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91 Ill. App. 313

Parker v. Macoy

Appellate Court of Illinois

Decided October 4, 1900

Appellate Court of Illinois · decided 1900-10-04

<p>1. Practice—Setting Aside Judgments at Subsequent Terms—Void Judgments.—The rule that the court is without jurisdiction to set aside a final judgment rendered at a prior term, does not apply to void orders or judgments. ■</p>

Relies on Keeler v. People ex rel. Kern · Peterson v. Metropolitan National Bank · Dunkelmann v. Brunnell

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Reversed and remanded · Decided 1900-10-04

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently May 1973

4 state decisions

2019001910192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Mr. Presiding Justice Adams

¶1deliverer the opinion of the court.

¶2The November term, 1899, of the County Court, commenced November 13tli. The appellant, who was plaintiff in that court, having filed his appearance in the cause October 27, 1899, and the transcript of the proceedings before the justice having been filed November 3, 1899, ten days before the commencement of the term, as required by the statute, the court had jurisdiction of the persons of the parties and the subject-matter, and the judgment dismissing the appeal, etc., was a final judgment, which the court was powerless to set aside at a subsequent term, except, perhaps, for error in fact on motion in the nature of error coram nobis. There was no such motion made, nor does anything appear in the record which would support such motion, if made. January 4, 1900, was a day of the December term of the court. The order reinstating the cause, made at that term, was not appealable, but the appeal from the judgment of February 6,1900, brings the entire record here and presents the question of the validity of the order of January 4, 1900. Dunklemann v. Brunnell, 44 Ill. App. 438.

¶3The order of January 4, 1900, is clearly void, having been made at a term subsequent to that at which final judgment was rendered. Dunklemann v. Brunnell, supra, and cases cited.

¶4That order being void, it follows necessarily that the judgment of February 6, 1900; was also void. The rule that the court is without jurisdiction to set aside a final judgment, rendered at a prior term, does not apply to void orders or judgments. Keeler v. The People, 160 Ill. 179, 182; Peterson v. Metropolitan Bank, 88 Ill. App. 190.

¶5The judgment of February 6, 1900, appealed from, will be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the trial court to vacate and set aside that judgment, and also the order of January 4, 1900, reinstating the cause, and to issue a writ ol procedendo to the justice who rendered the judgment appealed from to the trial court. Reversed and remanded with directions.

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