DeWit v. Firstar Corp.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[The] court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment ... Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) was adopted to clarify a[ ] court’s power to correct its own mistakes in the time period immediately following entry of judgment. Rule 59(e) motions serve a limited function of correcting manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Such motions cannot be used to introduce new evidence, tender new legal theories, or raise arguments which could have been offered or raised prior to entry of judgment.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In Re Tama Beef Packing Inc. · In Re Crystalin, LLC

2. “The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that “[a]n enterprise is particularly likely to be found where ... the enterprise alleged is a legal entity rather than an ‘assoeiational enterprise.’ Legal entities are garden-variety ‘enterprises’ which generally pose no problem of separateness from the predicate acts.” Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1060 (citing case). However where an associatiori-in-fact entity is alleged, the Supreme Court has said that the enterprise may be shown “by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.” Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583 , 101 S.Ct. at 2528 ; Libertad, 53 F.3d at 442 (describing the requirement as alleging facts that, the constituent entities or persons constituted and operated as part of an association-in-fact enterprise); Crowe, 43 F.3d at 205 (citing this standard from Turkette); Aetna Cas. & Surety, 43 F.3d at 1557 (citing the Turk-ette standard); Console, 13 F.3d at 651-52 (citing Turkette); Frank v. D Ambro-se 4 F.3d 1378 , 1386 (6th Cir.1993) (citing Turkette). In other words, [plaintiffs] must show the existence of the enterprise, of which [defendants] were a part. As a matter of law, it is not sufficient -that several organized, ongoing groups come together for one concerted action, unless those groups can also be shown to constitute a larger unit, over and above their separate structures and operations, and that this unit meets the Turkette criteria for a”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 378 F. Supp. 2d 1070 - Schuster v. Anderson

3. “The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals commented on the “dangers of filing a self-styled ‘motion for reconsideration’ that is not described by any particular rule of federal civil procedure,” and identified the usual bases upon which such motions are construed to have been made, in Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161 (8th Cir.1988): Federal courts have construed this type of motion as arising under either Rule 59(e) (motion to alter or amend the judgment) or Rule 60(b) (relief from judgment for mistake or other reason). See Spinar v. South Dakota Bd. of Regents, 796 F.2d 1060 , 1062 (8th Cir.1986). The two rules serve different purposes and produce different consequences, both substantive and procedural. See A.D. Weiss Lithograph Co. v. Illinois Adhesive Prods. Co., 705 F.2d 249, 249-50 (7th Cir.1983) (per curiam). When the moving party fails to specify the rule under which it makes a postjudgment motion, that party leaves the characterization of the motion to the court’s somewhat unenlightened guess, subject to the hazards of the unsuccessful moving party losing the opportunity to present the merits underlying the motion to an appellate court because of delay. Sanders, 862 F.2d at 168 * * ^ * * * The court’s “somewhat unenlightened guess” here is that the motion, filed within ten days after the judgment, was intended to be made pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(e); Sanders, 862 F.2d at 168-69 (distinguishing between of a motion filed within ten days of the judgment, deemed to be ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In Re St. Marie Development Corporation of Montana, Inc.