dissent">LIVINGSTON, Justice,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. While the majority accurately sets forth the standard of review regarding motions to suppress, I disagree with the analysis which leads to the majority’s conclusion that there were “articulable facts ... to create some reasonable inference of criminal conduct” prior to making an investigative stop as required by Viveros v. State, 828 S.W.2d 2, 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) and Williams v. State, 835 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.). While a police officer is permitted to make a temporary investigative detention on less evidence than is required to show probable cause for an arrest, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that some activity out of the ordinary is or has occurred indicating a crime. Stone v. State, 703 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).

The fourteenth court of appeals requires the court to find “the officer, in light of his experience and general knowledge, had specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts would reasonably warrant the investigative stop.” Williams, 835 S.W.2d at 783. As the majority’s opinion in this case explains, “[T]he detaining officer must point to something which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the detainee was engaged in a criminal act.” The officer in this case failed to do so.

Here, there is no testimony by Officer Flores that she had suspicion of a crime or intoxication. She did, however, testify that there was no minimum speed limit posted and that it was not a crime to weave within one’s own lane. On voir dire she states its *348“suspicion for me to stop it.” The only “testimony” regarding the reasonable inference actually drawn from the appellant’s behavior came from the judge who noted that the appellant’s car nearly hit another car after he exited to stop and that his weaving was clearly “an indication that possibly the person is intoxicated.” The trial court incorrectly said the officer concluded appellant was intoxicated.

Reviewing the testimony at trial, Officer Flores simply never stated any conclusion as to what her suspicion might have been. Further, she never gave any testimony indicating upon what experience and general knowledge she could have based such a conclusion.

For these reasons, I would find that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the motion to suppress. I would, therefore, be unable to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or the punishment. Tex. R.App.P. 81(b)(2). I would reverse and remand the case for a new trial.

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