¶1(dissenting). I must dissent. Due process requires that a person charged with violation of probation must be given sufficient notice to permit adequate preparation for a hearing in a contested case. People v Gulley, 66 Mich App 112; 238 NW2d 421 (1975), Iv den 396 Mich 850 (1976). It is my strong conviction, however, that there is no mandatory due process requirement that a period of time elapse between the service of notice of probation violation and a truly voluntary and knowing plea of guilty to the violation.
¶2In this case, before allowing the defendant to make any statement as to whether she was guilty or not guilty of the violation, the court carefully explained to the defendant that she had a right to be represented by an attorney, that, if she could not afford an attorney, the court would furnish one for her and that she was entitled to a hearing in court on the probation violation charges. The court then asked the defendant if she understood what he was telling her and she responded, "Uh-huh”. To make certain that the defendant understood the court then explained these rights a second time and again asked the defendant if she understood him. The defendant replied, "Yes, I understand.”
¶3The court then asked the defendant if she wanted an attorney and she answered that she did *79not. The court asked if the defendant wanted to have a hearing, and she said, "No”. Finally the court asked, "Are you going to plead to the charges now?” The defendant said, "Yes”, and then entered her plea of guilty.
¶4In People v Rial, 399 Mich 431; 249 NW2d 114 (1976), both defendant Rial and defendant Beene entered pleas of guilty at their initial hearings on the prosecutor’s petitions for revocation of probation. Both had been advised of their right to counsel and to a formal hearing on the charges. In upholding the guilty pleas the Court stated:
"Each defendant was advised by the court that if he wished to contest the alleged violations of his probation, a hearing would be held to determine the truthfulness of the charges, and he would be entitled to counsel at the hearing. Given the limited nature of these hearings, we hold that both defendants were adequately informed of their procedural and constitutional rights.” People v Rial, supra, 436.
¶5In my judgment the defendant in this case clearly understood what the court was telling her and knowingly and voluntarily entered her plea of guilty. I find no violation of defendant’s due process rights in the court’s acceptance of that plea.
¶6I would affirm.