¶1dissenting.
¶2Reaffirming the reasoning in my dissenting opinion in Beasley v. State, 902 S.W.2d 452 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (Maloney, J., dissenting), I dissent. The evidence of gang membership in the instant case fails to meet the standard articulated in United States v. Lemon, 728 F.2d 922, 941 (D.C.Cir.1983), applied by this Court in Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 197-98 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). Evidence of group affiliation may not be admitted at punishment unless the evidence is sufficient to establish that the defendant is a member of the group, the group’s aims are illegal, and the defendant intended to further those illegal aims. Lemon, 723 F.2d at 941. As in Beasley, 902 S.W.2d at 470 (Maloney, J., dissenting), the evidence is insufficient to establish that appellant intended to further the activities of the gang, the third prong of the Lemontest. Officer Furguson testified that he had observed appellant in the company of other known gang members and that he had seen appellant wearing a Canine Posse tee shirt. Plurality opinion at 948. He further testified that the purpose of the Canine Posse is to distribute narcotics; however, appellant took the stand and objected to that characterization of the gang, maintaining that the gang is more like a social club. Notably, no linkage between narcotics distribution and appellant was established; that is, the record is devoid of evidence that appellant engaged in some act that indicated that he intended to further the illegal aims of the gang or that he actually participated in gang-related illegal activities. Absent this connection, the gang membership evidence is of minimal relevance and unfairly prejudicial. See Beasley, 902 S.W.2d 471 (Maloney, J., dissenting).