903 So. 2d 1265 - State v. Roe’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

83 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 83 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Finally, we consider the defendant's assertion that the sentencing hearing did not comply with La.Code Crim.P. art. 556.1(A)(1) because the trial court did not inform him that aggravated second degree battery would be designated as a crime of violence, which would mandate that the defendant serve eighty-five percent of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole or good time release under La.R.S. 15:574.4(B). In State v. Herrington, 32,858 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/8/99), 749 So.2d 862 , the second circuit considered a similar argument presented by a defendant who had not been informed that he would have to serve eighty-five percent of his sentence before he could obtain parole following his plea of guilty to aggravated battery. In Herrington , the second circuit stated: In State v. Lewis, 30,536 (La.App.2d Cir.4/8/98), 711 So.2d 383 , the defendant made an argument similar to that raised in the present case. The defendant pled guilty to drug related charges. After the plea, the defendant discovered that he was not eligible for parole under La. R.S. 15:574.4 because he was a third felony offender. He appealed, arguing that his plea was not voluntary because he was not informed of his ineligibility for parole. This court held that the trial court did not have to inform the defendant that he was ineligible for parole because it was not part of the statute under which he pled guilty. In State v. Lewis, supra , this court stated: Defendant was . . . a third-felony offender. LSA-R.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 934 So. 2d 935 - State v. Fontenot

2. “A. (1) Any person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony or adjudicated a delinquent under Title VIII of the Louisiana Children’s Code for the commission of a felony-grade violation of either the Louisiana Controlled Dangerous Substances Law involving the manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or a crime of violence as listed in Paragraph (2) of this Subsection, or who, after having been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States, or any foreign government of a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony, thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state, upon conviction of said felony, shall be punished as follows: [[Image here]] (b) If the third felony is such that upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then: [[Image here]] (ii) If the third felony and the two prior felonies are felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B), a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:540 et seq. when the victim is under the age of eighteen at the time of commission of the offense, or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more, or any other crimes punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more, or any combination of such crimes, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 70 So. 3d 82 - State v. BOURDA

3. “[0]ur review indicates that the record supports the defendant’s assertion that the trial court did not list the elements of the offense at the sentencing hearing. However, as in [State v.] Morrison [, 99-1342 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/00) , 758 So.2d 283 ], our review indicates that the defendant was properly Boykinized, informed of the factual basis for the charge and informed of the possible sentencing exposure. Furthermore, the defendant does not allege on appeal that he did not understand the nature of the charge against him, merely that the district court did not ascertain that he understood. Based on these circumstances, we find the trial court’s failure to list the specific elements of the defendant’s charge to be harmless error.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 4 So. 3d 1011 - State v. Roberts