State v. Goodman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[t]he statute at issue in this case is clearly and plainly written. Removal or confinement is not “unlawful” if it is accomplished with the consent of “a parent.” The statute does not use the term “custodial parent.” The consent of “a parent” is sufficient. The State’s argument that the phrase “responsible for the general supervision of the minor’s or incompetent’s welfare” modifies the words “a parent, guardian or other person” is unpersuasive. Considering the language in context and assuming that the General Assembly used each word in the statute purposely with the intent of conveying a meaning and serving a purpose, we are of the opinion that the phrase upon which the State relies modifies only the words “other person.” This phrase serves to describe persons, in addition to parents and guardians, who may consent to the removal or confinement of a minor or incompetent. Applying the phrase in the manner suggested by the State would render the terms “parent” and “guardian” superfluous and unnecessary. * * * Therefore, we conclude that the defendant is not subject to prosecution for especially aggravated kidnapping under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13 — 305(a)(2). The indictment in this case fails to allege that the defendant removed or confined the minor child by force, threat, or fraud, and the removal or confinement was not accomplished “without the consent of a parent” because the defendant is the minor child’s father.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Cook

2. “legislative intent is to be ascertained primarily from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, without a forced or subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the language. [State v.] Alford, 970 S.W.2d 944, 946 [Tenn. 1998]; Carter [v. State ], 952 S.W.2d [417,] 419 [Tenn. 1997]. Courts are restricted to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used by the legislature in the statute, unless an ambiguity exists which requires further inquiry to ascertain legislative intent. Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tenn.1998). The language employed must be considered in the context of the entire statute, and the component parts of a statute should be construed, if possible, consistently and reasonably. Alford, 970 S.W.2d at 946 ; Wilson [v. Johnson County ], 879 S.W.2d [807,] 809 [Tenn. 1994], Furthermore, we are to assume that the legislature used each word in the statute purposely, and that the use of these words is intended to convey a meaning and serve a purpose. Browder, 975 S.W.2d at 311 . Where the language of the statute is clear and plain and fully expresses the legislature’s intent, resort to auxiliary rules of construction is unnecessary, and we need only enforce the statute. Id.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Osborne

3. “39-13-305. Especially aggravated kidnapping. — (a) Especially aggravated kidnapping is a false imprisonment, as defined in § 39-13-302: (1) Accomplished with a deadly weapon or by display of any article used or fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly weapon; (2) Where the victim was under the age of thirteen (13) at the time of the removal or confinement; (3) Committed to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage; or (4) Where the victim suffers serious bodily injury. (b)(1) Especially aggravated kidnapping is a Class A felony. (2) If the offender voluntarily releases the victim alive or voluntarily provides information leading to the victim’s safe release, such actions shall be considered by the court as a mitigating factor at the time of sentencing.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Cook