State v. Moore’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In the context in which ‘affront’ and ‘alarm’ are used in section 566.095, what is prohibited are sexual requests or solicitations that the defendant knows are likely to cause such a reaction. To be impolite is not enough. To be annoying is insufficient. The words ‘affront or alarm’ convey, respectively, a deliberate offense or a feeling of danger. At the least, real emotional turmoil must result.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Beine · State v. Jeffries

2. “A person commits the crime of sexual misconduct involving a child if the person: (1) Knowingly exposes the person’s genitals to a child less than fourteen years of age in a manner that would cause a reasonable adult to believe that the conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm to a child less than fourteen years of age.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Beine · State v. Jeffries

3. “[T]he plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adju dication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that conduct — even if expressive — falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect — at best a prediction — cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Jeffrey