906 F. Supp. 2d 42 - Lopez v. Miller’s Empirical Analysis
2012
Citation profile
1 district ·
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Schlup v. Delo · Michael Wayne Williams v. John Taylor Warden · House v. Bell · Panetti v. Quarterman
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Pinholster does not preclude a court from relying upon evidence produced at an evidentiary hearing for the purposes of a de novo § 2254(a) determination. Pinholster’s analysis was directed entirely toward the language and context of § 2254(d) and the strangeness of “ask[ing] federal courts to analyze whether a state court’s adjudication resulted in a decision that unreasonably applied federal law to facts not before the state court.” 131 S.Ct. at 1399. Moreover, in rejecting the petitioner’s argument that the Court’s holding rendered § 2254(e)(2) superfluous, the Court noted that “[s]ection 2254(e)(2) continues to have force where § 2254(d)(1) does not bar federal habeas relief.” Id. at 1401. Although the Court raised as example of that “continued force” the situation where a claim was “not adjudicated on the merits in state court,” id. (emphasis added), the same reasoning would logically apply to claims that have been adjudicated on the.merits by the state court but have surpassed § 2254(d), see id. at 1412 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“If the federal habeas court finds that the state-court decision fails (d)’s test ..., then an (e) hearing may be needed.”). After all, although § 2254(d) “focuses on what a state court knew and did,” § 2254(a) does not involve any review of a state court’s conclusions and does not contain “backward-looking language,” • id. at 1398-99; it applies simply because the petitioner is a state prisoner. There is nothing “strange” about relying upon new ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissente.g. Pope v. Crews“Defendant first claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate two prospective alibi witnesses, Lydia Rivera (defendant’s sister-in-law) and Helen Guido (defendant’s mother-in-law). Both Rivera and Guido provided affidavits stating that they were talking to defendant in the early morning hours of August 31, 1989, when the shooting took place, and that they were never contacted by Lupo. Defendant’s claim, however, is undermined because it is directly contradicted by his own and counsel’s statements on the record. After the close of the evidence, defense counsel Lupo placed on the record that defendant had informed him of a single alibi witness. Counsel told the court that he had interviewed the witness at length and that he had advised defendant and his family that it would not be prudent to put that witness on the stand. Counsel asked whether defendant agreed and defendant stated, “Yes, I agree with him.” The court asked defendant to acknowledge whether what his lawyer said was true; defendant replied in the affirmative and confirmed that he was satisfied in not presenting the alibi witness. Now claiming that counsel neglected to investigate two alibi witnesses, defendant nevertheless fails to explain why he would have misled the court into believing that only one alibi witness existed, that defense counsel properly investigated that witness, and that defendant had discussed the matter with counsel. Accordingly, defendant’s new allegations are simply not”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Lopez is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on both his gateway claim of actual innocence and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. With respect to the latter claim, however, Pinholster precludes the court from relying upon evidence produced at the hearing to determine whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d), the state court’s adjudication of Lopez’s ineffective assistance claim involved an unreasonable application of federal law or was based on an unreasonable detexmiination of the facts. But if the court later concludes — based solely on the state court record — that the state court’s decision was unreasonable under § 2254(d), it will consider the evidence generated at the hearing to determine whether Lopez is being held in custody in violation of the United States Constitution, thus entitling him to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a). The court will hold the hearing on Lopez’s claims before it rules on the substance of those claims.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.