Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 902 F.2d 553 - Smith v. Cadagin

Smith v. Cadagin’s Empirical Analysis

902 F.2d 553 · 1990

Citation profile

16
cited by 16 later decisions
1
states following
April 2017
most recently cited

8 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently April 2017

8 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

100199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Doyle v. Ohio · Sumner v. Mata · Jenkins v. Anderson · Sloan v. Hicks

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The Sixth Circuit similarly has made it clear--albeit in a somewhat different situation--that concern with the exploitation of silence is the factor that must govern our application of Doyle.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “'consistently explained Doyle as a case where the Government had induced silence by implicitly assuring the defendant that his silence would not be used against him.' " United States v. Butler, 924 F.2d 1124 , 1129 (D.C.Cir.) (quoting Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 , 607, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 1312, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982) (per curiam)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 205, 116 L.Ed.2d 164 (1991). In Doyle the Court stated 42 while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. 43 426 U.S. at 618, 96 S.Ct. at 2245 (footnote omitted). 44 "Supreme Court cases following Doyle have been careful to apply this constitutional policy concern with precision.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “voluntarily commented upon his participation in the incident and quite gratuitously characterized the event as one that 'got out of hand.' At trial, he returned to the same 'subject matter' ... and used another verbalization to characterize his acts--a 'practical joke.' " Id. at 559. Consequently, "[t]he prosecutor's cross-examination was limited to the defendant's earlier description of the encounter and was not ... an attempt to exploit the defendant's silence--the gravamen of the error condemned in Doyle.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.