majority"> Mbrrimon, J.,

after stating the case. It seems that the. court below based its intimation that the plaintiff could not sustain her action upon the ground that the judgment in the action determined in the superior court of Rowan, county, wherein she and the present defendant were plaintiffs, and H. C. Eccles wasdefendant, operates as an estoppel of record upon her as to her present alleged cause of action. • At the argument, we were much inclined to think so, but a *326 careful examination of the record in that action leads us to a different conclusion.

It is true, the action referred to was brought for the purpose of settling the affairs of the partnership as between the several partners. This appears from the allegations and scope of the complaint, and also from the demand therein for judgment, and as well from the motion for the reference and a general account, which the court refused to grant. But the present plaintiff and defendant, both plaintiffs in that action, alleged specially, that the defendant therein, their co-partner, H. C. Eceles, had chiefly managed the business of the partnership, received the receipts and income thereof, and, in some respects, mismanaged its business, whereby it had been endamaged ; and one purpose of the- action was to compel him to account to the plaintiffs in that action specially, as well as the general purpose thereof to compel a general account and settlement inter partes. The record in that action shows, that no reference for an account therein was made; that no account was taken : that there was no accounting or settlement between the plaintiffs themselves; and, it also appears therein that the defendant Eccles alleged in his answer, as matter of de-fence, that there had been a settlement of the partnership affairs before that action was begun, and it further appears that he agreed, as the result of a compromise, to pay the plaintiffs the sum of $255, in order (as he testified in this action) to rid himself of the action and all further liability and annoyance on account of the partnership. He consented that a judgment might be entered against him for that sum in favor of the plaintiffs; such judgment was entered, and thus the action terminated.

Now, it cannot be questioned, that where a matter of litigation between two or more parties has been duly settled by a judgment or decree in an action properly instituted by one of such parties against the' other, that such judgment *327 or decree operates as an estoppel of record upon such parties and their privies, whenever the same matter shall be called in question in any subsequent litigation. As to all material allegations of the record upon which issue has been taken and found, and all matters settled and embraced by the final judgment or decree between the parties to the action, the record is conclusive upon them, according to its legal force and effect, and operates to estop them from again litigating the same fact or matter, so determined. As for example, if a fact be agreed upon by the parties to an action and this be entered of record, or a fact be found by verdict, and the court takes action therein and pronounces judgment or a decree, neither of the parties can ever afterwards deny that fact, so long as the judgment or decree remains unre-versed. The doctrine of estoppel is essential in the administration of justice: without it, there would be no stability in judicial proceedings, no end of litigating the same cause of action, and there would be universal confusion and distrust.

But the judgment or decree, to have such effect, must be direct, and rest upon the precise issues and matters litigated and settled.

If it appear on the face of the record, that the main purpose of the action was not tried or passed upon, and that the judgment does not embrace it in terms or by neeessary implication, as to such matters there can be no estoppel. It is indeed, sometimes vaguely said that a judgment or decree is conclusive of every thing that might have been litigated and settled in the action, but this statement is far too broad, unless it be taken as applying to the particular issue or matter actually litigated and determined, and such matters and things necessarily implied by them. Baird v. Baird, 1 Dev. & Bat., 524 ; Armfield v. Moore, Busb., 157; Temple v. Williams, ante 82; Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. Rep., 606; 2 Smith L. C., 573, (4 Am. Ed.) Big. on Estoppel, 103.

*328 It appears from the record pleaded as an estoppel/ that Eecles gave the plaintiff and defendant in this action (his co-partners) a judgment for $255.00, to relieve and discharge him from all further liability-to account to them as their co-partner, and this was the only matter settled by the judgment, and so to that matter it operates as an estop-pel upon the plaintiff and defendant in this action; but that judgment does not purport to have been a settlement of the rights of the plaintiffs in the action in which it was given, as between themselves. They did not account with each other as partners or otherwise. And it seems that as to themselves, the action was practically abandoned. The judgment therefore does not conclude the plaintiff in favor of the defendant in this action as to the partnership affairs.

The allegations of the complaint are vague and unsatisfactory. They ought to be made with much precision. It may be, as is imperfectly alleged, that the plaintiff and defendant settled the partnership accounts,-as between themselves, except as to the single item mentioned in the complaint; or it may be, that as to this, the plaintiff’s demand is barred by the statute of limitation ; or it may be, that the plaintiff and defendant have not settled the partnership affairs as between themselves, the other partner Eccles having purchased from them his acquittance in that respect. As there was no estoppel, the action ought to have been tried upon its merits, apart from that supposed defence.

There is error.. The judgment of nonsuit must be set aside, the action reinstated, and further proceedings had therein according to law. Let this opinion be certified to the superior court. It is so ordered.

Error. Reversed.

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