Criger v. Becton’s Empirical Analysis
902 F.2d 1348 · 1990
Citation profile
25 federal appellate · 6 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 42 later decisions — most recently July 2014 · most notably Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley (1997), Fray v. Omaha World Herald Company (1993)
25 federal appellate · 6 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 4013 · 42 U.S.C. § 4014 · 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Administrative Procedure Act of 1946)
Relies on Udall v. Tallman · Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond · Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital · Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham · Central Intelligence Agency v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“two apparently contradictory lines of decision”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“We are convinced the SFIP liberalization clause was intended merely to give the insured the benefit of favorable changes made by FEMA during the policy term. The clause fosters administrative efficiency by allowing FEMA to give an insured the benefit of an amendment without requiring each SFIP to be rewritten or endorsed every time FEMA makes a change. The liberalization provision does not give retroactive effect to new SFIP terms; rather, it serves as a device for automatically reading into existing policies beneficial changes as soon as FEMA makes them and declares them to be in force.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[W]hen it is the Secretary’s [of Health and Human Services] regulation that we are construing, and when there is no claim in this Court that the regulation violates any constitutional or statutory mandate, we are properly hesitant to substitute an alternative reading for the Secretary’s unless that alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the Secretary’s intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.