Mohamed v. Kerr’s Empirical Analysis
91 F.3d 1124 · 1996
Citation profile
6 federal appellate · 1 district · 5 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently February 2019
6 federal appellate · 1 district · 5 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 636
Relies on Atlantic Coast Line Co v. State of Florida State of Florida · Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks · 30 Ill. 2d 73 - Pocius v. Halvorsen · Mohamed v. Kerr · United States v. Bedford Associates
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“It is a long-standing legal principle that '[a] person who has conferred a benefit upon another in compliance with a judgment ... is entitled to restitution if the judgment is reversed or set aside, unless restitution would be inequitable ....'”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“"[W]here a judgment creditor pays her attorney for legal services rendered from the judgment proceeds, the attorney is under no duty to repay the money if the judgment is subsequently reversed. Restatement of Restitution § 74 cmt. h, illus. 20. Thus, were the proceeds retained by McCullough [the attorney] simply payment for services renderedand therefore, a tangible debt owed to him by Mohamedrequiring repayment would not be appropriate. "The relevant fact that distinguishes this case from the protection normally afforded payments to attorneys, as innocent payees, is the nature of the fee arrangement: a contingent legal fee. In other words, McCullough was to be paid a set percentage of any recovery made on behalf of Mohamed. The contingent fee is dependent on success; the attorney assumes, along with the client, the inherent risks of litigation." (Emphasis added.) 91 F.3d at 1126-27. We agree. We also agree with the Mohamed II court's reliance on the Restatement of Restitution in a contingent fee case. "In this type of case, McCullough's relationship to the litigation's outcome is analogous to that of a real party in interest, and he is similarly under a duty to restore the amount received by him. See Restatement of Restitution § 74 cmt. k." 91 F.3d at 1127. See also Pocius v. Halvorsen, 30 Ill.2d 73, 84-85 , 195 N.E.2d 137 (1963) (a contingent fee must be returned to its source if the litigation is ultimately unsuccessful on appeal).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Although we agree that the law of restitution generally will not require an attorney to repay legal fees paid by a client from a judgment that is subsequently reversed on appeal, restitution by the attorney is appropriate where such a payment is made pursuant to a contingent fee.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.