¶1 The opinion of the Court was -delivered by
¶2 This appeal depends- on: the construction of the following language contained in- a deed of conveyance from Reuben: Clink-scales to his -daughter, Isabella Bssa Clinkscales:- “To'have and to hold, all and singular, the said- -premises 'before mentioned unto the said Isabella Clinkscales and her heirs- forever, free from the control and liability of any husband she may have, reserving 10 myself and my wife, Isabel E. Clinkscales-, -the use and proceeds of all the crops, or income of whatever kind or description- whatsoever, and should I die before my wife, I. E. Clinkscales, them she is -to have the use and possession of the premises -before mentioned for her maintenance and support during her lifetime, and at her death the said Isabel E. Clinkscales is to have, hold and forever thereafter occupy, possess and enjoy all and singular the said premises to1 'her bodily heirs-, -to her and their only proper use, behoof and benefit forever, and should the said Isabel E. Clinkscales- die without bodily heirs, then the- above described premises- is to be divided equally between her brothers and sisters, and should any one or more of her brothers or sisters die -before her death, then the bodily heirs of the deceased brother or brothers or sister shall share the -portion- of the deceased parents.”
¶3 The question is whether, subject to- the reservation of thp use of the l'andi to -the -grantor and his- wife, the daughter, *61 Isabella, took a fee simple absolute, or a fee simple defeasible oo her death without bodily heirs, or a fee conditional.
¶4 We agree with the Circuit Judge that it is settled by authority that Isabella took a fee simple absolute. Edmunds v. Edmunds, 2 Strob. Eq. 101; Allen v. Fogle, 6 Rich. 54; Ex parte Yown, 17 S. C. 536; Glenn v. Jamison, 48 S. C. 316, 26 S. E. 677; Chavis v. Chavis, 57 S. C. 173, 35 S. E. 507.
¶5 It is the judgment of this Court that the judgment of the Circuit be affirmed.