Hogan v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “This court follows the United States Supreme Court's two-pronged approach when determining whether witness identifications violate due process. Green v. State , 776 P.2d 754 , 756 (Wyo. 1989) ; Sears v. State , 632 P.2d 946 , 948-49 (Wyo. 1981). First, we determine whether the identification procedures were unnecessarily suggestive, i.e., was the procedure surrounding the identification suggestive and if so were there good reasons why less suggestive procedures were not used. See generally , Wayne R. LaFave and Gerald H. Israel, 1 Criminal Procedure § 7.4(b) at 581 (1984) ( citing Stovall v. Denno , 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967) ). Second, if we determine that the identification procedures were unnecessarily suggestive, we look to the totality of the circumstances to discern whether the unnecessarily suggestive identification was otherwise reliable. Green , 776 P.2d at 756 . In other words we weigh a number of factors against the corrupting influence of the identification procedure. We consider whether time and environmental conditions gave the witness an ample opportunity to view the perpetrator of the crime at the scene. We also examine the degree of the witnesses' attention to the perpetrator at that time, giving due regard to whether the witness was casually or intimately involved in the criminal event, and whether the witness had any special training or experience in making observations or identifications. Next, we analyze the accuracy of any desc”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Majhanovich v. State

2. “(b) Speedy trial. (1) It is the responsibility of the court, counsel and the defendant to insure that the defendant is timely tried. (2) A criminal charge shall be brought to trial within 120 days following arraignment unless continued as provided in this rule. (3) The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for trial: ⅜ ⅜ * (C) Delay granted by the court pursuant to paragraph (4) or (5); [[Image here]] (4) Continuances not to exceed six months from the date of arraignment may be granted by the trial court as follows: (A) On motion of defendant supported by affidavit; or (B) On motion of the attorney for the state or the court if: (i) The defendant expressly consents; (ii) The state’s evidence is unavailable and the prosecution has exercised due diligence; or (in) Required in the due administration of justice and the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced; and (C) If a continuance is proposed by the state or the court, the defendant shall be notified. If the defendant objects, the defendant must show in writing how the delay may prejudice the defense. * * * (6) Any criminal case not tried or continued as. provided in this rule shall be dismissed 120 days after arraignment. [[Image here]] (8) A dismissal for lack of a speedy trial under this rule shall not bar the state from again prosecuting the defendant for the same offense unless the defendant made a written demand for a speedy trial or can demonstrate prejudice from the delay.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Detheridge v. State

3. “Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash.App. 495 , 704 P.2d 1236 (1985).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Vena v. State