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901 F.2d 772

Docket No. 89-35254.

United States v. Suquamish Indian Tribe

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued and Submitted March 6, 1990.

Decided April 19, 1990.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1990-04-19

6 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“not think of a more comprehensive and complex case than”

quoted by 6 later decisions, including Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Washington, Green v. United States

“A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule.... [I]n actions to be tried without a jury ... a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Asuquo Nkop v. City and County of San Francisco, Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Department of Revenue of State of Washington

Relies on Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn. · Hoptowit v. Ray · United States v. Washington

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by Eugene Allen Wright · Decided 1990-04-19

How this case has been cited

Cited by 51 later decisions — most recently May 2024 · most notably Greene v. United States (1993), Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Department of Revenue of State of Washington (1991)

24 federal appellate · 2 district · 2 state decisions

3301990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*773John Henry Browne, Browne, Ressler & Foster, Seattle, Wash., for plaintiff-appellant (Suquamish Indian Tribe).

¶2Mason D. Morisset, Pirtle, Morisset, Schlosser & Ayer, Seattle, Wash., for Tulal-ip Indian Tribe.

¶3Daniel A. Raas, Bellingham, Wash, for Lummi Indian Tribe.

¶4Gregory M. O’Leary, Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe, Seattle, Wash., for Muckleshoot Tribe.

¶5Edward G. Maloney, Jr., Sedro Woolley, Wash., for Upper Skagit Tribe.

¶6John T. Stahr, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs-appellees.

¶7Before WRIGHT, REINHARDT and O’SCANNLAlN, Circuit Judges.

¶8EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:

¶9The Suquamish Indian Tribe of western Washington seeks an adjudication that it is the successor to the former Duwamish Tribe and entitled to exercise the fishing rights of the Duwamish. The district court denied relief.

¶10BACKGROUND

¶11The Suquamish filed this action as a separate proceeding in a continuing case that relates to the nature and extent of treaty Indian fishing rights in western Washington. See United States v. Washington, 384 F.Supp. 312 (W.D.Wash.1974) (Boldt decision), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.1975). In that decision, the district court held that tribes that signed the Treaty of Point Elliott could exercise their treaty protected fishing rights in “usual and accustomed” places.1384 F.Supp. at 343. The tribes *774were entitled to take up to 50 percent of the harvested fish from runs passing through their off-reservation grounds. Id.The Supreme Court substantially upheld the Boldt decision in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 685, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 3074, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 (1979).

¶12In 1975, the Suquamish, not a party to that case, sought a determination of its usual and accustomed fishing places in western Puget Sound. United States v. Washington, 459 F.Supp. 1020 (W.D.Wash.1978). The district court found that the Suquamish, a party to the Treaty of Point Elliott, held usual and accustomed fishing places in several areas on the west side of Puget Sound. Id. at 1049.

¶13In May 1985, the Suquamish filed this action to determine their usual and accustomed fishing places on the eastern side of Puget Sound. At the time of the Treaty of Point Elliott, they did not fish in those areas, which were the usual and accustomed fishing places of the Duwamish.2 The Suquamish argued that they could assert the fishing rights of the Duwamish because they were the successor in interest to the Duwamish.

¶14The district court in July 1987 referred this question to a special master over the objection of the Suquamish. The court appointed Robert Cooper, a retired magistrate, who had served in other United States v. Washington proceedings. After a two day trial, he filed his report, recommending the Suquamish request be denied. The district court adopted the report, finding that the Suquamish did not have the status of successor in interest.

¶15The Suquamish challenge the court’s ruling on two grounds, contending that the court (1) abused its discretion in referring the matter to a special master under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53; and (2) erred in finding that the Suquamish were not the successors to the Duwamish. The Muckle-shoot, who fish currently in eastern Puget Sound, and the Tulalip, Lummi and Upper Skagit Tribes join in opposing the contentions of the Suquamish.

¶16ANALYSIS

¶17I. Did the District Court Err When it Appointed a Special Master?

¶18A. Appointment

¶19A court may appoint a special master under exceptional conditions. Fed.R. Civ.P. 53(a).3 We review the court’s referral to a special master for abuse of discretion. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1263 (9th Cir.1982).

¶20The Suquamish contend that the order of referral did not show any exceptional condition and that there is none.4 We disagree.

¶21Masters may be appointed to aid a district court in the enforcement of its decree. See, e.g., Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 828 F.2d 536, 543 (9th Cir.1987). This proceeding is part of the district court’s continuing jurisdiction to implement its decree in the Boldt decision under which appointment of *775a master was to be determined as needed. See Washington, 384 F.Supp. at 408. Throughout the long history of this litigation, the district court has referred similar matters to special masters.5See, e.g., United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 841 F.2d 317, 318 (9th Cir.1988) (special master determined that evidence supported the Tulalip claim to expand usual and accustomed fishing grounds); United States v. Washington, 730 F.2d 1314, 1315 (9th Cir.1984); United States v. Washington, 626 F.Supp. 1405, 1487 (W.D.Wash.1985), aff'd, United States v. Skokomish Indian Tribe, 764 F.2d 670 (9th Cir.1985); Washington, 459 F.Supp. at 1041-42, 1068-69. Here, the special master contributed substantia] experience and assistance to the court in fashioning its decree.

¶22Masters may also be appointed because of the complexity of litigation and problems associated with compliance with the district court order. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1263. We cannot think of a more comprehensive and complex case than this. Since 1974, there have been numerous supplemental proceedings with voluminous filings. In the proceedings below, this was one of 14 sub-proceedings and over 11,000 papers had been filed with the district court.6

¶23We hold that there were exceptional conditions to justify the appointment of a special master. There was no abuse of discretion.

¶24B. Compensation

¶25The court determines the compensation of a magistrate. Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(a). The Suquamish Tribe asserts that requiring it to pay for the services of the special master was an abuse of discretion.

¶26We disagree. In Judge Coyle’s Order of February 23, 1989, he divided the special master’s compensation of $1,530 among the five parties, the four tribes, and the United States. Each was to pay a modest $306. Judge Coyle found that the $1,500 request was reasonable, and the Suquamish Tribe did not then object to paying its share. There was no abuse of discretion.7

¶27II. May the Suquamish Assert the Fishing Rights of the Duwamish?

¶28A. Proper Legal Standard

¶29The Suquamish allege that they have the right to fish in areas east of Puget Sound because they are the successor in interest to the Duwamish.8 They bear the burden of demonstrating successorship. See Lummi Indian Tribe, 841 F.2d at 318. We review de novo the question of what legal standard controls.

¶30When a tribe asserts fishing rights reserved to signatory tribes under the Treaty of Point Elliott, our decision in United States v. Washington, 641 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir.1981), provides the appropri*776ate legal standard.9 That a tribe includes descendants of treaty-signatory tribes does not alone allow it the fishing rights of a treaty tribe. Id. at 1370-71. To acquire the rights of a treaty-signatory tribe, a contemporary tribe must obtain “treaty tribe status.” Id.

¶31A tribe establishes treaty tribe status from a tribe that signed the Treaty of Point Elliott by establishing that “ ‘a group of citizens of Indian ancestry is descended from a treaty signatory and has maintained an organized tribal structure.’ ” Id.(quoting United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir.1975)). An organized tribal structure may be preserved “if some defining characteristic of the original tribe persists in an evolving tribal community.” 10Washington, 641 F.2d at 1372-73. Changes in tribal policy and organization attributable to adaptation will not necessarily destroy treaty tribe status. Id. at 1373.

¶32In Washington, we considered whether modern tribes, alleging they were the descendants of signatory tribes, could obtain treaty tribe status. We concluded that they could, if they met the test stated above. When, as here, one signatory tribe claims the rights of a second signatory tribe, we hold that treaty tribe status may also be had. We agree, however, with the district court that an additional requirement must be met to establish treaty tribe status in this instance. The court must:

look to all indicia of tribal relationship to assess whether there has been a consolidation or merger of the tribes, or cohesive bands thereof, sufficient to combine their tribal or political structures, (emphasis added)

¶33Order Adopting Special Master’s Report and Recommendation at 18.

¶34We hold that for a signatory tribe to obtain treaty tribe status from another signatory tribe, it must first show that the two tribes or cohesive bands thereof consolidated or merged and demonstrate also that together they maintain an organized tribal structure.11 If the signatory tribe meets that burden, then it may exercise the treaty rights of both signatory tribes.

¶35The district court properly required the Suquamish to show that the Duwamish had merged or consolidated with them.

¶36B. Factual Findings

¶37The district court’s determination that the Duwamish Tribe had not merged *777with the Suquamish Tribe is a factual matter which we review for clear error. See Washington, 641 F.2d at 1371.

¶38The Suquamish argue that they have presented sufficient evidence to establish that they are the successors in interest to the Duwamish. They presented evidence which, they argued, established that the United States intended to consolidate the two tribes. They relied on (1) a report by George Gibbs that the United States intended originally for the two tribes to be consolidated on the Port Madison Reservation,12 (2) the reference to Chief Seattle as Chief of both the Duwamish and the Suquamish in the Treaty of Point Elliott, and (3) the grant of nine allotments by the United States to Duwamish Indians on the Port Madison Reservation, which was on the west side of Puget Sound.

¶39Despite the Gibbs report, the court found that no evidence showed that the United States ever acted to relocate the Duwamish to Port Madison. It found that the reference to Chief Seattle as Chief of the two tribes did not reflect the political organization of the tribes or that the United States intended to consolidate the two. It found that the grant of allotments to Duwamish persons reflected the government’s willingness to provide allotments to those with some Duwamish blood, but that the Su-quamish presented no evidence that the approval of these allotments reflected a consolidation of the two tribes by the United States or a tribal decision to merge. The court’s findings are not clearly erroneous.

¶40Next, the Suquamish presented evidence that individual Duwamish moved to and settled at the Port Madison Reservation. They had no evidence, however, that a band or group moved there. The court found that those who moved to Port Madison would retain personal rights to return to their natal territory to fish, but that they could not transfer their rights to persons or tribes. See Washington, 641 F.2d at 1373 (fishing rights communal). Thus, it found that the relocation of individual Du-wamish to Port Madison would not have been perceived as a transfer of fishing rights to the Suquamish and that there was no basis to infer from the movement of some Duwamish that consolidation took place. These findings are not clearly erroneous.

¶41Finally, the Suquamish presented evidence that 73.9% of its current members have some Duwamish ancestry. The district court found that it could not infer from this percentage that the two tribes had merged or consolidated. It noted that most Suquamish had only a very small percentage of Duwamish blood, which could easily be attributed to the tendency of the Suquamish to intermarry, and that the compilation did not compare the relative percentage of Duwamish ancestry among other tribes in the region. The district court did not clearly err.

¶42Having reviewed the evidence, the district court found that:

¶431) the Duwamish and Suquamish Tribes were independent tribes when they signed the Point Elliott Treaty;

¶442) the Duwamish objected to being moved from their traditional home east of Puget Sound to the Port Madison Reservation west of it, and that there was animosity between the Suquamish and Duwamish;

¶453) in the years following the Treaty, the Duwamish did not intend to join or unite with the Suquamish and resisted efforts of the United States to unite them;

¶464) the United States continued to deal with the Duwamish as a distinct tribe; and

¶475) the Duwamish did not merge or consolidate with the Suquamish.

¶48Having reviewed the record, we find that these factual findings are supported by Dr. Barbara Lane’s testimony.13 The district *778court did not clearly err when it found that the Suquamish did not merge with the Du-wamish.

¶49CONCLUSION

¶50The district court properly appointed a special master. It applied the correct legal standard in United States v. Washington, 641 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir.1981), to determine if the Suquamish were the successors in interest to the Duwamish. It did not clearly err in finding and concluding that the Su-quamish did not merge with the Duwamish and were not entitled to exercise fishing rights on the east side of Puget Sound.

¶51AFFIRMED.

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