91 F. Supp. 2d 754 - Johnson v. Guhl’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 8 district · 6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"There can be no doubt but that the statutes and provisions in question, involving the financing of Medicare and Medicaid, are among the most completely impenetrable texts within human experience. Indeed, one approaches them at the level of specificity herein demanded with dread, for not only are they dense reading of the most tortuous kind, but Congress also revisits the area frequently, generously cutting and pruning in the process and making any solid grasp of the matters addressed merely a passing phase," Rehabilitation Ass'n of Virginia v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444 (4th Cir. 1994).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Estate of Gonwa Ex Rel. Gonwa v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Family Services · 726 F. Supp. 2d 480 - Dultz v. Velez

2. “(b) 8. In order for a transfer of assets to be considered to be for the sole benefit of a spouse, disabled child, or disabled individual under the age of 65, for the purposes of this subchapter, the transfer shall have been arranged in such a way that no individual except the spouse, disabled child, or disabled individual under age 65 can, in any way, benefit from the assets transferred either at the time of the transfer, or at any time in the future. For the purpose of this subchapter, the person administering the funds shall only be compensated for the reasonable costs that can be directly attrib utable to the administration of the funds and for compensation for that administration. In no event shall such compensation exceed the amounts allowed by law for the administration of trusts. The transfer of asset penalty exemption for transfers made for the sole benefit of the spouse, disabled child or disabled individual under the age of 65 does not impact the treatment of trust pursuant to NJ.A.C. 10:71-4.11. i. If the transfer instrument provides that there are beneficiaries other than a blind or disabled child, or a disabled individual under the age of 65, the sole benefit requirement shall not have been met if the instrument fails to provide that the State shall be the first remaining beneficiary of residual funds prior to disbursement to any other beneficiary. 1) In determining whether an asset was transferred for the sole benefit of a spouse, child or disabled individual as”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 166 F. Supp. 2d 42 - Johnson v. Guhl

3. “HCFA’s Guidelines and the Streimer letter, although not formal regulations, are entitled to some deference by this Court as long as “they are consistent with the plain language and purposes of the statute and if they are consistent with prior administrative views.” Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 801, 808 (3d Cir.) (granting deference to HCFA and HHS clearly stated views, albeit in policy letters, that states have discretion to employ either income-first or resource-first method to determine Medicaid eligibility), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 870 , 120 S.Ct. 170 , 145 L.Ed.2d 144 (1999) In examining HCFA’s interpretation of the treatment of irrevocable trusts, such as the CSATs at issue here, the Court determines that the agency’s view is based on a permissible construction of the statute ... The MCCA provides that when computing spousal share at the time of institutionalization, a “snapshot” of all of the couple’s countable resources, which includes “the total value of the resources to the extent either the institutionalized spouse or the community spouse has an ownership interest,” is taken. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(l). Under the plain meaning of this section, a CSAT is a resource to the community spouse, and therefore, is part of the total value of resources in determining spousal share. As discussed earlier in this opinion, if the community spouse’s share exceeds the “community spouse resource allowance,” then any excess must be spent down for the care of the institutionalized spouse”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 166 F. Supp. 2d 42 - Johnson v. Guhl