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← 91 N.H. 137 - State v. Cox

State v. Cox’s Empirical Analysis

1940

Citation profile

49
cited by 49 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
7
states following
November 2012
most recently cited

6 federal appellate · 34 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 49 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently November 2012 · most notably Cox v. State of New Hampshire (1941), Poulos v. State of New Hampshire (1953)

6 federal appellate · 34 state decisions

21019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Cantwell v. State of Connecticut · Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization · Thornhill v. Alabama · Schneider v. State · Lovell v. City of Griffin

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 49 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““[T]he act is implicit in its requirement that the licensing authority act reasonably in granting or denying licenses, and with reference to the object of public order on the public ways. If it does not in express terms ‘make comfort or convenience in the use of streets * * * the standard of official action’ (Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 516 , 59 S.Ct. 954, 964 , 83 L.Ed. 1423 ), the necessary inference is that it does, based upon the presumption in favor of the validity of legislation as reenforced by the expqress provision of the act bestowing ‘delegated powers’ upon the authority, as a grant intended to be only of due legislative power which may properly be delegated. The discretion thus vested in the authority is limited in its exercise by the bounds of reason, in uniformity of method of treatment upon the facts of each application, free from improper or inappropriate considerations and from unfair discrimination. A systematic, consistent and just order of treatment, with reference to the convenience of public use of the highways is the statutory mandate. The licensing authority has no delegation of power in excess of that which the legislature granting the power has, and the legislature attempted to delegate no power it did not possess.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““The sole charge against appellants was that they were ‘talcing part in a parade or procession’ on public streets without a permit as the statute required. They were not prosecuted for distributing leaflets, or for conveying information by placards or otherwise, or for issuing invitations to a public meeting, or for holding a public meeting, or for maintaining or expressing religious beliefs. Their right to do any one of these things apart from engaging in a ‘parade or procession’ upon a public street is not here involved • and the question of the validity of an ordinance addressed to any other sort of conduct than that complained of is not before us. “There appears to be no ground for challenging the ruling of the state court that appellants were in fact engaged in a parade ’ or procession upon the public streets. As the state court observed: ‘It was a march in formation, and its advertising and informatory purpose did not make it otherwise. * * * It is immaterial that its tactics were few and simple. It is enough that it proceeded in an ordered and close file as a collective body of persons on the city streets’. “If a municipality has authority to control the use of its public streets for parades or processions, as it undoubtedly has, it cannot be denied authority to give consideration, without unfair discrimination, to time, place and manner in relation to the other proper uses of the streets. We find it impossible to say that the limited authority conferred by the licensi”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “Where a statute is fairly susceptible of two interpretations, one rendering it constitutional and one not, that construction will ordinarily be adopted which will uphold its constitutionality. ... While 'words, provisions, or modifications' may not at all events be read into a law to the end that it may be clothed with constitutional validity (State v. Gerry, 68 N.H. 495, 503 , 38 A. 272, 276 , 38 L.R.A. 228 ), yet when the language [ 79 Cal.App.2d Supp. 892 ] used fairly admits of a construction which endows the law with validity, that construction will be adopted in preference to an opposing construction.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.