Havens v. Hoffman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “are defective in that each fails to state the prevailing standard of care by which to measure the adequacy of the consent obtained, if any. The standard of care must be stated with specificity sufficient to enable the court to determine if appellee properly disclosed the risks and alternatives in conformance with the standard. Hurtt v. Goleburn, 330 A.2d 134 (Del.Supr.1974). Because these supporting affidavits fail in this important respect, appel-lee, as movant, did not meet his initial burden of proving the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. Since appellee failed to properly support his motion for summary judgment, appellant was entitled to rely upon her allegation that she did not receive adequate information to enable her to give an informed consent, and she had no obligation to present any factual support for her allegation. Petersen v. Campbell County Memorial Hospital District, 760 P.2d 992 (Wyo.1988); Metzger [v. Kalke], 709 P.2d 414 [(Wyo.1985) ]; Hurtt, 330 A.2d 124 . Her unrefuted allegation is sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the pleadings of the parties structure a question of fact as to appel-lee's alleged negligent failure to obtain informed consent. Petersen, 760 P.2d 992 ; Metzger, 709 P.2d 414 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bangs v. Schroth

2. ““Wyoming adheres to the majority position, known as the ‘traditional’ or ‘professional’ view, with respect to the required scope of disclosure. This standard provides that the physician is required to disclose only such risks that a reasonable practitioner of like training would have disclosed in the same or similar circumstances. Under this standard, expert testimony is required to establish what a reasonable practitioner would disclose in the same or similar circumstances. “In order to overcome a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff in a medical malpractice ease must also present evidence, usually in the form of expert testimony, indicating the departure by a medical practitioner from a recognized standard of practice was a proximate cause of her injury. A plaintiff establishes proximate cause in an informed consent case by proof that proper disclosure would have resulted in a decision against the proposed treatment or procedure.... “With the foregoing principles in mind, we look to the materials in the record to determine if genuine issues of material fact exist which would preclude the entry of summary judgment.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Weber v. McCoy

3. “8. I confirm the following: That my physician has explained to me the nature, purpose, and possible consequences of the procedure(s) as well as the risks involved, and the possible complications and/or alternative methods of treatment. I understand that the explanation I have received is not exhaustive because of unforeseen circumstances that may arise and I have been advised that a more detailed and complete explanation of the preceding matter will be given to me if I so desire. Upon reading the previous statement, I do not desire such further explanations. Furthermore, I acknowledge that I have received no guarantees or assurances as to the results that may be obtained from the performance of this operation or procedure.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bangs v. Schroth