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← 91 NY 451 - Hynes v. . McDermott

Hynes v. . McDermott’s Empirical Analysis

1883

Citation profile

109
cited by 109 later decisions
24
states following
May 1984
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 101 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 109 later decisions — most recently May 1984 · most notably In Re the Estate of Findlay (1930), Grey v. Heckler (1983)

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 101 state decisions — followed in 24 states

18018831890190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Caujolle v. . Ferrie · Hynes v. . McDermott · Tillman v. Lansing

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 109 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The presumption of marriage, from a cohabitation, apparently matrimonial, is one of the strongest presumptions known to the law. This is especially true in a case involving 'legitimacy. The law presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage; legitimacy, and not bastardy. Where there is enough to create a foundation for the presumption of marriage, it can be repelled only by the most cogent and satisfactory evidence.” Hynes v. McDermott, 91 N. Y. 451 .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““There is nothing to warrant the proposition that the subsequent conduct of the parties shall be rendered ineffectual to prove marriage by reason, of the existence, at a previous period, of some bar to the interchange of consent. It would be very unfortunate if it were so. * * * There is no foundation for the argument that the matrimonial consent must of necessity be referred to the commencement of the cohabitation, nor any warrant for the-appellant’s ingenious argument that, as the consent interchanged must be-referred to some particular period, which he insisted was at the commencement of the cohabitation, and therefore insufficient, the cohabitation, which continued afterwards without interruption, would warrant no other conclusion than that which would be warranted by the consent interchanged at a time when it was insufficient. I should undoubtedly oppose to that another, and, I think, a sounder, rule and principle of law, namely, that you must infer the consent to have been given at the first moment when you find the parties able to enter into the contract The conclusion, therefore, that I derive, and which, unquestionably, is consistent with the language of the cases which have been referred to, is that the consent between these parties was given, and that the marriage, therefore, in theory of law, took place, at the time when, by the death of the first husband, they became competent to enter into the contract.” L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. p. 212.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “"The presumption of law is not lightly to be repelled. It is not to be broken in upon or shaken by a mere, balance of probability. The evidence for the purpose of repelling it must be strong, distinct, satisfactory, and conclusive. ””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.