90 F. Supp. 1012 - In Re Kessler’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Section 302, 11 U.S.C.A. § 702 , incorporates the provisions of Chapters I to VII, inclusive, into Chapter XI, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter XI. Under § 2, sub. a(3) a receiver has been authorized to avoid a transfer made by the bankrupt, Maynor v. Schaefer, 1943, 244 Ala. 111 , 11 So.2d 846 , and to avoid a mortgage invalid as against creditors. McGlue v. Loudon, 1925, 251 Mass. 173 , 146 N.E. 255 . Thus when the bankruptcy court is ‘satisfied that such * * * authorization is necessary to preserve the estate or to prevent loss thereto,’ the receiver may be afforded the remedies of the trustee under § 70, subs, c, e, 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 , subs, c, e. See 4 Collier, Bankruptcy (Moore’s ed. 1942) 1493; cf. Moore v. Bay, 1931, 284 U.S. 4 , 52 S.Ct. 3 , 76 L.Ed. 133 , 76 A.L.R. 1198 . This view as to the scope of powers authorized to be conferred upon receivers finds support in § 23, 11 U.S.C.A. § 46 , providing for jurisdiction of actions by receivers; in § 11, sub. e, 11 U.S. C.A. § 29, sub. e, providing for time limitation on suits by receivers; and in § 48, sub. a(2), 11 U.S.C.A. § 76 , sub. a(2), providing for compensation of receivers preforming other than custodial duties. “The exercise by receivers of the powers authorized in § 2, sub. a(3) of the Act are not inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter XI. Indeed, in Chapter XI proceedings the necessity for arming a receiver with the trustee’s remedies under § 70, subs, c, e, is greate”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re of Valley City Furniture Co.

2. “Now, I conceive that it is the duty of all courts, before taking any action, and the surrender of property is an affirmative step, to ascertain whether that action will respect or violate any individual rights of which it may have become aware. Else its action may result in legal wrongs which if should be its uniform effort to avoid. A court must always award to each his own; “suum cuique tribuere.” Indeed, by virtue of “its possession it has come to be in the position of a plaintiff in interpleader, immune it is true, from legal redress, but not immune from responsibility for acting lawfully, from correctly choosing that person who is entitled to its favor. It cannot so act without making inquiry into the relative rights of the conflicting claimants. The confirmation does not affect the situation at all. The bankrupts are indeed entitled to repossess their own goods, but not the goods of others. How can it be ascertained what were their goods till the claims be heard? The very performance of the court’s duty involves the sifting of claims. It is an inherent condition of the execution of the composition in itself. Nothing of the sort arises as to goods out of its possession, because the court is not called upon to take any action as to these.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Law Research Service, Inc. v. Crook

3. “[T]he bankruptcy court now has jurisdiction after confirmation of an arrangement under the present statute to hear and determine known claims to property remaining in its possession, regardless of whether the confirmed arrangement includes express provision for retention of such jurisdiction pursuant to § 368. Id. at 1015 (citations omitted).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Food Distribution Center v. Food Fair Stores, Inc. (In Re Food Fair, Stores, Inc.)