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90 N.C. 171

Lee v. . Knapp

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Decided February 5, 1884

Supreme Court of North Carolina · decided 1884-02-05

<p>Judgment by default and inquiry — Evidence—Goods sold and delivei'ed.</p> <p>Upon an inquiry of damages, in a suit for goods sold and delivered, where judgment was taken by default for want of an answer, evidénce in bar of the action is not competent. The judgment by default admits the cause of action, and the plaintiff is only required, upon the inquiry, to make proof of the delivery of the goods and their value.</p> <p>(Garrard v. Dollar, 4 Jones, 175 ; Swepson v. Surnmey, 64 N. C., 293 ; Darker v. House, 06 N. C., 374, cited and approved).</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1884-02-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently December 1916

4 state decisions

201884189019001910decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Ashe, J.

¶1 The exceptions taken by the defendants to the ruling of His Honor in excluding the evidence offered by them were properly overruled by the court. The defendants proposed to prove that the articles alleged to have been purchased by them were not bought by them, but by one or the other of the two *173 corporations, in one of which the}'- held official positions. The evidence was of such a character that, if the facts proposed to be proved had been set up in an answer filed by them and sustained by proof, it would undoubtedly have defeated the plaintiff’s action.

¶2 And it is settled that on an inquiry of damages upon a judgment by default, nothing that would have amounted to a plea in bar to the cause of action can be given in evidence to reduce the damages (Garrard v. Dollar, 4 Jones, 175), and the reason given for the rule is, that to allow such evidence after a judgment by default on an inquiry of damages, would take the plaintiff by surprise and prevent him from meeting the defendant upon equal terms with respect to the evidence, whereas when such defense is set up in the answer, the plaintiff has notice of the defense and may prepare to meet it.

¶3 The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the goods mentioned therein were bought by the defendants,'and the judgment by default admits all the material allegations properly set forth in the complaint, and of course everything essential to establish the right of the plaintiff to recover. Any testimony therefore tending to prove that no right of action existed against the defendants, or denying the cause of action, is irrelevant and inadmissible on the inquiry of damages. Garrard v. Dollar, supra.

¶4 In this ease the action was in nature of assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, and the specific articles were not set forth in the complaint. The judgment by default admitted the plaintiff had cause of action against the defendants and would have been entitled to nominal damages without any proof; but in seeking substantial damages, he was required to make proof of the delivery of the articles and their value. This the plaintiff did, and there was no competent evidence offered by the defendants to reduce the damages. The evidence offered by them only went to the cause of action, which being admitted by the judgment by default, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of the *174 amount of goods proved to have been delivered. Swepson v. Summey, 64 N. C., 293; Parker v. House, 66 N. C., 374.

¶5 There is no error. The judgment of the superior court is affirmed.

¶6 No error. Affirmed.

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