the allegations in the anonymous
report, denied by Banks, were not specific enough to suggest that R.B.’s
alleged abuse or exposure to drugs were so recent and frequent to rise to the
level of imminent danger. The district court further noted that there was no
evidence that Herbrich and Williams learned any new information or
witnessed any abusive conduct toward R.B.—beyond the allegations in the
anonymous report—particularly on the day of removal. The district court
stated that “[t]o the contrary, Herbrich and Williams found R.B. under the
supervision of his grandmother playing in an age-appropriate manner without
any indication of abuse, an altercation, or illegal drug use.” Accordingly, the
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district court concluded that DFPS had violated Banks’s and R.B.’s
constitutional rights.
Relying on Gates v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory
Services, 537 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2008), the district court further concluded
that at the time of R.B.’s removal, the law was clearly established that it was
a constitutional violation to remove children from their homes without
consent, a court order, or exigent circumstances. The district court also
relied on an “Urgent Legal Advisory” memo (“Gates Memo”) sent to all
DFPS personnel outlining the higher threshold for emergency removals
following the holding in Gates.
DFPS then reurged qualified immunity in their motion for summary
judgment. The district court again determined that the record did not reveal
the kind of urgency or immediacy contemplated by either the Gates opinion
or Gates Memo. Accordingly, the district court denied the motion for
summary judgment and rejected qualified immunity to all named defendants
for the same reasons asserted in its order on the motion to dismiss.
DFPS timely appealed the denial of qualified immunity as to Herbrich,
Williams, and Juarez. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
II
While a denial of summary judgment is not a final judgment, the
Supreme Court has held that it is a collateral order capable of immediate
review when “(1) the defendant is a public official asserting qualified
immunity, and (2) ‘the issue appealed concerned, not which facts the parties
might be able to prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given facts show a
violation of clearly established law.’” Walsh v. Hodge, 975 F.3d 475, 480 (5th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Johnson v. Jones,
515 U.S. 304, 311 (1995)).
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“A denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is
reviewed de novo.” Wallace v. Cnty. of Comal, 400 F.3d 284, 288 (5th Cir.
2005). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “When assessing
an interlocutory appeal for qualified immunity, however, we cannot review a
district court’s conclusions that a genuine issue of fact exists concerning
whether a defendant engaged in certain conduct.” Walsh,
975 F.3d at 481
(citing Kinney v. Weaver,
367 F.3d 337, 346 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). In
other words, “we can review the materiality of any factual disputes, but not
their genuineness.” Wagner v. Bay City,
227 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2000).
This analysis involves two steps: (1) we must determine whether the
plaintiffs suffered a violation of their rights as a matter of law, and then (2) we
must decide whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of
the alleged misconduct. Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir.
2019).
III
Banks alleges that Herbrich and Williams violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. It is well established in this circuit that the Fourth
Amendment regulates social workers’ civil investigations, Roe v. Tex. Dep’t
of Protective & Regul. Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 401 (5th Cir. 2002), and protects
against unreasonable seizures of children from their homes, Wooley v. City of
Baton Rouge,
211 F.3d 913, 925 (5th Cir. 2000). Likewise, we have held that
“[b]ecause a parent’s custody and control of her children is a fundamental
liberty interest, the government may violate substantive due process [under
the Fourteenth Amendment] when it takes away that right.” Romero v.
Brown,
937 F.3d 514, 519 (5th Cir. 2019). “The procedures required for a
constitutional search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment are adequate
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to protect [parents’] procedural due process rights and liberty interest in
directing the upbringing of their children.” Gates, 537 F.3d at 435.
We first address the denial of qualified immunity as to DFPS agents
Herbrich and Williams. We then address whether the district court properly
denied qualified immunity to Juarez, an Investigation Supervisor.
A
The first prong of a qualified immunity analysis asks whether the
plaintiff has suffered a constitutional violation. Walsh, 975 F.3d at 481. The
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that “the government may
not seize a child from his or her parents absent a court order, parental
consent, or exigent circumstances.” Gates,
537 F.3d at 435. “Exigent
circumstances in this context means that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, there is reasonable cause to believe that the child is in
imminent danger of physical or sexual abuse if he remains in his home.”
Id.
at 429. “This is a flexible inquiry that considers all of the facts and
circumstances with no one factor being dispositive.”
Id. In Gates, we
enumerated a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in abuse cases. See
id.
We tailored those factors for cases of neglect in Wernecke v. Garcia,
591 F.3d
386 (2009). Here, we consider the following Wernecke factors:
(1) Available time to obtain a court order;
(2) Risk that a parent might flee with the child;
(3) Availability of less extreme solutions;
(4) Any harm to the child that might arise from his removal;
(5) Nature of the danger facing the child (its severity, duration,
frequency, and imminence);
(6) Strength of the evidence supporting immediate removal; and
(7) Presence or absence of parental supervision.
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Id. at 398. DFPS claims these factors support removal. Banks argues that the
record supports a finding that no exigent circumstances warranted removal.
In applying these factors to R.B.’s removal, we must view the summary
judgment evidence in the light most favorable to Banks, as the non-moving
party. See
id. (citing Kinney,
367 F.3d at 350). The record before us shows no
evidence whatsoever of exigent circumstances.
Consider our approach in Gates. There, we focused on the
information known to defendants at the time they made the decision to
remove the children from the home. 537 F.3d at 429. Applying the abuse
factors, we found that there were allegations of recent (same day) physical
abuse, corroborated by several of the children in the home.
Id. at 430. There
was no evidence that defendants could have gathered all this information
before the courts closed that day, so it was not possible to obtain a court order
in a timely fashion.
Id. Further, defendants considered and ruled out less
drastic options such as having the plaintiff father vacate the house or place
the children with a family friend, but concluded he was unlikely to stay away.
Id. We determined that the defendants did not violate the Fourth
Amendment rights of plaintiffs by seizing the children without a court order
because, though a “close call,” exigent circumstances existed.
Id.
Here, the information known to DFPS at the time of removal—June
19—included anonymous allegations that were uncorroborated and expressly
denied by Banks, unlike the corroborated abuse found in Gates. DFPS claims
that it could not have sought a court order before June 19 because they had
not seriously considered removal until June 17, when Williams and Herbrich
learned some of the “most alarming” information about R.B.’s
circumstances. However, DFPS knew most of the information on June 16,
when Williams first met with Banks. At that time, Banks misrepresented her
address, admitted her family had a history of drug use, and noted that she was
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury about a fight between Shirley and
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Muesse. Thus, according to DFPS’s own timeline of events, they had
relevant information prior to Sunday, June 19, to seek a court order, a less
extreme alternative.
Similarly, in Wernecke, we found a Fourth Amendment violation after
concluding that exigent circumstances to remove the children did not exist:
Although several factors seem to weigh towards the
reasonableness of the removal—(1) business hours were
concluded and obtaining a court order would likely not be
possible in a timely fashion, (2) the risk of flight was high as
Mrs. Wernecke had already absconded with KW, and (3)
[defendant] attempted to institute both a safety plan and a
placement with extended family before placing the boys in
state custody—the sum of the Werneckes’ facts does not
indicate the existence of truly exigent circumstances. The
presence of medications and syringes in the home, in
childproof containers and under parental supervision, does not
rise to the level of exigency. Nor does mere clutter in the
home. In the light most favorable to the Werneckes, a
reasonable person would not believe that an immediate danger
would be posed by JW and JW remaining in the home.
591 F.3d at 399. While drug use and violence in the home are unquestionably
concerning, the evidence here does not establish exigent circumstances
justifying R.B.’s removal. Notably, Banks passed a drug test administered the
day she was located at the courthouse in La Grange. DFPS has put forth no
evidence—or even alleged—that Shirley and Muesse had used
methamphetamines while supervising R.B., simply claiming that their history
of drug use was sufficient. When Williams interviewed Banks, however, she
indicated that the allegations in the anonymous report were false and that she
had no knowledge of anyone doing drugs around R.B. As to physical violence
in the home, even DFPS admits that R.B. exhibited no signs of “physical[]
injur[y].” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Banks, a
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reasonable person would not believe that an immediate danger was posed to
R.B., who was playing in the front yard in an age-appropriate manner under
the supervision of his grandmother when he was removed.
Finally, contrary to DFPS’s assertion, Pate v. Harbers is not analogous
to the instant case. See 667 F. App’x 487, 487 (5th Cir. 2016) (unpublished)
(affirming the district court’s grant of qualified immunity). In Pate, the
district court weighed the Gates and Wernecke factors and concluded that
there was no constitutional violation, as exigent circumstances existed,
particularly where there was “significant evidence” of recent drug
possession and use. Pate v. Harbers,
2015 WL 4911407, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Aug.
17, 2015). Specifically, Pate admitted to using marijuana and subsequently
tested positive for amphetamines.
Id. at *8. At the time of the child’s
removal, the totality of the circumstances warranted a finding of exigent
circumstances. Pate left the child in the care of her boyfriend, who did not
adequately supervise him, and the two-year-old was found by defendants
with a diaper full of urine and pen marks on his body.
Id.
In contrast, Banks denied using drugs and tested negative for any illicit
substances. DFPS does not include any allegation that Banks, Shirley, or
Muesse, who supervised R.B. at various times, were using drugs around R.B.
beyond the refuted allegations in the anonymous report. DFPS characterizes
Banks and her family in the most inflammatory terms to elicit an emotional
response, but there was insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that
R.B.’s life and limb were in imminent danger. “The mere possibility of
danger arising in the future is not enough.” McMurry v. Brunner, No. 21-
50888, 2022 WL 17493708, at *3 (5th Cir. Dec. 7, 2022) (citing Gates,
537
F.3d at 429). Unsuitable as R.B.’s living situation may have been, it did not
constitute exigent circumstances necessitating warrantless removal from his
mother. Thus, the seizure of R.B. by DFPS violated the constitutional rights
of both R.B. and Banks.
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B
The second prong of a qualified immunity analysis asks whether the
right at issue was clearly established at the time of the misconduct. Morrow,
917 F.3d at 874. The focus of this prong “should be on ‘fair warning’:
qualified immunity is unavailable ‘despite notable factual distinctions
between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long
as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue
violated constitutional rights.’” Wernecke,
591 F.3d at 393 (quoting Hope v.
Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002)).
DFPS argues that to overcome qualified immunity, Banks “had to
identify caselaw holding an emergency child removal was unconstitutional
under similar circumstances.” It claims she cannot do so because, although
the Fifth Circuit has previously analyzed qualified immunity in the context
of emergency child removals, “none of these cases dealt with the unique
dangers present to R.B.” DFPS further faults the district court’s qualified
immunity analysis as failing to identify on-point precedent, overemphasizing
internal DFPS policies, and shifting the burden to DFPS to demonstrate that
their conduct was constitutional. We address each argument below.
Our precedent clearly establishes that removal of a child without
parental consent, court order, or exigent circumstances violates the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Gates, 537 F.3d at 438 (“[N]ow that we have
clearly established the law in this area, we expect that [DFPS], law
enforcement agencies, and their agents and employees will abide by these
constitutional rules and seek to involve the state courts, who act as neutral
magistrates in these complicated matters, as early in the process as is
practicable.”); Wernecke,
591 F.3d at 399-401 (“Fifth Circuit law clearly
established in June 2005 that the warrantless seizure of the Wernecke boys—
in the absence of any imminent danger—was a constitutional violation.”);
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Romero, 937 F.3d at 521-22 (“It is thus clearly established that a court order
or exigency is the predeprivation process that is due when social workers
remove a child.”); McMurry,
2022 WL 17493708, at *4 (“Brunner’s actions
violated the parents’ right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, law that was clearly established as Gates placed officials ‘on
notice that they violate procedural due process when they remove children
without a court order or exigent circumstances.’”(citation omitted)). These
cases have clearly established that R.B. and Banks had the right not to have
their child-parent relationship invaded by government actors without court
order, consent, or exigent circumstances.
Contrary to DFPS’s claim, our precedent does not require that the
district court identify caselaw holding that an emergency child removal was
specifically unconstitutional under similar circumstances, nor does it require
a case directly on point. “[I]t is not necessary that ‘the very action in
question has previously been held unlawful.’” Austin v. City of Pasadena,
Tex., 74 F.4th 312, 326 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,
483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “Instead, there can be notable factual distinctions
between the precedents relied on . . . so long as the prior decisions gave
reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional
rights.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly,
this argument lacks merit. 3
Further, “[w]e do not require a case directly on point, but existing
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
_____________________
3
Even if this were required, the Wernecke court specifically found that an
emergency child removal violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, so the district
court did identify a case holding that an emergency child removal was unconstitutional. See
Wernecke, 591 F.3d at 400-01.
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563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). Here, there is no question, based on the ample
precedent before us, that the constitutional rights of a child and his parents
are violated when the government seizes the child absent consent, court
order, and exigent circumstances. Moreover, exigent circumstances have
been clearly defined at least since Gates in 2008 to require imminent danger
of physical or sexual abuse. See Gates,
537 F.3d at 429. That evidence is
entirely absent here.
Turning to the district court’s reliance on the internal policies of
DFPS, specifically the Gates Memo, we find no error. 4 The district court
permissibly consulted the Gates Memo in the context of notice and found
that DFPS’s conduct contradicts it. See, e.g., Hope, 536 at744-45 (finding that
a DOJ report buttressed its conclusion that respondents violated clearly
established law). Under our current caselaw, violations of internal
procedures or policies are insufficient to give rise to constitutional violations.
See Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating
that “even a negligent departure from established police procedure does not
necessarily signal violation of constitutional protections”); Harris v. Payne,
254 F. App’x 410, 416-17 (5th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (per curiam) (finding
no Fourth Amendment violation where, inter alia, defendants’ violation of
internal policies “[did] not transform [plaintiff’s] claim into one of
constitutional dimension”). But when properly supported by precedent,
_____________________
4
The district court referenced the Gates Memo, an internal DFPS document
created in the aftermath of the Gates decision which requires DFPS employees to “obtain
consent or file for a court order prior to removal of the child unless life or limb is in
immediate jeopardy or sexual abuse is about to occur.” It further states that a “neglect
case will rarely support an emergency removal without a court order” and that employees
“must have information that suggests that the child in question is in danger of harm now.”
It lists examples of neglect cases warranting emergency removal, including “an infant at
home alone, a case of medical neglect that has become urgent, or a toddler found wandering
in the street.”
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these internal procedures bolster a finding that defendants had “fair and clear
warning” of the clearly established right at issue. Hope, 536 U.S. at 745-46
(“Even if there might once have been a question regarding the
constitutionality of this practice, the Eleventh Circuit precedent . . . as well
as the DOJ report condemning the practice, put a reasonable officer on
notice. . ..”); Groh v. Ramirez,
540 U.S. 551, 564 (2004) (“In fact, the
guidelines of petitioner’s own department placed him on notice that he might
be liable. . ..”). Thus, the district court properly concluded that the Gates
Memo undercut DFPS’s argument that exigent circumstances existed
warranting removal.
Finally, the district court did not improperly shift the burden onto
DFPS, but appropriately addressed and relied on the correct standard
concerning burdens of proof. DFPS cherry picks one statement made by the
district court, in which it claimed that DFPS failed to offer any authority
supporting the argument that a child’s prior exposure to drugs indicates that
life or limb is in immediate jeopardy, supporting emergency warrantless
removal. But, as Banks correctly argues, the district court was simply
observing that DFPS did not point to any circumstances on June 19 to
remotely suggest that R.B. was in imminent danger.
In sum, relying on our ample precedent outlining the contours of the
constitutional rights at issue, bolstered by DFPS’s own internal memo to its
employees clarifying the higher burden for emergency removals following
Gates, we conclude that DFPS’s conduct violated the clearly established
rights of R.B. and Banks. This precludes the defense of qualified immunity
at the summary judgment stage as to Herbrich and Williams.
C.
Finally, DFPS argues that Linda Juarez, an Investigation Supervisor,
was not meaningfully involved in R.B.’s removal because “she did not
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conduct the investigation into R.B.’s situation, nor did she order his
removal.” Banks argues that the evidence supports that Juarez was directly
involved in the decision to remove R.B.
The district court found that “[a]lthough Juarez was not the ultimate
decisionmaker, it is clear that she was personally involved in the decision to
remove R.B.” It considered her specific involvement, including staffing the
case with Montoya, who decided on removal, and participating in the phone
conference with ADA Supak, who also recommended removal. Therefore,
the district court concluded that “Juarez’s actions were causally connected
to the alleged constitutional violation,” and denied qualified immunity. We
disagree.
“[T]o state a cause of action under section 1983, the plaintiff must
identify defendants who were either personally involved in the constitutional
violation or whose acts are causally connected to the constitutional violations
alleged.” DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Woods
v. Edwards,
51 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)). “A supervisory
official is held to a standard of ‘deliberate indifference,’ which requires proof
that the supervisor ‘disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his
action.’” Evett v. DETNTFF,
330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Southard v. Tex. Bd. of Crim. Just.,
114 F.3d 539, 551 (5th Cir. 1997)).
Juarez is entitled to qualified immunity because, like the supervisor in
Wernecke, she was “neither the ultimate decision maker, nor was she actively
involved in the decision to remove the [child].” See 591 F.3d at 401. Juarez
neither conducted the investigation into R.B. nor ordered his removal; she
even admitted her lack of authority to order R.B.’s removal. She merely
escalated the case to Program Director Montoya and remained on the phone
while Williams contacted ADA Supak. On the date of removal, it was
Matchett, Montoya, and Supak who instructed R.B.’s removal—not Juarez.
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Juarez was, at most, “merely a conduit for information between” the
investigators and the program director. See Wernecke, 591 F.3d at 402.
Though the dissent views Juarez as more than a conduit of information
because she escalated the case to Montoya, the supervisor did the same in
Wernecke and we nonetheless concluded that she was entitled to qualified
immunity. Wernecke is not distinguishable based on the number or type of
depositions in the record. We must instead look to what the available
evidence shows. In Wernecke, the court evaluated the available record
evidence and concluded that it showed that the supervisor was a mere
conduit for information, lacked authority to order removal, and was thus
entitled to qualified immunity. So too here. Even though the quantity of
record evidence describing Juarez’s role in DFPS is greater here than in
Wernecke, it nonetheless shows that Juarez, like the supervisor in Wernecke,
lacked independent authority to order removal and was a conduit of
information between Williams and the program director. Wernecke controls
and Juarez is entitled to qualified immunity.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of
qualified immunity as to Williams and Herbrich and REVERSE the district
court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Juarez.
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No. 23-20107
Jacques L. Wiener, Jr., Circuit Judge, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
I concur in my colleague’s thoughtful qualified immunity analysis and
agree that DFPS’s conduct violated the Plaintiffs–Appellees’ clearly
established rights. However, I would further hold that no DFPS Defendant
is entitled to qualified immunity—including Linda Juarez. I therefore
respectfully dissent from Part III.C of the majority opinion.
I first highlight a few relevant facts. Robin Williams was the DFPS
investigator assigned to the Banks case. Michael Matchett was Williams’s
supervisor, but, because he was new on the job, Investigation Supervisor
Linda Juarez “provided him with assistance and back up as needed.” As
such, Williams went to Juarez with concerns about the Banks family. Juarez
believed that the facts, recounted by Williams, were sufficiently serious as to
require elevation to the Program Director, Defendant Dora Montoya, who
ultimately approved R.B.’s removal. The district court denied wholesale
DFPS’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Juarez was
personally involved in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs’ rights. I would
affirm that wholesale denial of summary judgment.
To state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defendant must
have been either “personally involved in the constitutional violation,” or
their acts “causally connected” to the violation. Magnolia Island Plantation,
L.L.C. v. Whittington,
29 F.4th 246, 251 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Anderson v.
Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist.,
184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999)). “[I]ndividual
liability for a government official who violates constitutional rights . . . turns
on traditional tort principles of ‘but-for’ causation.” Sims v. City of
Madisonville,
894 F.3d 632, 639 (5th Cir. 2018); see also
id. at 641 (focusing on
whether the defendant “set in motion” the violation) (quoting Maestas v.
Segura,
416 F.3d 1182, 1191 (10th Cir. 2005)). The final decisionmaker is not
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Case: 23-20107 Document: 00517020482 Page: 18 Date Filed: 01/03/2024
No. 23-20107
the only defendant who can be held liable in a § 1983 case. Wernecke v. Garcia,
591 F.3d 386, 401 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that a defendant is personally
involved when they are “the ultimate decisionmaker” or is “actively
involved in the decision to remove the [child]”); see also Sims,
894 F.3d at
639, 641 (“[S]omeone who is not a final decision maker and makes a
recommendation that leads to the plaintiff being harmed can be liable . . . .”);
Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
798 F.2d 748, 758 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming a
defendant’s conviction even though “he only had recommending
authority”).
Here, Juarez “set in motion” R.B.’s removal by deciding whether to
“approve the worker’s [i.e., Williams’s] decisions or provide directions on
changing them.” See Sims, 894 F.3d at 641. Had Juarez disagreed with
Williams’s analysis of the Banks case, it never would have been brought to
Montoya, the ultimate decisionmaker, and R.B. would not have been
removed. This is not liability based on bare respondeat superior, see Evett v.
DETNTFF,
330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003), or based on Juarez’s role as a
supervisor, see Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Reg. Servs.,
537 F.3d 404,
436 (5th Cir. 2008). It is instead based on Juarez’s personal decision to
elevate the case to Montoya, which constitutes “an affirmative link between
the incident and some act by the defendant.” Murphy v. Kellar,
950 F.2d 290,
292 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976)).
The majority analogizes to Wernecke v. Garcia, in which we held that
serving as a “conduit for information” was insufficient to establish personal
involvement. 591 F.3d at 402. But the level of discretion and decision-making
power enjoyed by Juarez goes beyond serving as a mere “conduit.” See
id.
Unlike in Wernecke, in which no other record evidence linked the supervisor
to the case, Williams’s deposition describes Juarez’s involvement. See
id. at
401 (“Notably, Mr. Wernecke’s affidavit does not mention Trainer . . . .”);
id. at 402 (emphasizing that Trainer’s own deposition was “the only piece of
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evidence in the record put forth by the Werneckes that contains any
information about her knowledge and involvement”). Finally, as noted in the
majority opinion, DFPS does not contest Matchett’s personal involvement;
however, he did not become involved in the case at all until removal had
already been approved. It is unclear how Matchett—but not Juarez—could
be personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.
Especially given the stage in litigation, I would affirm the district court
in its entirety, including the holding that Juarez was causally connected to the
alleged constitutional deprivation.
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