Halberg v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[The purpose and flagrancy of the initial illegal act, the amount of time between the illegal act and the defendant's subsequent statement, the defendant's physical and mental condition at the time of the subsequent statement, whether the defendant remained in custody or was at liberty during this interval, whether the defendant had the opportunity to contact legal counsel or friends during this interval, whether the subsequent interview took place at a different location, whether the defendant's interrogators were the same officers who committed the prior illegal act, whether the evidence obtained from the prior illegal act affected the defendant's decision to submit to a subsequent interview, whether the police used lies or trickery to influence the defendant's decision, and whether there were other intervening events that affected the defendant's decision.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kalmakoff v. State · Kalmakoff v. State

2. “decision to submit to the second and subsequent interviews was 'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the ... taint' of the Miranda violation at the first interview.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Vent v. State · Kalmakoff v. State

3. “it [would be} error to employ [a] "but for" test to analyze whether Halberg's subsequent statements were the fruit of her first interview. Long before Histad, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected a causation or "but for" test as the method for judging whether a defendant's statement is the result of a prior occurrence. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. [590,] 603, 95 S.Ct. [2254,] 2261[, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)]; Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. [28,] 30, 97 S.Ct. [202,] 208-04[, 50 L.Ed.2d 194 (1976) (per cu-riam )]. The question is not whether the content of the second and subsequent interviews would have been the same if the initial interview had not taken place. Instead, the question is whether Halberg's decision to submit to the second and subsequent interviews was "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the ... taint" of the Miranda violation at the first interview. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 602 , 95 S.Ct. at 2261 . Under this test, we must concentrate on Halberg's consent to participate in the subsequent interviews and decide whether this consent was tainted by the statements she made during the first interview.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kalmakoff v. State